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This dissertation is comprised of three essays on corporate investment.
The first essay, titled “What If the Firm Does Not Diversify? A Self-Selection
Free Bayesian Approach”, takes a comprehensive look at the diversification discount.
By employing a switching regression model with the Bayesian data augmentation
methodology, I compare the actual post-acquisition firm value of diversifying ac-
quirers to the counterfactual alternative which is a non-diversifying acquisition. I
find that there is a considerable amount of acquirers that could improve their value
by diversifying acquisitions more than what they would improve by non-diversifying
acquisitions. When there are negative shocks to the acquirers’ primary industries,
when these industries are concentrated and the firms are not dominant players in
the industries, diversifying acquisitions add values to the firms. The firm-by-firm
analysis shows that on average, no diversification discount exists.
The next two essays study U.S. manufacturing firms’ outsourcing activity, us-
ing a unique dataset of purchase obligations from firm 10-Ks. The second essay
is titled “Outsourcing and Firm Financial Structure”, and the third essay is titled
“Firm Risk Taking versus CEO Diversification: Evidence from Outsourcing Firms”.
In the second essay, I explore the outsourcing decision and its implications
on firm investment and capital structure. I first examine what kinds of firms use
external contracts to provide a product or service as a major input to their produc-
tion. I find that relatively young or large firms with a large number of patents are
more likely to use external purchase contracts. Within high-technology industries,
firms with purchase contracts tend to have higher R&D investment, while in low-
technology industries, firms with purchase contracts are more likely to enter new
markets. Outsourcing activity has important risk and capital structure implications,
as firms that outsource have significantly less leverage. These results are consistent
with outsourcing being used by firms to improve their flexibility. Faced with this
increased firm flexibility and fewer fixed assets to pledge as collateral, outsourcing
firms finance their operations proportionally more with equity.
In the third essay, I examine CEO compensation in outsourcing firms. I find
that the intensity of outsourcing can significantly explain the variations in CEO
compensation; the more the firms do outsourcing, the more they pay to their CEOs.
Outsourcing firms promote managerial risk-taking by using proportionally more
equity-based compensation. However, they also need to compensate additionally
their CEOs for the higher risk exposure to the firms’ increased total risks. I show
that outsourcing firms determine their compensation level and structure based on
this optimal trade-off.
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Chapter 1
What If the Firm Does Not Diversify? A Self-Selection Free
Bayesian Approach
1.1 Introduction
Extensive literature documents on the diversification discount (e.g. Lang &
Stulz 1994; Berger & Ofek 1995). The diversification discount means that a typi-
cally diversified firm that operates in more than one industry is undervalued when
compared with the average value of comparable single-segment firms. However,
other strand of literature on diversification shows that errors in data and econo-
metrics could create a false implication about the discount (e.g. Campa & Kedia
2002; Villalonga 2004), or that the discount itself is a result of value-maximizing
investments of the firms that differ in their managerial and organizational skills (e.g.
Maksimovic & Phillips 2002; Gomes & Livdan 2004). The critical assumption in the
diversification discount is that diversifying firms have sufficiently equal features with
comparable single-segment firms, with the exception of the diversification decision.
However, comparable features between single-segments firms and diversified firms
are limited to the observable data, which are usually accounting data.
In this paper, I take a more comprehensive look at the diversification discount
1
by considering unobservable private information as well as public information. I
analyze whether the diversification that acquires asset portfolios spanning several
industries is value-enhancing, by comparing the actual post-diversification firm value
and the counterfactual alternative. I define the counterfactual choice of a diversify-
ing acquirer as the acquisition of assets in industries where the acquirer has already
been operating. The counterfactual choice could not be no-merger, because the ac-
tions that an acquirer has already taken, such as payment to the target firm and
other costs of acquisitions, are not reversible in the accounting data.
Previous studies have compared diversified firm value (in general, associated
with Tobin’s Q) with the same measure of single-segment firms. However, this
comparison may generate spurious interpretation of the discount, because firms in
those two categories are significantly different in their acquisition styles. The most
commonly used method to reconfigure a firm’s asset portfolio is mergers and acqui-
sitions. Under current M&A accounting principles, the acquirer’s Q mechanically
drops after asset purchases. The purchase accounting requires acquirers to record
the acquired assets in their book as market value, and this makes the market-to-
book ratio of the new addition toward 1.1 Therefore, if the acquirer’s original Tobin’s
Q is greater than 1, it drops even though there is no fundamental value decrease.
Custodio (2009) takes care of the goodwill term in the acquirer’s book that also
creates an incidental drop in the acquirer’s Q. Therefore, in this paper I suggest a
fair comparison between the post-diversification value of each diversifying acquirer
and its own counterfactual alternative, to mitigate the mechanical problems in using
1The detailed derivation about the mechanical drop in Q is shown in Appendix A.1.
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Tobin’s Q.
My sample comprises of 2,826 mergers and acquisitions occurring between
1997 and 2006. I use the Corporate Segment data from Compustat after 1997 when
the segment disclosure requirements were revised. Previous studies have recognized
that the Compustat Industry Segment data might contain self-reporting problems.
However, the disclosure requirements were revised in SFAS 131 in 1997. Most of the
earlier studies recognizing the problems in the Compustat Industry Segment data
cover pre-1997 data. Also, Berger and Hann (2003) show that SFAS 131 increased
the number of reported segments and provided more disaggregated information after
1997. The IBM example in Berger and Hann (2003), which restates from one indus-
try segment before revision to seven operating segments under the new standard,
shows how effectively it works.
I use a two-step conditional event study which is free of self-selection bias.
I first develop a corporate decision model of whether to expand within their own
industries or to new industries. The private information that leads to each decision
is estimated in the model. Including the private information, I next estimate the
firm valuation for each endogenous decision. The firm value of unchosen investment
regime is augmented as a by-product of Bayesian estimation. Then, with this coun-
terfactual data, I compare the corporate values under the two exclusive investment
regimes, to examine whether the acquirers truly reap benefits from the diversifying
acquisitions.
My findings are summarized in two points. First, firms decide to expand their
business to new industries, because it is desirable under the current firm and market
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conditions. The firm-level and the industry-level characteristics such as the firm’s
overall profitability, main segment market share, main industry competitiveness, and
some unknown private conditions make a firm choose to operate in new industries.
Second, I do not find diversification discount when diversifying acquirers are com-
pared with non-diversifying acquirers, and also when the actual post-diversification
value is compared with the counterfactual alternative. In my results, a large number
of firms could actually improve their value by deciding to operate in other indus-
tries additionally. Diversifying acquisitions can add value to the firms, particularly
when the firms are not dominant players in their primary industries, and when their
primary industries are concentrated and especially experience declining demand. I
also find evidence that the value decrease in some diversifying acquirers seem to
be growth-option exercises at their best investment opportunities. These findings
are consistent with implications of the model in Maksimovic and Phillips 2002 that
growth and investment of conglomerate and single-segment firms are related to fun-
damental industry factors and individual segment level productivity.
1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 Switching Regression Model
The following switching regression involves a decision model of investment
regimes and two valuation models. A firm chooses in equation (1) between the two
exclusive investment regimes which are diversifying and non-diversifying acquisi-
tions. By the choice, the firm is valued differently using the model of either (2) or
4
(3).
I∗ = Zγ + η∗ (1.1)
Q∗1 = X1β1 + ε
∗
1, (1.2)
Q∗0 = X0β0 + ε
∗
0 (1.3)
I∗ is a latent variable representing the experienced utility level for the decision
maker of the firm. Z is a set of observed firm characteristics and η∗ is private infor-
mation for the decision maker which is not observed by markets. η∗ follows a normal
distribution, as I assume a probit model for the decision procedure. Although I de-
velop the decision model using a latent variable I∗, the actual data observed is a
binary variable I, which is 1 when I∗ > 0 and 0 otherwise. I define I = 1, when a
firm chooses to diversify. Q∗1 and Q
∗
0 represent the firm value when the firm chooses
its investment regime to expand into a new industry and to expand focused in its
current industries, respectively. After a firm completes its acquisition, the post-
acquisition valuation keeps following either (1.1) or (1.2) for several years, based on
the decision the firm made.
This switching regression model allows the estimates of both regression co-
efficients and intercepts can vary with the two different investment regimes. The
sets of observed firm characteristics, X1 and X0 in (1.2) and (1.3) have the same
dimension and items. The regressors, Z, X1 and X0 are demeaned, as it is assumed
E[Zγ̂] = 0. The error terms in the three models are not independent of each other.
Therefore, usual OLS estimates would be biased from the correlations. Heckman
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(1979) addresses this correlated structure using the inverse Mills ratio. In this pa-
per, I employ the Roy model (Roy 1951) instead, and assume that the error terms
in (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) are distributed as a trivariate normal.
[INSERT FIGURE 1.1 HERE]
Figure 1.1 illustrates the variable structures of the switching regression model.
The variable I∗, Q∗1 and Q
∗
0 include unobserved data. The * is suffixed to the vari-
ables that have unobserved data. Although the decision indicator I is observed, the
latent variable I∗ which is private to the decision maker is not observed. On the
other hand, Q∗1 and Q
∗
0 are partially observed. Let N1 and N0 denote the number
of diversifying firms and non-diversifying firms in the sample. We get N1 actual
observations from the diversifying firms on the change in the firm’s Q between pre-
and post-acquisition, and Q1o in Figure 1.1 represents these N1 observations. How-
ever, we cannot observe what the value would be, if the firm chooses the alternative
investment regime of expanding focused in its own industries at the given year.
Q0m
∗ in Figure 1.1 represents these N1 counterfactual data. Similarly, Q0o is the
N0 observations from the firms who expand focused in their own industries. Q1m
∗
is the corresponding N0 counterfactual data for the firms. The subscript, 1 or 0
represents the decision of diversifying acquisitions, and o or m refers to observed or
missing (unobserved), respectively.
The previous empirical studies about diversification discount only analyze the
difference between the observed variables, which is E[Q1o] − E[Q0o]. However, we
can not conclude by this comparison that diversification destroys firm value. The
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real effect of the diversification decision on the firm value should be determined
by E[Q1o]− E[Q0m∗]. In this paper, the Bayesian data augmentation technique is
used to create the unobserved counterfactual data of Q1m
∗ and Q0m
∗, which are
the shaded areas in Figure 1.1. The detailed methodology about the Bayesian data
augmentation is discussed in the next section.
1.2.2 Bayesian Data Augmentation
The self-selection issue signifies the correlation between error terms, η∗, ε∗1 and
ε∗0 in equation (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3). If valuation is related to the private information
of the decision maker which is not fully observed to the markets, the error terms in
valuation model are not random anymore and correlations between η∗ and ε∗1 or ε
∗
0
would be expected. Let these correlation coefficients ρη1, ρη0 and ρ10.
I impose a constraint that the variance of η∗ should be 1. This constraint
comes from the non-identification problem of a probit model. The probit estimates
of coefficients are not uniquely identified, as the latent variable I∗ which is artificially
augmented during the Bayesian process is scalable unless the sign is not changed.
Therefore, I impose a constraint on the variance of η∗ to be 1 as the maximum
likelihood probit estimation does. The distribution of three error terms, η∗, ε∗1 and






















Following Koop and Poirier (1997) and McCulloch, Polson and Rossi (2000),
I use a Gibbs sampler to get the posterior distributions for estimates, γ, β1 and β0.
The latent data I∗ and the counterfactual data, Q1m
∗ and Q0m
∗ in which we are
more interested are generated as a by-product during this Gibbs sampling process.
The full conditional posterior distributions of γ, β1 and β0 have a Normal-Wishart
form, when their prior distributions are assumed to be normal. That is, γ, β1 and β0
have normal posterior distributions, and the inverse of the covariance matrix, Σ−1
has a Wishart posterior distribution. The constraint I impose on the variance of η∗,
however, makes the generation of a random Wishart matrix complicated, since one
of the matrix elements should be 1 always. I follow the direct simulation method of
a Wishart distribution when there is a normalization constraint by Nobile (2000).

















(i) The posterior of the regression coefficient conditioning on all other data is:
θ | Σ−1, I∗, Q∗1, Q∗0 ∼ N( θ , Ω) (1.5)
where
θ = Ω [ Ω−1θ +W ′( Σ−1 ⊗ IN)Y ] (1.6)
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and
Ω = [ Ω−1 +W ′( Σ−1 ⊗ IN)W ]−1. (1.7)
θ and Ω represent the prior mean and variance of θ, for which I assume non-
informative through the process.
(ii) The posterior of the inverse of the covariance matrix conditioning on all other
data is:
Σ−1 | θ, I∗, Q∗1, Q∗0 ∼ W ( ν , V ) (1.8)
given σ11 = 1 in Σ, that E(Σ
−1) = ν V
−1
. ν and V are defined as
ν = ν +N (1.9)
V = ν V + δ′δ (1.10)
where δ = [ η∗ ε∗1 ε
∗
0 ]
′, and ν and V are the parameters of the prior distribution.
They are also assumed non-informative.
(iii) Under the trivariate normal distribution
[ I∗ Q∗1 Q
∗
0 ]
′ ∼ N3 ( µ , Σ ) (1.11)
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where µ = [ Zγ X1β1 X0β0 ]
′, the posterior distribution of each I∗, Q∗1 and Q
∗
0
conditioning on µ, Σ and the other augmented data is
I∗ | Q∗1, Q∗0, µ,Σ ∼

TN(0,∞) ( µI , ωI ) if I = 1
TN(−∞,0) ( µI , ωI ) if I = 0
(1.12)
Q∗1 | Q∗0, I∗, µ,Σ ∼ N ( µ1 , ω1 ) (1.13)
Q∗0 | I∗, Q∗1, µ,Σ ∼ N ( µ0 , ω0 ). (1.14)
The consecutive Gibb’s draws from (1.5), (1.8), (1.12), (1.13) and (1.14) es-
timate the regression coefficients and fill up the latent/counterfactual data as well.
I refer to Koop (1997) for the theoretical derivation of means (µI , µ1, µ0) and vari-
ances (ωI , ω1, ω0).
2 I iterate the Markov Chain Monte Carlo process 10,000 times,
and discard the first 5,000 iteration as a burn-in sample.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Sample Construction
The acquirer sample comes from the merger and acquisition database in the
Securities Data Company (SDC). The firms in the M&A sample are acquirers in
all U.S. merger and acquisition deals completed between 1997 and 2006. I merge
the sample with the Corporate Segment data and Fundamental Annual data from
Compustat.
2The brief summary of the derivation is shown in Appendix A.2.
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For a given year in my final sample, all firms have no missing assets, sales
and equity data, and no missing yearly stock price and the number of shares out-
standing. I require that the total sales of a firm should be greater than $20m, and
exclude from the final sample the firms whose primary industry is financial services,
regulated utilities, the government, or non-classifiable establishments. In addition,
I exclude a firm’s segments which operate in those 4 categories. If a firm has repeat-
edly acquired other firms or assets during the sample period, I treat each acquisition
as a distinctive event and replicate all data of the repeat acquirer according to the
number of acquisitions during the period.
Lastily, I only include the [-2, 2] firm-year observations relative to the acqui-
sition event.2 I drop acquirers from the sample if they have no accounting data
the one year prior to or after the event, because it is important in this study to
analyze changes in firm value between pre- and post-acquisition. I do not impose
any restriction on non-acquire observations. Table 1.1 shows the composition of my
final sample.
[INSERT TABLE 1.1 HERE]
I particularly study the recent time period from 1997 to 2006, as the revision of
disclosure requirement of the Compustat Industry Segment data (SFAS 131) takes
effect from 1997. Although Compustat tried to backdate this requirement up to
1990, those backdated data are not complete. The Compustat Industry Segment
data may contain multiple segment records for a given fiscal year with different
source years. This is due to the fact that companies can report segment data for
2For a robustness check, I test with the [-1,1] or [-3,3] window, and the results do not change.
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a given year more than once. I use the segment data reported at the same source
year as the given fiscal year. Using the restated segment records at the most recent
source year yields similar results.
1.3.2 Variables of Interests
I classify each acquisition by the new corporate organizational structure that
the acquisition generates. I define an acquisition as a diversifying acquisition and
the acquirer as a diversifier, if the acquirer reports a new industry (a new 4-digit
SIC code) in its segment reporting either at the year of acquisition or in the next
year. Based on this definition, diversifiers are not equivalent to multi-segment firms.
If a multi-segment firm does not enter into a new industry by the given acquisition,
I classify the firm as a non-diversifier at the time of the acquisition. Table 1.2
describes the characteristics of diversifiers versus non-diversifiers.
[INSERT TABLE 1.2 HERE]
I use industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value. Tobin’s Q for
each firm is the ratio of market value to book value of the firm’s assets. Market
value of assets refers to the sum of market value of common equity (the closing price
× the number of shares outstanding), book value of preferred stock, minority inter-
est and debt (long-term debt + current debt). I industry-adjust the actual Tobin’s
Q each year by subtracting the industry median. The results are consistent when
subtracting the market value-weighted industry mean. I define segment industries
based on the segment’s 4 digit SIC code. If a firm is a multi-segment firm operating
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in more than one industry, I industry-adjust its Tobin’s Q by subtracting the seg-
ment asset-weighted sum of each industry median. I winsorize the top and bottom
1% of the distribution for the industry-adjusted Q.
I include other control variables at the firm-, industry-, and macro-level in the
model, such as firm size, age, profitability, investment on capital, R&D and advertis-
ing, leverage, cash reserve, and the number of different industries in which the firm
operates at the given year. I consider the firm’s performance in its primary industry
as well, such as the main segment’s operating margin, sales growth, market share,
and the percentile rank of the firm in that industry. In addition, I include three
variables that capture a firm’s primary industry conditions; the competitiveness of
the industry using the Herfindahl-Hirschman sales index, the industry sales growth,
and the standard deviation of the industry sales (the log of sales) during the three
years prior to the acquisition, which proxies a shock to the industry. I include the
GDP growth, to control for the business cycles in the entire economy.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Existence of Diversification Discount
I begin my analyses by first showing that the diversification discount still
exists in my sample, when I follow the previous empirical methodology as in Lang
and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995). Using the industry-adjusted Tobin’s
Q as a measure of firm excess value, I compare the average value of diversified firms
with that of single segment firms, in Table 1.3. The diversifiers are defined as the
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firms which report that they operate in more that on industry, regardless of whether
they are acquirers at the given year of my sample. Panel A in the table shows that
firm value decreases as the number of segments increases. This confirms the results
of Land and Stulz (1994). In Panel B, the effects of ndiffseg on the firm value in
all specifications are significant and negative. The effect is greater in the acquirer
sample than in the non-acquirer sample. Overall, the diversification discount in the
usual meaning exists in my sample.
[INSERT TABLE 1.3 HERE]
1.4.2 Heckman Two-Stage Approach
The following OLS estimations in (1.15) and (1.16) attempt to examine the
effect of diversification on the changes in firm value. However, η in (1.15) and ε
in (1.16) might be correlated. Thus, the OLS estimates suffer from the omitted
variable bias, which means a disregard of the private information partially revealed
by the firm’s investment decision in this case.
I∗i = Ziγ̂ + ηi (1.15)
∆Qi = α×DIV ERSEi +Xiβ + εi (1.16)
Heckman (1979) corrects this omitted variable bias estimating a two-stage
self-selection model. The two-stage approach introduces a correction term called
the inverse Mill’s ratio λ in order to put into the valuation model the partially
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known private information from the firm’s decision model.
∆Qi = α×DIV ERSEi +Xiβ + π λi + εi (1.17)
, where λ = λ1 DIV ERSE + λ2(1 − DIV ERSE), λ1(Zγ) = φ(Zγ)Φ(Zγ) and λ0(Zγ) =
− φ(Zγ)
1−Φ(Zγ) .
Table 1.4 reports the OLS estimates for the diversification discount. Panel
A of the table reports firm value for the separate samples of non-diversifiers and
diversifiers. The dummy variable, ACQ represents the state whether it is before
or after the acquisition event. Panel B examines the diversification discount in the
first difference of firm value between pre- and post-acquisition. The dummy vari-
able DIVERSE indicates whether the acquisition is a diversifying acquisition. It
shows that acquisition discount exists in both diversifier and non-diversifier sam-
ples. It appears that the acquisition discount is slightly greater in the diversifier
sample than in the non-diversifier sample (-0.172 versus -0.210). However, Panel B
shows that the dummy variable of whether the firms is a diversifying acquirer or
non-diversifying acquirer has no large effect on the firm value. The effect disappears
for industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, while it still exists for unadjusted Tobin’s Q.
Table 1.5 report the first- and the second-stage regression estimates of the
Heckman (1979) self-selection model. In the second-stage, I find that λ is signifi-
cantly negative, and thus the correlation between η in (1.15) and ε in (1.16) (Rho)
is surely non-zero. This negative correlation implies that markets react negative
to the news of diversification. It is possibly because markets may question about
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the firm’s performance in the primary industry, when the firm announces that it
intends to start a business in the new industry. The effect of diversification on the
firm value turns out to be significantly positive, after controlling for the revealed
private information using λ in the second-stage regression results.
[INSERT TABLE 1.4 AND 1.5 HERE]
Li and Prabhala (2006) note that near-multicollinearity could arise in the
Heckman model, when the extra variable in Z are weak and have limited explanatory
power. It is because λ is roughly linear in parts of its domain, while it is a nonlinear
function. The exclusion restriction, which needs strong instruments in Z is required
to generate credible estimates free from self-selection bias. The Bayesian switching
regression model has the several advantages over the Heckman’s two-stage approach
in this sense. The firm-by-firm comparison between the actual post-diversification
firm value and the counterfactual alternative provides a more direct examination
how diversification affects firm value.
1.4.3 Bayesian Inferences and Diversification Effect
The posterior distributions of the regression coefficients in the Bayesian switch-
ing model, (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) are reported in Table 1.6. As I use non-informative
priors, the posterior results involve only actual data information and have a close
relationship with OLS outcomes. I present the 95% Highest Posterior Density In-
terval which is similar to the confidence interval in frequentist econometrics. The
estimated covariance matrix of the trivariate normal distribution shows how the
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investment decisions to expand into new industries are correlated with the market
valuation. The correlations between the errors of equation (1.1) and (1.1) or be-
tween the errors of (1.1) and (1.3) (ρη1 or ρη0) can be interpreted as how much the
decision maker’s private information is partially revealed and incorporated in the
market valuation. ρη1 and ρη0 are estimated as negative, and those are significant at
the 95% of credibility level. This negative correlation is consistent with the previous
results of the Heckman’s two-stage model.
[INSERT TABLE 1.6 HERE]
The main objective of this paper is to examine the effect of diversification on
firm value controlling for the self-selection of diversifying firms. In this section, I
present the direct comparison between the observed diversification outcome and the
counterfactual outcome augmented by the above Bayesian inferences. In Figure 1.2,
Panel 0 shows that the mean distributions of 5,000 iterations of ∆Q1m
∗−∆Q0o for
non-diversifying firms. Panel 1 shows that the mean distribution ∆Q1o − ∆Q0m∗
for diversifying firms. From Panel 1, I find that diversifying acquisitions were, on
average, desirable value-enhancing decisions. Furthermore, Panel 0 provides evi-
dence that many non-diversifying acquirers missed profitable investment opportu-
nities that they could have enjoyed if they chose the alternative investment regime.
[INSERT FIGURE 1.2 HERE]
One of the benefits that the Bayesian switching regression model provides is
that it is able to determine whether each diversifying acquisition was truly value-
enhancing or not. Panel 1 in Figure 1.2 shows that there still exists a large number
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of value-decreasing acquisitions in the diversifier sample (∆Q1o−∆Q0m∗ < 0), even
though the average of ∆Q1o − ∆Q0m∗ is greater than zero. Thus, separating the
diversifier sample into two subsamples with value-enhancing and value-decreasing
diversifications will provide more valuable intuitions about the diversification deci-
sions than the do propensities in a probit model. Table 1.7 summarizes differences
in firm characteristics and industry conditions between value-enhancing and value-
decreasing diversifications. I find that the non-dominant players in their primary
industries (when the industries are concentrated by other dominant players) are
more likely to improve their value by expanding to new industries. Also, the pri-
mary industries of the value-improving diversifiers are more likely to experience
declining demand. The firms that improve their value by the diversifications tend
to have lower leverage and invest less in R&D.
[INSERT TABLE 1.7 HERE]
Moreover, Table 1.7 shows that the pre-acquisition Q and performance mea-
sures (opmarg and mainseg opmarg) are significantly higher in the firms with a
decrease in their value after the diversifications. This finding suggests that the
firms may exercise their growth-options at the best investment opportunities, and
thus optimally lower their Qs. Also, the percentage of stock used in the method
of payment is significantly higher for the value-decreasing diversifications. This is
consistent with the literature on market valuation and mergers (e.g. Maksimovic &
Phillips 2001; Jovanovic & Rousseau 2001) in that high market valuation seems to
be correlated with high acquisition activity.
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Overall, my results find that there exist no diversification discount, on aver-
age, and the decrease in Q for some diversifying acquirers is consistent with optimal
growth options exercises.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the diversification discount in a more comprehensive
way. Due to the spurious mechanical drop in the acquirer’s Q caused by current
accounting procedures, it is unfair to compare the value of diversified firms with
that of comparable single-segment firms. Thus, I suggest a fair comparison between
the actual post-diversification value and the counterfactual alternative, and show
that there is no evidence that diversifying acquisitions destroy firm value.
From the Bayesian switching regression model which is free of self-selection
bias, I find that the private information of decision makers is partially revealed
to the markets and affects the valuation of the acquirers. While markets react
negatively to the news of a firm’s diversification, the actual effect of diversification
on the firm value is positive when I control for the private information of decision
makers. By comparing each firm value after the diversification to its counterfactual
alternative, I find that the diversifying acquisitions are desirable for the firms that
are not dominant players in their primary industries, particularly when the primary
industries are concentrated and experience negative shocks.
Finally, I find that the firms with a value decrease after the diversification are
more likely to have higher pre-acquisition Qs and better operating performance than
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the firms with a value increase. These results suggest that those firms exercise their




A.1 Mechanical Drops in Acquirer’s Q
Under the current M&A accounting procedures, the acquirer’s Q mechanically
drops after M&A. The above figure shows a general case of accounting books for
an acquirer and a target. BA, BD and BE represent book value of assets, debt
and equity, respectively. And MA, MD and ME represent market value. I assume
market value of debt equals book value of debt.








Let’s suppose that Acquirer buys Target by paying a premium p on top of Target’s
market value. (p ≥ 0) Then, post-acquisition Q of Acquirer (or combined firm’s Q)
is computed as below according to what payment method is used.
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(i) If the payment method is solely Acquirer’s stock:
Qa+t =
MAa +MAt
BAa + (MAt + p)
=
MAa + (MDt +MEt)
BAa + ((MDt +MEt) + p)
(A.2)
(ii) If the payment method is solely cash and Acquirer finance the acquisition by
using x cash reserve and issuing (1− x) debt:
Qa+t =
MAa +MAt −
cash payment︷ ︸︸ ︷
(MEt + p) +
debt issue︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− x)(MEt + p)
BAa + (MAt + p)− (MEt + p) + (1− x)(MEt + p)
=
MAa +MAt − x(MEt + p)
BAa + (MAt + p)− x(MEt + p)
(A.3)
When x = 1 and p = 0, i.e. , when the acquisition is financed by 100% cash from








In equation (A.2) and (A.3), the additional terms appended in the denominator after
acquisition is always greater than or equal to those in the numerator. Therefore, if
the pre-acquisition Tobin’s Q of Acquirer was originally greater than 1, the post-
acquisition Tobin’s Q results in the smaller number than pre-acquisition Q.
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A.2 Trivariate Normal Distribution
The means and variances, (µI , µ1, µ0) and (ωI , ω1, ω0) of the conditional dis-
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Proof.
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Thrm 1. Suppose Y has a N3(µ,Σ) distribution, which is partitioned as Y =
[ Y ′a Y
′
b ]
′, where Ya and Yb are of dimension 1 and 2, respectively. In the same
way, partition the mean and covariance of Y; that is, µ = [ µ′a µ
′
b ]
′ and Σ = Σaa Σab
Σba Σbb
. Assume that Σ is positive definite.
Then, the conditional distribution of Ya|Yb is
N1 ( µa + ΣabΣ
−1




Let Ya = Q
∗





′, or Ya = Q
∗






Q∗1 | Q∗0, I∗, µ,Σ ∼ N ( µ1 , ω1 )
Q∗0 | I∗, Q∗1, µ,Σ ∼ N ( µ0 , ω0 ),
where (A.6)-(A.9) hold by Thrm1.
When Ya = I
∗






I∗ | Q∗1, Q∗0, µ,Σ ∼

TN(0,∞) ( µI , ωI ) if I = 1
TN(−∞,0) ( µI , ωI ) if I = 0
1The proof of Thrm 1 refers to Theorem 3.5.3 in the page 175 of Hogg, McKean and Craig
2005.
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where (A.4) and (A.5) hold. It is because the sign of I∗i is constrained by Ii as
I∗i =

≥ 0 if Ii = 1
< 0 if Ii = 0
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A.3 Variable Definitions
• ACQ is one, if the firm year is after the acquisition.
• DIVERSE is a firm-level variable which equals one if the firm is a diversifying
acquirer.
• log(asset) is the log of total assets.
• log(sales) is the log of sales.
• age is firm age, defined as a given year minus the year when the firm first
appeared in Compustat.
• ebit/sales is earnings before interest and taxes, divided by sales.
• opmarg is operating income before depreciation scaled by sales.
• mainseg opmarg is the main segment’s operating income before depreciation
scaled by sales.
• ROA is net operating income divided by total assets in the prior year.
• Tobin Q is Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is market value of assets divided by book
value of assets. Market value of assets is market value of common equity plus
book value of preferred stock plus debt (long-term debt + debt in current
liabilities) plus book value of minority interest.
• ∆ind Q the difference between industry Tobin’s Q and the value in the prior
year. Industry Tobin’s Q is the median of firm Tobin’s Q in the 4-digit SIC
code industry.
• cash/assets is cash and short-term investments, divided by assets.
• capx/assets is capital expenditures divided by total assets in the prior year.
• rnd/assets is R&D expenditures divided by total assets in the prior year.
• adv/assets is advertising expenditures divided by total assets in the prior year.
• sales growth is the percentage growth in sales in a given year.
• disappear is a dummy variable that equals to one if a firms in the sample
disappears later during the sample period.
• leverage is the ratio of total debt to the book value of assets.
• stnet debt is short-term net debt that equals to current debt minus cash divided
total assets.
• nseg is the total count of a firm’s operating segments.
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• ndiffseg is the total count of a firm’s operating segments, which appear in
different industries at the four-digit SIC code level.
• mainseg indrank is a firm’s percentile rank of sales of its main industry seg-
ment. The smaller the variable, the greater its sales in the main industry.
• mainseg mshare is a firms’ market share in its main industry.
• mainseg sales growth is the percentage growth in sales of a firm’s main industry
segment in a given year.
• mainind HHI is a measure of a firm’s main industry competitiveness, which
the Herfindahl index on sales using firms in Compustat.
• mainind sales growth is the percentage growth in total industry sales of a
firm’s main industry in a given year.
• sd(mainind sales) is the standard deviation of the log of sales during the prior
three years in a firm’s primary industry
• GDP growth is the percentage growth in GDP in a given year.
• % stock used is the percentage of stock used in the method of payment.
• stock deal is one, if the deal uses stock payment more than 50%.
• ∆goodwill/asset is the difference in goodwill between one year after and before
the acquisition, adjusted by the pre-acquisition assets.
• ind-adj represents the subtraction by the 4-digit SIC industry median of the
variable.
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Figure 1.1: The Variable Structures in Bayesian Switching Regression Model
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Figure 1.2: The Mean Distributions of ∆Tobin Q1 - ∆Tobin Q0
The figure shows the mean distribution of 5,000 Bayesian iterations of ∆Tobin Q1 (ind-adj) - ∆Tobin Q0
(ind-adj) for all 2,584 firms. The number of diversifiers (DIV ERSE = 1) is 331, and the number of non-diversifier
(DIV ERSE = 0) is 2,495. It examines if firms could improve their value by diversifying into new industries through
acquisitions. For DIV ERSE = 1, the Bayesian augmented data is ∆Tobin Q0 (ind-adj), while ∆Tobin Q1 (ind-adj)
for DIV ERSE = 0.
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Table 1.1: Number of M&A Deals
The table describes the composition of my final sample over the period, 1997-2006. The merger and acquisition
data are obtained from the SDC platinum M&A database. All M&A deals in the sample have U.S acquirers and
targets and the completion years between 1997 and 2006. I require acquirers should have both -1 and + 1 relative
year accounting data to the acquisition year. I classify each acquirer either the diversifier or non-diversifier based
on whether the firm reports a new 4-digit SIC code for its operating segments in the Compustat Industry Segment
reporting database at the year of the acquisition or within one year after the acquisition.
Total number of Deals in Final Sample
Year Non-diversifier Diversifier Total
1997 294 94 387
1998 265 76 341
1999 263 51 314
2000 264 18 282
2001 226 15 241
2002 256 16 272
2003 241 17 257
2004 229 22 251
2005 204 11 215
2006 253 11 263
Total 2495 331 2826
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Table 1.2: The Characteristics of Diversifier
Table 2 reports different characteristics between Diversifier and Non-diversifier. Operating margin(opmarg), main segment operating margin(mainseg opmarg) and Tobin’s Q
are industry adjusted as well as winsorized. The industry-adjusted variable is the actual value minus the median value of all single segment firms having the same 4 digit SIC
code. If the firm is a multi-segment firm, the industry value is computed as the segment asset-weighted sum of all industry medians of its multiple segments. Variable definitions
are in Appendix.
Diversifier Non-diversifier Difference
variable mean median sd min max mean median sd min max mean diff t-stat
log(asset) 6.2 6.01 2.07 1.92 12.5 6.01 5.91 1.78 1.02 12.1 0.182 (1.71)
age 15.2 11 12.8 0 42 11.8 8 11.1 0 43 3.347*** (5.06)
opmarg (ind-adj) 0.0652 0.0414 0.147 -0.428 0.529 0.0849 0.051 0.168 -0.567 0.567 -0.0197* (-2.03)
mainseg opmarg (ind-adj) 0.066 0.0437 0.148 -0.418 0.532 0.0865 0.0515 0.168 -0.578 0.578 -0.0205* (-2.11)
Tobin Q (ind-adj) 0.21 0.167 1.09 -3.56 3.68 0.323 0.171 1.18 -3.75 3.8 -0.113 (-1.65)
cash/asset 0.106 0.053 0.133 0 0.763 0.14 0.0879 0.15 0 0.886 -0.0340*** (-3.92)
capx/asset 0.0594 0.0449 0.0704 0.00118 0.78 0.0622 0.0375 0.0745 0 0.615 -0.00287 (-0.66)
rnd/asset 0.0327 0.00833 0.053 0 0.266 0.0575 0.0195 0.0881 0 0.88 -0.0248*** (-5.00)
adv/asset 0.00669 0 0.0603 0 1.08 0.00932 0 0.031 0 0.574 -0.00263 (-1.26)
disappear 0.36 0 0.481 0 1 0.255 0 0.436 0 1 0.104*** (4.03)
leverage 0.205 0.195 0.173 0 0.737 0.171 0.125 0.173 0 0.872 0.0339*** (3.35)
stnet debt -0.0655 -0.0269 0.157 -0.763 0.425 -0.11 -0.0697 0.173 -0.886 0.442 0.0441*** (4.40)
nseg 1.94 1 1.22 1 7 1.5 1 1 1 9 0.433*** (7.18)
ndiffseg 1.67 1 0.989 1 6 1.34 1 0.776 1 6 0.326*** (6.93)
mainseg indrank 0.319 0.273 0.24 0.0082 1 0.304 0.25 0.221 0.00319 1 0.0155 (1.18)
mainseg mshare 0.0803 0.0213 0.135 0.0000371 0.785 0.0634 0.0107 0.133 0.000001 0.993 0.0169* (2.17)
mainseg sales growth 0.321 0.16 1.4 -0.927 24.3 0.329 0.163 0.959 -0.97 23.4 -0.00772 (-0.13)
mainind HHI 0.192 0.158 0.146 0.0211 0.977 0.162 0.127 0.139 0.0169 0.985 0.0302*** (3.68)
mainind sales growth 1.7 0.0774 10.2 -0.98 95.1 0.492 0.069 3.41 -0.989 95.1 1.206*** (4.35)
SD(mainind sales) 0.444 0.212 0.588 0.000213 3.9 0.39 0.246 0.427 0.0000658 3.57 0.0538* (2.05)
GDP growth 3.68 3.75 0.995 0.759 4.55 3.25 3.69 1.2 0.759 4.55 0.426*** (6.17)
N 331 2495 2826
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Table 1.3: Existence of Diversification Discount
Panel A reports the mean discounts of diversified firms. I compare the average industry-adjusted Tobin’s Qs between
single segment firms and multi-segment firms. This confirms the result of diversification discount of Lang and Stulz
(1994). Panel B shows the effect of the segment numbers on firm value over the sample period 1997-2006. ndiffseg
represents the total number of different industries that a firm operates in (4-digit SIC code). Variable definitions
are in Appendix.
PANEL A
Number of segment 1 seg 2 seg 3 seg 4 seg 5 seg
Mean Tobin Q (ind-adj) 0.194 0.009 -0.057 -0.045 -0.166
N 20508 3366 1458 471 220
Mean Difference (between 1 & n seg) - 0.185 0.250 0.239 0.359
t-stat - (9.28) (8.67) (4.80) (4.95)
PANEL B
Dependent variable: Tobin Q (ind-adj)
(1) Whole sample (2) Non-acquirers (3) Acquirers
ndiffseg -0.110*** -0.077*** -0.121***
(-13.96) (-5.01) (-12.93)
log(asset) 0.069*** 0.024*** 0.085***
(18.41) (5.11) (15.96)
ebit/sales -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000***
(-3.83) (-8.46) (-12.33)
capx/asset 1.259*** 1.260*** 1.441***
(17.47) (13.12) (13.50)
cash/asset 0.996*** 0.724*** 1.223***
(17.33) (9.13) (15.36)
leverage -0.698*** -0.385*** -0.833***
(-19.21) (-8.08) (-16.82)
sales growth 0.008** 0.005*** 0.026
(2.85) (3.94) (1.63)
mainind sales growth -0.002 -0.000 -0.003
(-1.50) (-0.24) (-1.63)
GDP growth 0.017** 0.011 0.017*
(3.18) (1.52) (2.36)
N 26099 9210 16889
R2-adj 0.056 0.046 0.066
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Table 1.4: OLS estimates of Diversification Discount
Panel A reports the effect of acquisitions on the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q for the separate sample of Non-
diversifier and Diversifier. I classify each acquirer in the sample either as a non-diversifier or a diversifier based
on the new segment’s 4-digit SIC code. If the firm reports a new SIC code in the Compustat industry segment
reporting, it is regarded as a diversifier. The variable ACQ represents the state whether it is before or after the
acquisition. All firm years are in the relative event window of [-2 year, +2 year] centering the acquisition year.
Variable definitions are in Appendix.
PANEL A
Dependent variable: Tobin Q (ind-adj)













sales growth 0.026 0.060
(1.55) (1.68)
mainind sales growth -0.005 0.001
(-1.80) (0.38)





Panel B reports the effect of diversification on the change in firm value. The variable DIVERSE is a dummy variable
indicating whether the acquirer is a diversifier. The change in firm value(∆Tobin Q (ind-adj) or ∆Tobin Q) is the
actual firm value one year after the acquisition minus the actual firm value one year before the acquisition.
PANEL B











sales growth 0.252*** 0.314***
(4.80) (4.71)
mainind sales growth -0.001 0.022*
(-0.10) (2.38)
GDP growth -0.052** 0.087***
(-2.91) (5.83)
Tobin Q (ind-adj, lagged) -0.563***
(-28.62)







Table 1.5: Two-Stage Heckman Estimates
Model (1) is a two-step consistent estimator, and (2) and (3) are full maximum likelihood estimators. The dependent
variable DIVERSE is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a diversifier. All regressors in the first-stage
estimation are one year lagged from the acquisition event. Variable definitions are in Appendix.
FIRST STAGE DIVERSE
(1) TWO-STEP (2) MLE (3) MLE
age 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.007***
(4.00) (3.53) (3.36)
cash/ asset -0.304 -0.852** -0.776***
(-1.18) (-3.13) (-3.35)
leverage 0.323 0.374* 0.551***
(1.65) (2.04) (3.38)
mainseg opmarg (ind-adj) -0.294 -0.261 0.124
(-1.37) (-1.30) (0.65)
Tobin Q (ind-adj) -0.001 -0.003 -0.133***
(-0.03) (-0.10) (-4.66)
mainseg sales growth 0.003 -0.001 -0.014
(0.11) (-0.03) (-0.44)
mainseg indrank 0.120 0.139 0.086
(0.82) (0.96) (0.67)
mainind HHI 0.702** 0.557** 0.565**
(3.20) (2.64) (3.21)
mainind sales growth 0.015** 0.005 0.002
(2.59) (0.78) (0.53)
SD(mainind sales) 0.024 0.034 0.014
(0.32) (0.50) (0.23)
GDP growth 0.179*** 0.198*** 0.107***
(5.83) (6.67) (3.59)
N 2826 2826 2826
chi2 1205.019 998.631 1441.531
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
log likelihood -4841.531 -4169.401
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]
Model (2) and (3) are different in the dependent variable and regressors. (3) uses the change in Tobin’s Q level,
and (2) uses industry-adjusted value.
SECOND STAGE ∆Tobin Q (ind-adj) ∆Tobin Q (ind-adj) ∆Tobin Q
(1) TWO-STEP (2) MLE (3) MLE
DIVERSE 1.137*** 1.102*** 1.106***
(3.71) (9.23) (19.98)
log(asset) 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.061***
(4.95) (5.11) (7.18)
ebit/sales 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.035***
(4.82) (3.61) (3.61)
capx/asset 1.021*** 1.030*** 0.810***
(3.73) (4.45) (4.49)
cash/asset 1.091*** 1.126*** 1.484***
(6.21) (5.97) (9.11)
leverage -0.417*** -0.399*** -0.851***
(-3.62) (-3.65) (-9.55)
sales growth 0.247*** 0.241*** 0.284***
(6.63) (4.49) (4.01)
mainind sales growth -0.001 0.000 0.020*
(-0.06) (0.04) (2.36)
GDP growth -0.056*** -0.058*** 0.074***
(-3.43) (-3.29) (5.21)
Tobin Q (ind-adj, lagged) -0.559*** -0.559***
(-32.90) (-28.11)




Rho -0.607*** -0.594*** -0.770***
Sigma 1.024 1.020 0.850
Lambda (Rho*Sigma) -0.622*** -0.606*** -0.655***
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Table 1.6: Posterior Results for γ, β1, β0, and Σ
The table reports the posterior distributions of γ, β1 and β0, and Σ from the 5,000 Bayesian iterations. nse stands
for the numerical standard error. [hpdil,hpdir ] shows the 95% Highest Posterior Density Interval which is similar to
the confidence interval in frequentist econometrics. Variable definitions are in Appendix.
variables mean sd nse 95% hpdil 95% hpdir
γ
const −1.246 0.031 0.003 −1.297 −1.194
age (lagged) 0.061 0.022 0.003 0.024 0.095
cash/asset (lagged) −0.781 0.252 0.042 −1.217 −0.313
leverage (lagged) 0.325 0.162 0.020 0.046 0.593
mainseg opmarg (ind-adj, lagged) −0.288 0.189 0.029 −0.612 0.026
Tobin Q (ind-adj, lagged) −0.001 0.026 0.003 −0.044 0.043
mainseg sales growth (lagged) −0.009 0.028 0.004 −0.053 0.038
mainseg indrank (lagged) 0.339 0.163 0.023 0.071 0.581
mainind HHI (lagged) 0.669 0.222 0.035 0.246 1.041
mainind sales growth (lagged) 0.007 0.005 0.001 −0.002 0.016
GDP growth (lagged) 0.032 0.052 0.006 −0.044 0.125
β1
const 0.217 0.026 0.004 0.175 0.259
log(asset) 0.680 0.052 0.008 0.599 0.767
ebit/sales −0.001 0.030 0.005 −0.059 0.039
capx/asset −0.069 0.028 0.005 −0.123 −0.030
cash/asset 0.951 0.663 0.107 −0.177 1.962
leverage 0.515 0.569 0.099 −0.440 1.520
sales growth −0.954 0.370 0.066 −1.670 −0.391
mainind sales growth 0.245 0.164 0.031 −0.049 0.475
GDP growth 0.041 0.023 0.003 0.003 0.080
Tobin Q (ind-adj, lagged) −0.183 0.047 0.008 −0.255 −0.103
β0
const −0.597 0.049 0.008 −0.673 −0.514
log(asset) −0.347 0.025 0.003 −0.389 −0.306
ebit/sales 0.054 0.012 0.001 0.034 0.074
capx/asset 0.026 0.006 0.001 0.016 0.036
cash/asset 0.941 0.288 0.022 0.463 1.416
leverage 1.148 0.169 0.009 0.870 1.428
sales growth −0.337 0.126 0.013 −0.549 −0.133
mainind sales growth 0.235 0.040 0.003 0.170 0.299
GDP growth −0.005 0.010 0.001 −0.021 0.011
Tobin Q (ind-adj, lagged) −0.042 0.017 0.001 −0.069 −0.015
Σ
Σ11(σ2η) 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Σ12(ρη1σ1) −0.582 0.039 0.006 −0.651 −0.519
Σ13(ρη0σ0) −0.595 0.073 0.014 −0.709 −0.478
Σ21(ρη1σ1) −0.582 0.039 0.006 −0.651 −0.519
Σ22(σ21) 1.048 0.062 0.009 0.952 1.156
Σ23(ρ10σ1σ0) −0.333 0.067 0.012 −0.442 −0.232
Σ31(ρη0σ0) −0.595 0.073 0.014 −0.709 −0.478
Σ32(ρ10σ1σ0) −0.333 0.067 0.012 −0.442 −0.232
Σ33(σ20) 1.037 0.040 0.005 0.975 1.106
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Table 1.7: Value-Enhancing versus Value-Decreasing Acquisitions
The table reports the firm-level and industry-level characteristics between value-enhancing and -decreasing firms with diversifying acquisitions. The columns of Positive (∆Tobin
Q1-∆Tobin Q0) show the mean and median characteristics of the firms that would have an increase in firm value by diversify acquisitions. The columns of Negative (∆Tobin
Q1-∆Tobin Q0) show the characteristics of the firms that would have a decrease in firm value. Variable definitions are in Appendix.
Positive (∆Tobin Q1-∆Tobin Q0) Negative (∆Tobin Q1-∆Tobin Q0) Difference
variable mean median mean median mean difference t-stat
log(asset) 6.04 5.91 6.03 5.94 0.00512 (0.06)
log(sales) 5.88 5.73 5.92 5.81 −0.0387 (-0.42)
age 12.4 8 11.3 7 1.063 (1.95)
ebit/sales −0.0159 0.0845 0.0266 0.112 −0.0425 (-0.85)
opmarg (ind-adj) 0.0757 0.0438 0.112 0.0804 −0.0364 ∗ ∗∗ (-4.59)
mainseg opmarg (ind-adj) 0.0771 0.0446 0.114 0.0827 −0.0369 ∗ ∗∗ (-4.64)
Tobin Q (ind-adj) 0.26 0.136 0.522 0.34 −0.262 ∗ ∗∗ (-4.69)
ROA (ind-adj) 0.0304 0.0226 0.0368 0.0237 −0.00634 (-1.18)
capx/asset 0.0619 0.0374 0.0619 0.0427 0.0000407 (0.01)
rnd/asset 0.0509 0.0135 0.0704 0.0391 −0.0195 ∗ ∗∗ (-4.79)
adv/asset 0.00906 0 0.00882 0 0.000231 (0.13)
cash/asset 0.134 0.0799 0.145 0.101 −0.0108 (-1.51)
leverage 0.179 0.144 0.157 0.1 0.0222 ∗ ∗ (2.66)
stnet debt −0.102 −0.0594 −0.115 −0.0806 0.0127 (1.54)
disappear 0.272 0 0.25 0 0.0216 (1.01)
nseg 1.6 1 1.36 1 0.234 ∗ ∗∗ (4.69)
ndiffseg 1.41 1 1.25 1 0.159 ∗ ∗∗ (4.09)
mainseg indrank 0.313 0.261 0.276 0.223 0.0363 ∗ ∗∗ (3.38)
mainseg mshare 0.0629 0.0113 0.0761 0.0116 −0.0132∗ (-2.06)
mainseg sales growth 0.326 0.156 0.337 0.193 −0.0112 (-0.23)
mainind HHI 0.167 0.132 0.159 0.119 0.00824 (1.22)
mainind sales growth 0.549 0.069 0.999 0.0957 −0.450∗ (-1.97)
SD(mainind sales) 0.391 0.245 0.42 0.255 −0.0282 (-1.31)
GDP growth 3.25 3.69 3.52 3.75 −0.262 ∗ ∗∗ (-4.60)
% stock used 13.6 0 23.5 0 −9.912 ∗ ∗∗ (-4.79)
stock deal 0.0924 0 0.167 0 −0.0748 ∗ ∗∗ (-5.07)
∆goodwill/asset 0.159 0.042 0.121 0.0266 0.0385 (1.06)
N 2294 532 2826
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Chapter 2
Outsourcing and Firm Financial Structure
2.1 Introduction
Why do manufacturing firms use outside contracts to produce? Do high-
technology and low-technology firms have different reasons? How is the use of
outsourcing related to firm performance, investment, and financial structure? This
paper attempts to address these questions using a new dataset of purchase obli-
gations from firm 10-Ks. I examine which firms use outside contracts as a major
input to their production, the industry determinants of this activity, and whether
the outsourcing activity has an important relation with firm financial structure.
Evidence from the electronics, pharmaceuticals and automotive industries
shows that the use of contract manufacturing has been growing significantly since
the 1990s. In particular, the electronics industry outsourced $75 billion to con-
tract manufacturers in 2000, representing 10% of total production (Plambeck and
Taylor 2005). Many leading industrial companies, such as Apple Inc., IBM, Gen-
eral Electronics, Dodge, and Arizona Iced Tea directly manufacture an increasingly
shrinking proportion of their products.1 This increased outsourcing activity has
1See an article from Fortune, October 3, 1994, “You’ll never guess who really makes”. Sturgeon
(1997) also cites a prominent example of Apple Inc. that sold its largest U.S. personal computer
manufacturing facility in Fountain, Colorado to a small contract-manufacturer, SCI systems in
1996 and outsourced production to the company.
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large implications for firm investment. Figure 2.1 presents long-run trends in cor-
porate investment activity including mergers and acquisitions and lumpy capital
investment in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Surprisingly, the number of firms with
lumpy capital investment, as a fraction of the total number of firms in the same in-
dustry, decreases continuously over time. Without considering outsourcing activity,
this long-run trend is difficult to explain. Yet, the corporate investment literature
rather has focused on mergers and acquisitions and investment in the form of capital
expenditures. Much less is known about firm-level outsourcing activity.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.1 HERE]
I examine the firm- and industry-level determinants of outsourcing activity. At
the firm-level, I specifically examine whether a firm is more likely to outsource when
its property rights are likely to be enforced through patents. At the industry-level,
I investigate whether increased competition in both product and supplier markets
leads firms to more outsourcing.
My results show that relatively young and large firms with a large number
of patents are more likely to outsource their production. Industry factors are also
important to explaining outsourcing activity. Firms in high-technology industries
generally do more outsourcing. The greater the competition in the product market,
the more firms in the industry outsource their production. Supplier market compe-
tition also has a positive effect on the likelihood of the outsourcing activity.
I report three major findings in regard to how outsourcing activity financially
affects firms. First, by outsourcing, firms generally improve performance in gener-
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ating cash flow. Outsourcing firms move to lowering operating leverage by using
more variable costs versus fixed costs. As a result, they can achieve substantial
increases in sales without committing to long-term spending for internal capacity
growth. This helps outsourcing firms generate higher operating cash flow. Second,
outsourcing firms can achieve operating flexibility in the aspects of streamlined pro-
duction processes and the realization of cash flow. Operating flexibility in this paper
refers to the ability of a firm to adjust its factors of operation such as production
volumes, choices of suppliers, and product differentiation in response to product
market changes. Based on this flexibility, outsourcing firms within high-technology
industries are more likely to invest more heavily in R&D. This is consistent with
firms focusing on their core competencies and leaving simple production process
to contract manufacturers. On the other hand, low-technology outsourcing firms
are more likely to enter new markets. Outsourcing firms do not need to develop
their own facilities, and thus they can switch their products or operate additional
segments in new industries at lower costs. Third, I find that firms that outsource
have significantly less leverage. Debt markets may consider outsourcing firms with
fewer fixed assets and more innovative investment riskier. Thus, the rates in debt
financing will be higher for those outsourcing firms.
Overall, these findings imply that outsourcing is used by firms to improve their
flexibility. This flexibility may allow the outsourcing firms to invest in product in-
novations or in new businesses. Outsourcing activity has important risk and capital
structure implications. Being faced with fewer fixed assets to pledge as collateral,
outsourcing firms have significantly less leverage.
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Empirically establishing firms’ incentives to engage in outsourcing activity and
its financial impacts on the firms is difficult, mainly because such analysis requires
detailed firm-level outsourcing data. Outsourcing activity is a transaction that is not
included in a company’s consolidated financial statements under generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). Therefore, precise firm-level outsourcing data have
not been collected. Although such data exist, they are limited to survey data.
In this paper, I use firm purchase obligations as a measure of firm-level out-
sourcing activity. I obtain my unique data on purchase obligations from firm 10-K
filings on the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Edgar website, using web
crawling and automated text analysis to extract the data.2 A purchase obligation is
defined as an agreement to purchase goods or services that is enforceable and legally
binding on the company in the future. Thus, it may capture the firm’s outsourcing
activity. I document the validity of this measure of outsourcing first, by examining
capital expenditures and capital intensity of firms with purchase obligations.
Theoretically, the extensive economics literature on incomplete contracts and
industrial organization studies the bilateral contractual relationship between a buyer
(an outsourcing firm) and a supplier (a contract manufacturer), and the organiza-
tional choice for procurement (e.g. Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978; Williamson
1979; Mastern 1984; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Whinston
2003). The classic studies highlight the importance of the contracting costs and ex-
ante investment incentives in deciding the types of contracts. However, more recent
literature on trades develops various models in which outsourcing is viable under the
2In Section 3, I describe the purchase obligations data in detail.
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costs of incomplete contracts (e.g. McLaren 2000, Grossman and Helpman 2002,
2004; Antras 2003, 2005; Antras and Helpman 2004). In these models, the tradeoffs
between the costs of operating a vertically-integrated organization and the costs that
arise from search frictions and incomplete contracting determine the mode of orga-
nization. These influential studies provide an understanding of the cross-industry
difference in outsourcing activity and the growth of outsourcing activity across time.
However, empirically little has been known about firm-level differences in outsourc-
ing decisions and the financial implications of the outsourcing activity on the firms.
In addition to providing new data on firm-level outsourcing activity, my pa-
per makes three additional contributions to the related literature. First, my results
assist in understanding firms’ incentives to use outside contracts. I find that in-
creased competition in the product market leads firms to reduce production costs
through outsourcing. Supplier market competition and property rights protection
make outsourcing more viable by relieving incomplete contracting problems. Sec-
ond, I document new stylized facts on outsourcing firms’ investment. Outsourcing
firms invest more heavily in product innovation or in starting new businesses, rather
than investing in internal capacity growth. These investment styles have certain risk
implications. Third, my paper connects the increasing use of outside contracting
to the capital structure literature. Extensive literature studies the relation between
liquidation value and firm financial structure (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1992; Morel-
lec 2001; Benmelech and Bergman 2009). There has been no attempt, however, to
uncover the financial structure of outsourcing firms that reduce their fixed assets
and improve their flexibility.
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My empirical strategy does not intend to show explicitly the causal effects
of outsourcing on other corporate decisions, as the complex corporate decisions
in production, investment, and financial structure are surely simultaneous. Using
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), I rather contain the endogeneity of these
corporate decisions in my model and focus on finding factors that nonetheless have
significantly similar or differential effects on those decisions. By analyzing the sim-
ilar or differential effects of significant factors including the residuals for omitted
variables, my empirical strategy provides an understanding of the relations between
these simultaneous corporate decisions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discus-
sion of possible relations between outsourcing, corporate investment and financial
structure, and presents testable implications. In Section 3, I describe purchase obli-
gations data in detail and discuss empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the
results of empirical analyses. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, I describe possible economic reasons for an increasing shift from
in-house production to contract manufacturing, and discuss how this may affect firm
financial structure.
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2.2.1 Costs and Benefits of Outsourcing
Why do traditionally in-house manufacturing firms turn to outsourcing? At
its heart, this is a question of the extent of vertical integration and the bound-
aries of the firms. Industrial organization theories clearly identify the difficulty in
writing a contract that specifies all possible contingencies and all terms of business
relationship. Williamson (1979) emphasizes on the importance of the contracting
costs in deciding types of contracts or organization of production. Klen, Crawford
and Alchian (1978) highlight the potential ex-post holdup problems between firms
dealing with relationship-specific assets.
However, recent economic literature develops various trade models in which
outsourcing is viable under these costs of incomplete contracting. McLaren (2000)
empathizes the important role of market thickness (competition) in alleviating the
holdup problems. The market thickness refers to the number of available partners
that a firm can invest in a joint business with. Therefore, the costs of incomplete
contracting can be reduced, when competition in both customer and supplier mar-
kets is large. In Grossman and Helpman (2002), it is also documented that the
larger the number of potential business partners, the lower the search and matching
costs. Grossman and Helpman (2004) model an incentive system that explores the
tradeoff between the costly monitoring within the integrated firm and the costs of
incomplete contracting. Antras (2003, 2005), and Antras and Helpman (2004) de-
velop trade models in which firm (country) difference in endowments of factors such
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as labor, capital and productivity makes outsourcing viable.3
As Gorssman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moor (1990) note, ownership may
increase the incentives of both parties to participate in a joint business. In their
model, which firm owns the relationship-specific assets affects ex-ante investment
and contracting. In many cases of outsourcing, both outsourcing firms and contract
manufacturers make relationship-specific investments. In general, outsourcing firms
invest in product concept and design, and contract manufacturers make investment
in production capacities. Therefore, regarding the outsourcing firms’ perspectives,
it is an essential factor in determining the feasibility of outsourcing how their own-
ership of product concept and design is protected.4
The potential benefits of outsourcing are directly addressed by the cost argu-
ments. Outsourcing can reduce production costs (Lambrecht, Pawlina and Teixeira
2010). Specialized contract manufacturers can achieve economies of scale by pooling
products and supplying many customers in the same industries. Outsourcing to the
other regions (or countries) with cheaper labor or commodities can reduce produc-
tion costs. Firms can also save inventory carrying costs by outsourcing production
processes.
In addition to these advantages, the benefits of using outside contracts include
3See a survey paper of Spencer (2005) for the theoretical trade models on international out-
sourcing and incomplete contracts.
4The recent example of the growing importance in property rights protection is a patent war
between Apple Inc. and Samsung. Samsung is a major supplier of components to Apple Inc., and
also a strong competitor in the smart phone and tablet PC markets. A TIME article, “What a
Patent War Means for South Korea’s Samsung” (September 9, 2011), claims that the patent war
can be seen as a litigation designed to protect competition and innovation, or a market trick to block
challengers. See Harvard Business Review, September 2006, “When Your Contract Manufacturer
Becomes Your Competitor” for a discussion on how outsourcing can heighten the competition.
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increased firm flexibility. Outsourcing firms with fewer fixed costs versus variable
costs can adjust production volumes according to the volatile market demands with
less difficulty than non-outsourcing firms. This benefit of production flexibility in-
creases with the extent of product market competition and the speed of market
changes. Outsourcing firms’ flexibility is not limited to the production. Piore and
Sabel (1984) document that flexible production provides a firm capacity to quickly
accommodate various changes and needs from the markets. By leaving simple or
non-core processes of manufacturing to contract manufacturers, firms can extend
their innovative capability in their specialties, and consequently improve their com-
petitiveness by outsourcing. Several examples of large high-technology firms are
consistent with firms outsourcing low-end products, while continuously introducing
technological advances to their core products at the high-end level. Those examples
include computer makers such as Apple inc. IBM, Intel, and automakers including
Porsche and DaimlerChrysler. I conjecture that this firm flexibility gained by out-
sourcing can boost the firms’ R&D efforts in their core businesses. This conjecture
is more likely to apply to the high-technology firms. Therefore, in this paper, I test
whether the outsourcing firms invest more heavily in R&D than non-outsourcing
firms.
Another flexibility benefit arises from a different channel. Outsourcing firms
do not need to develop their own facilities to produce new products by using third-
party contractors. Therefore, they can add or switch products at lower costs. For
example, a paper clip manufacturer that outsources the partial or whole production
process of making clips can start a new business of producing (or outsourcing) alu-
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minum foil containers at lower costs than non-outsourcing paper clip makers. I test
a hypothesis that captures this benefit of lower costs in starting new businesses.
The following hypotheses based on the aforementioned costs and benefits of
outsourcing are tested. The first two hypotheses concern the likelihood and the
feasibility of outsourcing.
Hypothesis 2.1. Large firms and firms with proper protective mechanisms for their
property rights are more likely to outsource production.
Hypothesis 2.2. Increased competition in the product market and the supplier mar-
kets leads firms to more outsourcing.
The following two hypotheses focus on outsourcing firms’ investment. Key to
testing these hypotheses is the degree of firm flexibility.
Hypothesis 2.3. Outsourcing firms conduct more R&D than non-outsourcing firms.
Hypothesis 2.4. Outsourcing firms are more likely increase operating segments
than non-outsourcing firms.
2.2.2 Outsourcing and Firm Financial Structure
In this section, I discuss how different the outsourcing firms’ financial struc-
tures are from non-outsourcing firms. The following four major facts characterize
outsourcing firms: (1) From the benefits of cost reduction, outsourcing firms gener-
ate higher cash flow. (2) The proportion of fixed assets to total assets is significantly
less. (3) The highly specialized workers are left in the firm. (4) Outsourcing firms
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are more likely to invest in new and innovative projects with less certainty, given
that my last two hypotheses are verified. It is notable that all of these changes
predict the same directional implication on firm financial structure; a decrease in
the use of debt financing
First, it is less likely for a firm to use more debt, when the firm generates
enough cash flow from operation. The cash flow realization also provides opportu-
nities to adjust leverage (Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins and Smith 2011).
Second, The lower capital-intensity makes debt financing less viable than eq-
uity financing. Debt holders favor fixed assets over intangible assets. Therefore, all
else being equal, if a firm has fewer fixed assets to be used as collateral when issuing
bonds or taking loans, the price of credit should be higher (Benmelech and Bergman
2009).
Third, outsourcing firms are more likely to be disinclined to debt financing,
due to the human costs of bankruptcy. By outsourcing a large portion of produc-
tion processes, only highly specialized workers may remain in the firm and those
workers are entrenched; i.e. it is costly for them to find a new job at the same
wage. Therefore, the level of risk aversion of these entrenched employees against the
benefits of debt will optimally determine firm leverage (Berk, Stanton and Zechner
2010). Hence, outsourcing firms will issue only modest levels of debt, assuming that
remaining workers in the outsourcing firms are more risk-averse than production
workers.
Fourth, innovations are more likely to be financed by equity, due to the
intangible nature of their investment, asymmetric-information and moral hazard.
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Asymmetric-information and moral hazard are two factors widely viewed as driving
wedges between the cost of internal and external financing. These wedges are likely
to be larger in the case of innovative investment, because of the highly uncertain
and less informative characteristics of the investment (Hall 2005; 2009).
Based on the above discussion, I develop the following hypothesis regarding
outsourcing firms’ capital structure.
Hypothesis 2.5. Outsourcing firms are less leveraged than non-outsourcing firms.
2.3 Data and Methodology
I electronically collect purchase obligations data from the Edgar 10-K filings
website. I utilize PERL programming for web crawling and to parse the documents.5
I provide the detailed collection procedure in Appendix B.1. I obtain the primary
firm data from the CRSP/Compustat merged database and link this to the purchase
obligations data using the central index key (CIK). My sample period covers from
2004 to 2009, because firms are not required to disclose purchase obligations data
before December 15, 2003. I only study public manufacturing firms (SIC codes 2000
to 3999). In the rest of this section, I describe purchase obligations data in detail,
how I construct my sample and the variables of interest, and what is my empirical
methodology is.
5Lee (2010) first collects and studies purchase obligations data. The description of his data can
be found at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/klee/Kwang Lee Purchase Obligations Data.htm.
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2.3.1 Purchase Obligations Data
The SEC issued on January 2003 a final rule on Disclosure about off-balance
sheet arrangements and aggregate contractual obligations.6 This rule requires pub-
lic companies other than small business issuers7 to provide an explanation of its
contractual obligations in a separately captioned subsection of the Management’s
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section. U.S. GAAP already requires firms to ag-
gregate and assess all of the specified categories of contractual obligations; long-term
debt obligations, capital lease obligations, and operating lease obligations. However,
this SEC’s final rule in particular includes “purchase obligations” category and re-
quires to provide tabular disclosure of all four categories of contractual obligations.
The SEC defines a purchase obligation as an agreement to purchase goods
or services that is enforceable and legally binding on the registrant in the future.
Therefore, a firm’s purchase obligations represent the amount of inputs in produc-
tion that will be purchased in the near future (Lee 2010). Purchase obligations
are different with open-market orders, in that a company legally submits purchase
contracts to the third parties. Thus, purchase obligations are more likely to capture
a firm’s outsourcing activity.
For the fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2003, all public firms
(other than small business issuers) started disclosing purchase obligations in their
6This rule is to implement Section 401(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See Final
Rule: Disclosure in Managements Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Arrange-
ments and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Rel. No. 33-8182, Exchange
Act Rel. 34-47264, Financial Reporting Rel. No. FR-67, International Series Rel. No. 1266,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8182.htm (Jan. 27, 2003).
7SEC defines a small business issuer as a company that had less than $25 million in revenues in
its last fiscal year, and whose outstanding publicly-held stock is worth no more than $25 million.
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financial statements. Therefore, my primary sample includes filings associated with
fiscal years ending in calendar years 2004 to 2009. Figure 2.2 shows examples of
purchase obligations disclosures in firm 10-Ks.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.2 HERE]
Firms generally do not subcategorize purchase obligations in their tabular dis-
closures. They sometimes provide limited information on the types of purchase obli-
gations in the following footnotes. For manufacturing firms, the most common type
of purchase obligation is an inventory purchase commitment. A service agreement,
including advertising, marketing and IT, is another common type of purchase obli-
gation.8 The payment due is classified by specified periods in the tabular disclosure
format. Among those specified periods, I use the total amount of future payment as
my measure for outsourcing activity, instead of using the amount within 1 year. This
is due to the fact that firms sometimes pay after the actual deliveries of products,
or they make installment payments. However, the majority of firms has purchase
obligations due within one year. This may imply that prices in contracts are more
likely to be adjusted yearly to the markets.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for purchase obligations by two-digit
SIC code industries in the manufacturing sector. I assume that a firm other than
small business issuers has no purchase obligation, if the firm does not disclose an
amount of purchase obligation in its 10-K.9 In total, more than 60% of firms use
8See Lee (2010) for discussion about the across-industry variation in the type of purchase
obligations.
9The SEC final rule is adopting the “reasonably likely” disclosure threshold that currently
applies to other portions of MD&A disclosure. In the SEC’s 1989 MD&A Release, a company
55
outsourcing, and the mean value of purchase obligations reaches 7% of the total
sales (11% of the total sales within firms with non-zero purchase obligations). The
high-technology sectors including Industrial machinery and equipment, Electrical
and electronic equipment, and Instruments and related products show considerably
higher rates of firms that have purchase obligations. The outsourcing activity is
least prevalent in the Lumber and wood products industry.
[INSERT TABLE 2.1 HERE]
2.3.2 Sample Construction and Variables of Interest
I create the primary sample by merging all of the public firms in 10-K filings
database to the CRSR/Compustat database by the CIK. Then, I exclude firms
whose maximum sales revenue is less than $25 million, because they are regarded as
small business issuers which are not required to disclose contractual obligations. For
the operating segment information, I link the firm-year database to the Compustat
Industry Segment database.10 In addition, I supplement this database with the
NBER patent database for the firm patent counts.11 I do not exclude any firm-year
observation during this supplementation. I assume no firm activity of patenting for
the firm, if it shows no observation. The above sample construction procedure leaves
had an obligation to disclose prospective information in its MD&A “where a trend, demand,
commitment, event or uncertainty is both presently known to management and reasonably likely
to have material effects on the companys financial condition or results of operations.
10The Compustat Industry Segment data has been reputed to possibly contain problems in
reporting practice. However, Berger and Hann (2003) show that SFAS 131 increased the number
of reported segments and provided more disaggregated information after 1997.
11The NBER U.S. patent citations data file can be found at http://www.nber.org/patents/. The
database is extended by Bronwyn Hall to include matches to Compustat firms. I complement this
by additionally matching to the LexisNexis Directory of Corporate Affiliations database.
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me with 1,757 firms operating in 200 different four-digit SIC industries, and 8,211
firm-years during the period from 2004 to 2009.
I construct the following variables for outsourcing activity.
Outsourcing Dummy (PO exists): This firm-level variable is one, if a given
firm has disclosed a non-zero amount of purchase obligations at least once
during the sample period.
Increase in Outsourcing Dummy (PO increases): For a given firm-year,
this variable is one if ∆PO > 0.
Outsourcing Activity (PO/sales): For a given year, this variable is the
total amount of purchase obligations disclosed in a firm’s 10-K, scaled by total
sales.
Annual Outsourcing Activity (PO1year/COGS ): For a given year, this
variable is the total amount of purchase obligations due within 1 year, scaled
by costs of good sold.
I construct the following key variables to examine the feasibility of outsourcing
and possible relations to the financial attributes.
High Technology Industry Dummy (high-tech industry): I use 31 dif-
ferent four-digit SIC codes to define the high-technology manufacturing in-
dustries.12 High technology industries are: computers and office equipment,
12TechAmerica organization defines 45 sic-based high-technology industries on their web-
site. Among those, I use the definition of 31 manufacturing industries. See
http://www.techamerica.org/sic-definition. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics also defines NAICS-
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consumer electronics, communications equipment, electronic components and
accessories, semiconductors, industrial electronics, photonics, defense electron-
ics, and electromedical equipment. Appendix B.2 shows these 31 industries in
detail.
Product Market Competition (compete-TNIC ): For a given year, this
industry-year level variable is a measure of product market competitiveness,
based on the Text-Based Network Industries by Hoberg and Phillips (2011).
This is one minus the TNIC Herfindahl index.
Supplier Market Competition (supplier compete): For a given year, this
industry-year level variables is one minus the weighted mean of supplier mar-
ket Herfindahl indexes using sales of COMPUSTAT firms. I define supplier
markets using the input-output benchmark table from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.13 The weight of each supplier market equals the producers’ value of
inputs used by the customer industry as a fraction of total value of all inputs.
I assume the Herfindahl index of the imported input market is zero, which
refers to the highest competition.14
R&D Investment (R&D/sales): For a given firm-year, this variable is R&D
based high-technology industries. Although the definition of U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics is
broader, I find that these two definitions are congruous. My definition of high-technology indus-
tries does not include biotechnology firms. Biotechnology is not established yet with its own set
of SIC codes, and rather spreads over the drugs sector (SIC code=283).
13Input output benchmark tables are publicly available from the website of Bureau of Economic
Analysis at http://www.bea.gov/industry/io benchmark.htm. I use the 2002 standard use tables
at the detailed level, and match this data into four-digit SIC codes by correspondence tables
between IO, NAICS and SIC codes.
14For a robustness check, I also employ the fitted HHI indexes constructed by using both public
and private firms, instead of using COMPUSTAT firms. The procedure to construct these fitted
HHI indexes is described in Hoberg and Phillips (2010a). The results remain similar.
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expenditures, scaled by total sales.
Intellectual Property Right Protection (log(1+#patent)): This firm-level
variable is a total patent count granted to the firm during the 20 year period
from 1985 to 2004. Under the current U.S. patent laws, the term of a patent
is 20 years from the filing date of the earliest application.
Operating Segments (log(#seg)): For a given year, this variable is a count
of the operating segments which appear in different industries at the four-digit
SIC code level.
Change in Operating Segments (∆ seg): For a given year, this variable
is the change in the total number of four-digit SIC code industry segments.
This variable shows whether the firm starts operating additional segments in
new industries in the given year.
Leverage (market leverage or book leverage): This is the ratio of total debt to
the market value or book value of assets. Market value of total assets is market
value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock plus debt (long-term
debt + debt in current liabilities) plus book value of minority interest.
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics. Panel A reports firm-level statis-
tics for both firms with purchase obligations and without purchase obligations. I
also tabulate firm characteristics for the sub-samples of high-technology and low-
technology firms. Panel B reports firm-year level statistics for both firm-years with
an increase in purchase obligations and without an increase. For each variable, I
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winsorize the top and bottom 1% of the distribution.15
[INSERT TABLE 2.2 HERE]
According to the statistics in Panel A, the firms with purchase obligations rep-
resent more than half of the total firms in the sample. It shows that the firms with
purchase obligations differ from the firms without purchase obligations in many
aspects. Particularly, firms with purchase obligations are larger and more prof-
itable. Their growth opportunities (measured by Tobin’s Q and industry adjusted
Q) are higher than firms without purchase obligations. They also generate higher
and more stable cash flows. The property rights of outsourcing firms are more en-
forced through patents. High technology firms are more likely to have purchase
obligations. These differences are reasonably explained. If various components of a
complex (high-technology) product require special technology, firms are more likely
to outsource components other than their specialties. In this case, intellectual prop-
erty right protection (measured by total patent counts of the firm) is an important
factor to make contract manufacturing feasible and safe. Most notably, outsourcing
firms are significantly less leveraged, and summary statistics show that they are not
financially distressed (measured by profitability, cash holdings and payout ratios).
Both product market competition and supplier market competition are significantly
greater for the outsourcing firms’ industries. Therefore, both outsourcing firms and
their suppliers tend to face more available partners to make joint business contracts
15Several biotechnology firms excessively spend on R&D, and commonly show firm-years with
R&D/sale over 1. To avoid a possible outlier effect, I drop the firms with the mean R&D/sales > 5
and winsorize the top and bottom 2% of the distribution of R&D/sale. I do not find any outlier
problem in using R&D/assets.
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with.
ind outside input is a measure of industry dependence on outside inputs, which
is the value of total outside inputs as a fraction of the value of the total outputs of
an industry. This should be significantly higher for the outsourcing industries, if my
outsourcing measure based on purchase obligations only captures the raw material
contracts. However, this industry measure shows an insignificant difference between
outsourcing and non-outsourcing firms in the whole sample. It rather turns out to
be significantly less for high-technology outsourcing firms. Hence, purchase obliga-
tions are more likely to capture outsourcing activity, not just represent raw material
supplying contracts.
According to Panel B, the amount of purchase obligations increases in almost
half of the firm-years in the sample of firms with purchase obligations. The statis-
tics indicate that the firm-years with growing outsourcing activity differ from the
firm-years without an increase. The firm-years with an increase tend to have greater
sales growth and significantly higher Tobin’s Q. This implies that outsourcing firms
with growing sales and higher investment opportunities may expand their capabil-
ities by outside contracting, not by investing in fixed assets internally. long-run
∆ PPE/assets and long-run ∆ emp/sales confirm that both capital intensity and
labor intensity significantly decrease over the long run for the firms with increas-
ing purchase obligations. The firms with growing outsourcing activity also have
significantly less leverage than the firms without an increase.
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2.3.3 Empirical Methodology
In this paper, I analyze the possible relations in outsourcing activity, corporate
investment and financial structure. However, outsourcing firms are not randomly
selected. Moreover, the combination of complex decision processes in production,
investment, and financial structure are surely simultaneous. Therefore, endogeneity
concerns are present in my study. Given the limited purchase obligations data avail-
able (from 2004 to 2009), proper identification strategies are restricted. Therefore,
I do not attempt to make any inference in the causes and consequences. I rather
acknowledge the endogeneity of my models and focus on finding factors that have
significantly similar or differential effects on the corporate decision processes.
I use a simultaneous equation approach in which endogenous corporate deci-
sions are allowed. That is, the relevant equations are estimated together under the
identical regressors with the residuals correlated. Specifically, I estimate
Xi,t = f(Size, Age, TobinQ, Patents, Competition, Hightech Industry) + εi,t
Yi,t = g(Size, Age, TobinQ, Patents, Competition, Hightech Industry) + ηi,t,
where i indexes firms, t indexes years, Xi,t is the outsourcing decision, and Yi,t is the
other corporate decision of interest, such as R&D investment and capital structure.
I estimate this system of equations using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), in
which the residuals, (εi,t, ηi,t) are correlated. No instrumental variable is presented
in these regressions. From this specification, I am able to analyze which factors
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have significantly similar or differential effects on each endogenous decision. Then, I
present the propensity score matching estimates using matching variables including
those critical factors.
My identification strategy can be illustrated with an example. Let the vari-
able of interest be capital intensity. Outsourcing likelihood and capital intensity
are simultaneously estimated by regressing on the exact set of following variables:
size, age, Tobin’s Q, total counts of patents, competition, and high-tech industry
dummy. Suppose that the estimated signs of coefficients of (size, age, Tobin’s Q,
patents, competition, high-tech) are (+,−,+,+,+,+) for outsourcing likelihood.
On the other hand, they are (+,+,−,−,−,−) for capital intensity. Suppose also
that the residuals, (εi,t, ηi,t) are negatively correlated. The result for Tobin’s Q
implies that firms that have higher Tobin’s Qs are more likely to outsource. At
the same time, the firms with high Tobin’s Qs are less likely to be capital intense.
Similar interpretations are possible for age, total counts of patents, competition
and high-technology industry dummy. This empirical strategy using SUR provides
additional implications on omitted variables, as the correlation of the residuals is
estimated. In this example, the residuals are negatively correlated. This reveals
that the omitted variables have differential effects on the corporate decisions of out-
sourcing and capital intensity. According to this example, outsourcing firms are
more likely to be associated with less capital intensity.
This empirical strategy does not intend to show explicitly the causal effects of
outsourcing on other corporate decisions. However, analyzing the similar or differen-




This section presents the paper’s results. I begin by examining what deter-
mines the likelihood and feasibility of outsourcing. Then, I examine capital ex-
penditures and capital intensity of outsourcing firms to verify the validity of my
outsourcing measure. If my outsourcing measure based on purchase obligations
data is valid, capital expenditures and capital intensity (labor intensity as well) of
outsourcing firms should be less. Then, I further investigate how outsourcing firms
differ from non-outsourcing firms in their financial structure. I specifically exam-
ine market leverage and book leverage. The proportion of the fixed assets among
total asset portfolios is one of the most important variables that explain the cross-
sectional variance in leverage ratios. Therefore, outsourcing firms are expected to
have less leverage, as they operate fewer fixed assets than non-outsourcing firms. To
better understand this difference in leverage, I further examine outsourcing firms’
investment. In particular, I test whether outsourcing firms engage in any type of
investment that affects firm risks and financial structure, by focusing on their R&D
expenditures and the number of operating segments.
2.4.1 The Likelihood of Outsourcing and Firm Attribute Changes
This section begins by examining what determines the likelihood of outsourc-
ing. I use probit models and Table 2.3 presents the results. In Panel A, I examine
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the outsourcing decision. The firm-level dependent variable, PO exists equals to
one, when the firm discloses non-zero amount of purchase obligations at least once
during the sample period. In Panel B, I examine the growth of outsourcing activity.
The firm-year level dependent variable, PO increases equals to one, when the firm
increases the amount of purchase obligations in the given year. I include the indus-
try characteristics of the product market competition (compete-TNIC ), the supplier
market competition (supplier compete), the high technology industry dummy, the
industry dependence on the outside inputs (ind outside input), and the lagged in-
dustry trend of outsourcing activity (ind PO/sales). In Panel B, I also include the
macro credit spread, which is the spread between the Baa corporate bond yield and
the 10 year treasury rate (macro credit spread) as a measure for aggregate liquidity,
instead of using the year-fixed effects.
[INSERT TABLE 2.3 HERE]
Panel A of Table 2.3 shows that a firm is more likely to use outside contracts,
if it is young, large and a growth firm. My hypothesis regarding ownership protec-
tion suggests that firms with proper protective mechanisms for their property rights
are more likely to outsource. The results show that outsourcing firms’ property
rights tend to be more enforced through patents. This relation is economically and
statistically significant. Industry factors are also important to predict the outsourc-
ing likelihood. Firms in high-technology industries are more likely to use outside
contracts. Competition in the product market and the supplier markets positively
predicts the outsourcing activity, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2.2.
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Overall, these findings reveal that firms use outsourcing when their incom-
plete contracting costs are not severe. The greater marginal costs of operating a
vertically-integrated organization incentivize a relatively large firm to use more out-
side contracts. The ownership protection enforcement also has an important impact
on the firm’s outsourcing feasibility. A large number of available business partners
(measured by product market and supplier market competition) can reduce the costs
of incomplete contracting such as the hold-up problems and search costs. As a re-
sult, competition in both product and supplier markets plays a key role to predict
the outsourcing likelihood.
Panel B of Table 2.3 reports results for an increase in outsourcing activity. A
firm is more likely to increase its share of outsourcing, when its investment oppor-
tunities (measured by Tobin’s Q) and sales growth are higher.16 Industry charac-
teristics are not important to predict an increase in outsourcing activity. However,
the macro variable of aggregate liquidity is significantly and positively related to
the growth of outsourcing.
2.4.2 Capital Expenditures and Capital Intensity
I now test the validity of my outsourcing measure. To show that my measure
properly captures outsourcing activity, I examine the following firm attributes: cap-
ital expenditures and capital intensity (labor intensity). Outsourcing contracts are
in a number of cases the single largest source of purchase obligations, and the disclo-
16Lee (2010) confirms that the growth in purchase obligations is associated with higher future
sales and earning.
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sure rule may bring increased visibility to the terms of outsourcing transactions.17
However, in the examples of actual firm disclosures, I discover that firms sometimes
record their construction projects under the category of purchase obligations in their
own discretion. Therefore, outsourcing firms should spend less in capital expendi-
tures and have less capital intensity (labor intensity), if purchase obligations largely
and properly represent outsourcing activity. Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 present the
results.
In Table 2.4, I estimate a system of two equations with PO exists and CAPX/sales
as the dependent variables. The PO exists equation is a probit estimation. The
residuals of the two equations are correlated. I estimate the between-effect, year-
fixed effect, and industry-year fixed effect models. The regression results for PO
exists are similar in both magnitude and statistical significance to those reported in
Table 2.3. In the CAPX/sales equation, capital investment rates are higher, when
Tobin’s Q and sales growth are larger. They are lower in high-technology industries
and competitive industries. From these regressions, I separately generate a table
showing the effects of significant factors on each dependent variable. The table
shows that the effects of patents, Tobin’s Q, competition and high-tech are signif-
icantly opposite for the PO exists and the CAPX/sales. This implies that larger
firms in highly competitive and technology-oriented industries respond differently
to the outsourcing and capital expenditure decisions.
[INSERT TABLE 2.4 HERE]
17See “Outsourcing Advisory: New MD&A Requirements Under Sarbanes-
Oxley May Impact Outsourcing Transactions” of ALSTON+BIRST LLP at
http://www.alston.com/resources/advisories/ (July 30, 2004).
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Table 2.5 presents the results for capital intensity. I now estimate a system
of two equations with PO exists and PPE/assets as the dependent variables. In
the PPE/asset equation, capital intensity is higher when the firm is larger, older
and has lower Tobin’s Q. PPE/asset is lower in the high-technology industries and
the competitive industries. I also generate a table showing the effects of significant
factors on each dependent variable. This table finds that age, patents, Tobin’s Q,
competition and high-tech have the significantly opposite effects for PO exists and
PPE/assets. According to these results, firms with purchase obligations are more
likely to be associated with less capital intensity, when conditioning on firm size.18
[INSERT TABLE 2.5 HERE]
2.4.3 Outsourcing Firms’ Capital Structure
In this section, I examine how firm financial structure is related to outsourc-
ing activity. So far, I document that outsourcing firms have fewer fixed assets. The
fixed asset proportion among a firm’s asset portfolios is one of the most important
variables that explain the firm’s leverage ratio. Table 2.6 presents the results of
this prediction. In Table 2.6, I estimate a system of two equations with PO exists
and market leverage as the dependent variables.19 In the market leverage equation,
the level of debt is higher when the firm is larger and younger. The higher the
Tobin’s Q, the less leveraged the firm. High-technology firms with a large number
18In the unreported table, I find the similar results for labor intensity. Outsourcing firms are
more likely to be associated with less labor intensity, when conditioning on firm age.
19In unreported results, I use book leverage as the dependent variable and also find the similar
results.
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of patents are also less leveraged. The separate table of significant factors shows
that the effects of patents, Tobin’s Q, competition and high-tech are significantly
opposite for PO exists and market leverage. According to these results, outsourcing
firms are more likely to be associated with less leverage, when conditioning on firm
size and age.
In Table 2.7, I examine more directly whether outsourcing firms are less lever-
aged, using the propensity score matching estimates. Consistent with Hypothe-
sis 2.5, outsourcing firms’ use of debt is significantly less than non-outsourcing firms.
The results for both market leverage and book leverage are robust over the different
year samples and regardless of industry adjustment. The probit regression of PO ex-
ists uses the following matching variables: log(sales), log(1+age), log(1+#patents),
Tobin’s Q, operating margin, high-tech industry and PPE/assets. I intentionally add
PPE/assets for the matching variable in this specification, to determine whether the
results are solely driven by the fewer fixed assets of outsourcing firms. The magni-
tude and statistical significance get larger, when I do not include PPE/assets in the
matching variables.
[INSERT TABLE 2.6 AND 2.7 HERE]
In addition to the above tests, I analyze the relation between outsourcing and
leverage using instrumental variables in Table 2.8. A valid instrument in my study
is a variable that affects the decision of outsourcing, but has no impact on firm
leverage. I use distance to the closest seaport as a primary instrumental variable.
The distance to the closest seaport proxies for the firm’s feasibility to purchase
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products from foreign suppliers by water transportation. Assuming a large number
of U.S. manufacturing firms hire foreign suppliers, distance to international entry
ports is an important factor to the firm’s decision to offshore production. The details
on the instrumental variables are provided in Chapter 3.
[INSERT TABLE 2.8 HERE]
In Table 2.8, I alternately estimate OLS and IV regressions, and find the
results did not change between the two estimation methods. I control for year, and
industry in each four-digit SIC code. The estimates show that the industry-adjusted
market leverage decreases a 7 percentage point when the firm uses outsourcing. Also,
higher outsourcing intensity is more likely to lead to lower leverage. An increase
of outsourcing intensity by 0.1 is associated with a 0.9 percentage point decrease
in firm leverage. These tests include the PPE/assets variable to control for the
effect of fixed assets on firm leverage. Although fixed assets are likely to explain the
relation between outsourcing and leverage, it does not appear to be the sole reason.
Therefore, I investigate possible risk-related reasons in the next section.
2.4.4 Outsourcing Firms’ Investment
In this section, I test whether outsourcing activity is associated with particular
investment styles. I focus on Hypothesis 2.3 and Hypothesis 2.4, and examine differ-
ences in investment between high-technology and low-technology outsourcing firms.
Table 2.9 presents the results of how outsourcing activity is related to firm R&D
investment. I estimate a system of two equations with PO exists and R&D/sales
70
as the dependent variables. I drop the log(1+#patents) variable for this specifi-
cation, as the number of patents are possibly too much related to the firm R&D
level. In both PO exists and R&D/sales equations, the high-tech dummy variable
shows a significantly positive effect. Then, I estimate the same specification for the
two different sub-samples; low-technology and high-technology firms. Only in the
high-technology firm sample, age and competition have the same directional effect
on both PO exists and R&D/sales. In the low-technology firm sample, no factor
shows the same directional effect. These results are consistent with high-technology
firms responding in like manner to the outsourcing and R&D investment decisions.
Table 2.10 confirms this using the propensity score matching estimates. I find strong
support for Hypothesis 2.3 only in the high-technology firm sample. I do not find
evidence that low-technology outsourcing firms also invest more heavily in R&D
than non-outsourcing firms.
[INSERT TABLE 2.9 AND 2.10 HERE]
The relation between heavier R&D expenditures and outsourcing is not just
driven by the strong relation between the number of patents and the outsourcing
likelihood. Firms that have a large number of patents are not necessarily high-
technology firms or firms extensively investing in R&D. Patents include a consider-
able amount of design and concept inventions. In Table 2.3, the number of patents
still significantly explains the likelihood of outsourcing in the low-technology firm
sample. However, the results in Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 show that low-technology
firms’ outsourcing activity is irrelevant to the higher R&D expenditures.
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I now turn to examining the likelihood of entering new markets. By outsourc-
ing production processes, firms do not need to develop their own manufacturing
facilities for a new business. Therefore, they can switch their products or operate
an additional business at relatively lower costs than non-outsourcing firms. In Ta-
ble 2.11, I estimate a system of two equations with PO exists and log(#seg) as the
dependent variables. The high-tech dummy variable shows the significantly oppo-
site effects on PO exists and log(#seg). In the high-technology firm sample, the
effects of age and competition are also significantly opposite. These results imply
that there exists a positive relation between outsourcing and the number of busi-
ness segments, and this relation appears to be significant only for low-technology
outsourcing firms. I confirm this in Table 2.12 using the propensity score matching
estimates. High-technology outsourcing firms are more focused, and low-technology
outsourcing firms are more likely to add business segments in new industries.
[INSERT TABLE 2.11 AND 2.12 HERE]
Overall, my results on investment are consistent with outsourcing being used
by firms to improve their flexibility. With this increased firm flexibility, outsourcing
firms invest more heavily in R&D or more likely explore new market opportunities.
This tendency in investment may be another important contributing factor for the
outsourcing firms’ less leverage.
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2.5 Conclusion
I use a new dataset of purchase obligations in firm 10-Ks to measure firm-level
outsourcing activity. Based on these purchase obligations, I examine what kinds of
firms use external contracts to provide a product or service and what are the po-
tential economic reasons for using outsourcing. I also analyze how this outsourcing
activity and firm financial attributes are related. Specifically, my analysis focuses
on firm capital structure.
I first find that purchase obligations are a valid measure for capturing out-
sourcing activity, as capital expenditures and the capital intensity of outsourcing
firms decrease. I show that a firm is more likely to outsource its production to
outside contractors when it is large and young and when its property rights are
likely to be enforced through patents. I also show that an industry tends to have
more outsourcing firms when it is technology-oriented and when its product market
competition and supplier market competition are at high levels.
Outsourcing firms are significantly less leveraged than non-outsourcing firms.
I determine whether this finding is solely driven by the fewer fixed assets in outsourc-
ing firms. I find that outsourcing firms’ investment may be another important factor
that contributes to their having less leverage. My results show that high-technology
outsourcing firms invest more heavily in R&D and that low-technology outsourcing
firms are more likely to add operating segments in new industries. These findings
are consistent with outsourcing being used by firms to improve firm flexibility and
these firms investing in product innovation or exploring new market opportunities.
73
Appendix B
B.1 Collection of Purchase Obligations Data
This appendix describes how I collect the purchase obligations data. I first
electronically gather all “10-K”s and “10-K405”s by PERL web crawling1 to the
SEC Edgar database, and searching for the filings from 2004 to 2009. I do not
include “10KSB”s and “10KSB40”s, because small business issuers are not required
to disclose purchase obligations by the SEC’s final rules. Then, using PERL pro-
gramming I specifically extract purchase obligations data in the MD&A section and
other identifying information including the CIK number in each 10-K.
There are two types of reporting practices. First, firms use HTML docu-
ments. In this case, purchase obligations are disclosed in tabular formats. Second,
firms use TEXT documents. In this case, it is highly likely that the firms disclose
purchase obligations also in textual formats. For the HTML groups, I extract all
tables first and then sort out the certain tables including search keywords. The
search keywords are the combinations of “purchase” and one of the following terms:
“obligation” “commitment”, “agreement”, “order” and “contract”. From the tables
including the search terms, I extract the proper rows that contain the amount of
purchase obligations. For the TEXT document group, I use page breaks instead
1I acknowledge that Andy Leone’s Perl resource page at
http://sbaleone.bus.miami.edu/PERLCOURSE/Perl Resources.html provides a useful help
to get started Edgar web crawling algorithms using PERL.
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of tables. From the pages including the above search terms, I extract the proper
sentences that contain information on the amount of purchase obligations.
In case that my extraction process cannot sort out a table or a page containing
search terms, I reexamine the whole document and search for another terms includ-
ing either “contract obligation”, or “contract commitment”. When the extracted
information does not contain “purchase” or there still exist no match, I conclude
that the firm has no purchase obligations.
The reporting units vary with reporting firms. Therefore, I normalize the units
of disclosed purchase obligations in million dollars, by matching other information
in the extracted tables or pages with the corresponding COMPUSTAT data item.
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B.2 High Technology Industries
SIC Code Industry Description
Computers and Office Equipment
3571 Electronic Computers
3572 Computer Storage Devices
3575 Computer Terminals
3577 Computer Peripherals
3578 Calculating and Accounting Machines
3579 Office Machines
Consumer Electronics
3651 Household Audio and Video Equipment
3652 Phonographic Records and Prerecorded Tapes and Disks
Communications Equipment
3661 Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus
3663 Radio and TV Broadcast and Communications Equipment
3669 Other Communications Equipment
Electronic Components and Accessories
3671 Electron Tubes
3672 Printed Circuit Boards
3675 Electronic Capacitors
3676 Electronic Resistors
3677 Electronic Coils, Transformers, and Inductors
3678 Electronic Connectors
3679 Other Electronic Components
Semiconductors




3823 Process Control Instruments
3824 Fluid Meters and Counting Devices
3825 Instruments to Measure Electricity
3826 Laboratory Analytical Instruments
3829 Other Measuring and Controlling Devices
Photonics
3827 Optical Instruments and Lenses
3861 Photographic Equipment and Lenses
Defense Electronics
3812 Search and Navigation Systems, Instruments, and Equipment
Electromedical Equipment
3844 X-Ray Apparatus and Tubes and Related Irradiation Apparatus
3845 Electromedical and Electrotherapeutic Apparatus
By high-technology, I refer to micro-electronics rather than other technologies. I do not include biotechnology
firms in the high-technology industries. Biotechnology is not established yet with its own set of SIC codes, and
rather widely spreads over the drugs sector (SIC code=283).
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B.3 Variable Definitions
• PO exists is the firm-level variable that equals one, if a given firm has disclosed
a non-zero amount of purchase obligations at least once during the sample
period.
• PO increases is one, if the firm increases purchase obligations in comparison
to the prior year.
• PO/sales is the total amount of purchase obligations disclosed in a firm’s 10-K,
scaled by sales.
• PO1year/COGS is the total amount of purchase obligations due within 1 year,
scaled by costs of good sold.
• POlong/POtot is the ratio of purchase obligations due more than 1 year to
the firm’s total amount of purchase obligations.
• log(sales) is the log of sales.
• log(1+age) is the log of one plus firm age, defined as a given year minus the
year when the firm first appeared in Compustat.
• log(1+#patents) is the log of one plus the total patent count granted to the
firm during the 20 year period from 1985 to 2004.
• Tobin’s Q is market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Market
value of assets is market value of common equity plus book value of preferred
stock plus debt (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) plus book value
of minority interest.
• sales growth is the percentage growth in sales in a given year.
• profit/assets is operating income before depreciation plus interest expenses
plus deferred taxes, divided by total assets in the prior year.
• operating margin is operating income before depreciation, scaled by sales.
• SD(profit/assets is the firm-level standard deviation of profit/assets.
• SD(operating margin is firm-level the standard deviation of operating margin.
• fcf/equity is free cash flow (operating income before depreciation - interest
expenses - income tax - dividends on common and preferred stock) divided by
book value of equity.
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• cash/assets is cash and short-term investments, divided by assets.
• payout/earnings is cash dividends plus purchase of common and preferred
stock, divided by operating income before depreciation.
• emp/sales is the number of employees divided by sales. (persons/million dol-
lar)
• CAPX/assets is capital expenditures divided by total assets in the prior year.
• R&D/assets is R&D expenditures divided by total assets in the prior year.
• CAPX/sales is capital expenditures divided by sales in the same year.
• R&D/sales is R&D expenditures divided by sales in the same year.
• PPE/assets is gross property, plant and equipment divided by total assets in
the prior year.
• long-run ∆ PPE/assets and long-run ∆ emp/sales are long-run changes in
PPE/assets and emp/sales. The long-run change is defined as the log of a
three-year average from 2001 to 2003, divided by the three-year average from
2007 to 2009.
• log(#seg) is the log of the count of a firm’s operating segments which appear
in different industries at the four-digit SIC code level.
• ∆ seg is the change in the total number of four-digit SIC code industry seg-
ments.
• firm has a debt rating is a dummy variable showing whether the firm has a
credit rating.
• firm credit rating is a numerical score of the Standard & Poors ratings with 1
representing a AAA rating and 22 reflecting a D rating.
• market leverage and book leverage are the ratio of total debt to the market
value and book value of assets, respectively. Market value of assets is market
value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock plus debt (long-term
debt + debt in current liabilities) plus book value of minority interest.
• high-tech industry is a dummy variable indicating the 31 four-digit SIC codes
defined as high technology manufacturing industries by TechAmerica organi-
zation.
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• ind outside input is the total value of outside input as a fraction of total
value of industry output. This variable is created using the 2002 input-output
benchmark table from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
• compete (TNIC) is a measure of product market competitiveness based on the
Text-Based Network Industries by Hoberg and Phillips (2011). This is one
minus the TNIC Herfindahl index.
• supplier compete is one minus the weighted mean of supplier market Herfindahl
sales indexes using firms in Compustat.
• ind PO/sales is the industry median of PO/sales.
• ind-adj represents the subtraction by the 4-digit SIC industry median of the
variable.
• hist-adj represents the subtraction by the three-year median of the variable
from 2001 to 2003.
• macro credit spread is the spread between the Baa corporate bond yield and




Figure 2.1: Investment Trend
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(a) In the Apple Inc.’s 10-K for the fiscal year 2005
(b) In the Apple Inc.’s 10-K for the fiscal year 2008
(c) In the Gymboree Corporation’s 10-K for the fiscal period 2008
Figure 2.2: Examples of Purchase Obligations Disclosures
(b) Description of purchase obligations excerpted from the footnotes of the Apple Inc.’s 2008 10-K: “The
Company utilizes several contract manufacturers to manufacture sub-assemblies for the Companys products and to
perform final assembly and test of finished products. These contract manufacturers acquire components and build
product based on demand information supplied by the Company, which typically covers periods ranging from 30
to 150 days. The Company also obtains individual components for its products from a wide variety of individual
suppliers. Consistent with industry practice, the Company acquires components through a combination of purchase
orders, supplier contracts, and open orders based on projected demand information. Such purchase commitments
typically cover the Companys forecasted component and manufacturing requirements for periods ranging from 30
to 150 days. In addition, the Company has an off-balance sheet warranty obligation for products accounted for
under subscription accounting pursuant to SOP No. 97-2 whereby the Company recognizes warranty expense as
incurred. As of September 27, 2008, the Company had outstanding off-balance sheet third-party manufacturing
commitments, component purchase commitments, and estimated warranty commitments of $5.4 billion. During
2006, the Company entered into long-term supply agreements with Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., Intel Corporation,
Micron Technology, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and Toshiba Corporation to secure supply of NAND flash
memory through calendar year 2010. As part of these agreements, the Company prepaid $1.25 billion for flash
memory components during 2006, which will be applied to certain inventory purchases made over the life of each
respective agreement. The Company utilized $567 million of the prepayment as of September 27, 2008.”
(c) Description of purchase obligations excerpted from the footnotes of the Gymboree Corporation’s 2008 10-K:
“Inventory purchase obligations include outstanding purchase orders for merchandise inventories that are enforceable
and legally binding on the Company and that specify all significant terms (including fixed or minimum quantities to
be purchased), fixed, minimum or variable price provisions, and the approximate timing of the transaction. Other
purchase obligations include commitments for information technology and professional services.”
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Outsourcing Activity by Industry
The sample consists of 200 different 4-digit sic code industries in the fiscal year period of 2004-2009. The purchase obligations data are from firm 10-Ks. PO/sales is the
amount of purchase obligations normalized by sales. PO/sales is winsorized at the top and bottom 1 of the distribution. (1) is for the whole sample and (2) is for a sub-sample
of firms with non-zero purchase obligations.
(1) Whole Sample (2) PO exist=1
Industry Description SIC High-tech Firm Total Outsourcing Outsourcing PO/sales PO/sales
Code Firms(%) Years(#) Firms(#) Firms(#) Firms(%) Mean Median Mean Median
Food and kindred products 20 0 379 83 47 0.566 0.086 0.009 0.152 0.089
Tobacco manufactures 21 0 32 7 4 0.571 0.082 0.036 0.144 0.15
Textile mill products 22 0 55 12 7 0.583 0.014 0.005 0.024 0.013
Apparel and other textile products 23 0 166 37 20 0.541 0.061 0.011 0.114 0.105
Lumber and wood products 24 0 78 14 5 0.357 0.012 0 0.033 0.019
Furniture and fixtures 25 0 120 23 11 0.478 0.027 0 0.056 0.031
Paper and allied products 26 0 168 39 29 0.744 0.11 0.069 0.148 0.105
Printing and publishing 27 0 218 48 23 0.479 0.029 0 0.06 0.035
Chemicals and allied products 28 0 1413 306 190 0.621 0.098 0.015 0.156 0.076
Petroleum and coal products 29 0 113 22 17 0.773 0.197 0.046 0.255 0.123
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 30 0 156 35 17 0.486 0.039 0 0.081 0.044
Leather and leather products 31 0 97 18 12 0.667 0.067 0.046 0.1 0.103
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 32 0 80 16 12 0.75 0.06 0.016 0.08 0.034
Primary metal industries 33 0 245 60 41 0.683 0.162 0.018 0.237 0.112
Fabricated metal products 34 0 274 56 33 0.589 0.054 0.004 0.091 0.028
Industrial machinery and equipment 35 0.267 1084 232 151 0.651 0.052 0.025 0.081 0.064
Electrical and electronic equipment 36 0.77 1669 356 239 0.671 0.065 0.027 0.097 0.072
Transportation equipment 37 0 414 86 42 0.488 0.076 0 0.156 0.071
Instruments and related products 38 0.664 1293 274 163 0.595 0.048 0.011 0.08 0.053
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 39 0 157 33 15 0.455 0.024 0 0.054 0.029
Total 0.295 8211 1757 1078 0.614 0.07 0.014 0.114 0.067
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
The sample consists of 1,757 manufacturing firms with 8,211 firm-years in the fiscal year period of 2004-2009. Panel A is the summary statistics of firms with non-zero purchase
obligations versus firms with no purchase obligation. Panel B is the summary statistics of firm-years with increasing purchase obligations versus firm-years without an increase.
The summary statistics of sub-samples of non high-technology and high-technology firms are in (2) and (3). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Panel A (1) Whole Sample (2) Non High-Technology (3) High-Technology
PO exists=1 PO exists=0 Difference PO exists=1 PO exists=0 Difference PO exists=1 PO exists=0 Difference
Outsourcing-Related Characteristics
PO1year/COGS 0.143 0.000 0.143∗∗∗ 0.136 0.000 0.136∗∗∗ 0.158 0.000 0.158∗∗∗
POlong/POtot 0.166 0.000 0.166∗∗∗ 0.200 0.000 0.200∗∗∗ 0.158 0.000 0.158∗∗∗
General Firm Characteristics
log(sales) 6.219 5.167 1.052∗∗∗ 6.491 5.328 1.163∗∗∗ 5.621 4.724 0.897∗∗∗
log(1+age) 2.507 2.415 0.093∗ 2.57 2.405 0.165∗∗∗ 2.368 2.44 −0.072
log(1+#patents) 2.631 1.818 0.813∗∗∗ 2.43 1.651 0.778∗∗∗ 3.074 2.277 0.796∗∗∗
Tobin’s Q 1.775 1.68 0.094∗ 1.734 1.692 0.042 1.864 1.649 0.215∗∗
sales growth 0.135 0.121 0.014 0.134 0.126 0.008 0.137 0.108 0.029
profit/assets 0.081 0.052 0.029∗∗∗ 0.092 0.057 0.034∗∗∗ 0.056 0.035 0.021∗
operating margin 0.049 −0.007 0.056∗∗∗ 0.051 −0.014 0.065∗∗∗ 0.044 0.011 0.033
cash/assets 0.236 0.217 0.019∗ 0.189 0.199 −0.01 0.34 0.267 0.072∗∗∗
payout/earnings 0.216 0.149 0.067∗∗∗ 0.211 0.153 0.058∗∗∗ 0.228 0.139 0.090∗∗∗
Investment-Related Firm Characteristics
emp/sales 4.213 5.601 −1.388∗∗∗ 4.135 5.684 −1.549∗∗∗ 4.386 5.372 −0.986∗∗∗
CAPX/sales 0.048 0.042 0.006∗ 0.046 0.046 0 0.052 0.031 0.021∗∗∗
R&D/sales 0.098 0.092 0.006 0.077 0.084 −0.007 0.146 0.116 0.030∗∗∗
PPE/assets 0.468 0.457 0.01 0.517 0.496 0.02 0.361 0.352 0.01
long-run ∆ PPE/assets −0.065 −0.111 0.046 −0.067 −0.122 0.056 −0.062 −0.084 0.021
long-run ∆ emp/sales −0.336 −0.362 0.026 −0.368 −0.387 0.019 −0.264 −0.3 0.037
Leverage-Related Firm Characteristics
market leverage 0.163 0.186 −0.024∗∗∗ 0.191 0.21 −0.019 0.099 0.122 −0.022∗
book leverage 0.185 0.2 −0.015∗ 0.215 0.225 −0.011 0.118 0.131 −0.012
market leverage ind-adj 0.039 0.06 −0.022∗∗∗ 0.032 0.059 −0.027∗∗∗ 0.054 0.065 −0.011
book leverage ind-adj 0.045 0.057 −0.012 0.036 0.054 −0.017∗ 0.065 0.066 −0.001
market leverage hist-adj −0.026 −0.018 −0.007 −0.035 −0.025 −0.011 −0.005 −0.002 −0.003
book leverage hist-adj −0.02 −0.005 −0.015∗ −0.026 −0.01 −0.016∗ −0.006 0.008 −0.015
Industry Characteristics
high-tech industry 0.313 0.267 0.046∗∗ 0 0 0 1 1 0
ind outside input 0.615 0.609 0.006 0.616 0.602 0.014∗∗ 0.612 0.628 −0.016∗∗
compete (TNIC) 0.76 0.695 0.065∗∗∗ 0.737 0.683 0.054∗∗∗ 0.811 0.726 0.085∗∗∗
supplier compete 0.611 0.596 0.015∗∗∗ 0.593 0.577 0.016∗∗∗ 0.649 0.647 0.002
Observations 1078 679 741 498 337 181
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Panel B (1) Whole Sample (2) Non High-Technology (3) High-Technology
PO increases=1 PO increases=0 Difference PO increases=1 PO increases=0 Difference PO increases=1 PO increases=0 Difference
Outsourcing-Related Characteristics
PO1year/COGS 0.198 0.094 0.104∗∗∗ 0.189 0.092 0.097∗∗∗ 0.219 0.099 0.119∗∗∗
POlong/POtot 0.193 0.150 0.043∗∗∗ 0.228 0.180 0.048∗∗∗ 0.114 0.078 0.036∗∗∗
General Firm Characteristics
log(sales) 6.517 6.211 0.306∗∗∗ 6.815 6.46 0.355∗∗∗ 5.877 5.656 0.220∗∗
log(1+age) 2.749 2.601 0.149∗∗∗ 2.843 2.665 0.178∗∗∗ 2.548 2.457 0.091∗
log(1+#patents) 2.968 2.678 0.291∗∗∗ 2.838 2.474 0.364∗∗∗ 3.249 3.131 0.117
Tobin’s Q 1.817 1.61 0.208∗∗∗ 1.776 1.599 0.177∗∗∗ 1.907 1.633 0.274∗∗∗
sales growth 0.141 0.059 0.082∗∗∗ 0.14 0.059 0.081∗∗∗ 0.142 0.057 0.085∗∗∗
profit/assets 0.092 0.07 0.022∗∗∗ 0.102 0.079 0.023∗∗∗ 0.07 0.051 0.019∗∗∗
operating margin 0.072 0.039 0.033∗∗∗ 0.075 0.036 0.040∗∗∗ 0.066 0.048 0.018
cash/assets 0.234 0.23 0.004 0.187 0.185 0.002 0.335 0.332 0.003
payout/earnings 0.241 0.237 0.004 0.236 0.222 0.014 0.252 0.271 −0.019
Investment-Related Firm Characteristics
emp/sales 3.995 4.180 −0.185∗ 3.835 4.070 −0.235∗∗ 4.341 4.425 −0.084
CAPX/sales 0.048 0.048 0 0.044 0.045 −0.001 0.056 0.052 0.003
R&D/sales 0.099 0.096 0.002 0.08 0.075 0.005 0.139 0.144 −0.005
PPE/assets 0.462 0.47 −0.009 0.513 0.516 −0.003 0.351 0.368 −0.017
long-run ∆ PPE/assets −0.099 −0.041 −0.059∗∗∗ −0.085 −0.049 −0.036∗ −0.132 −0.022 −0.110∗∗∗
long-run ∆ emp/sales −0.366 −0.313 −0.054∗∗∗ −0.403 −0.339 −0.064∗∗∗ −0.283 −0.254 −0.029
Leverage-Related Firm Characteristics
market leverage 0.146 0.18 −0.034∗∗∗ 0.171 0.207 −0.036∗∗∗ 0.093 0.12 −0.027∗∗∗
book leverage 0.178 0.187 −0.009 0.206 0.216 −0.01 0.117 0.121 −0.005
market leverage ind-adj 0.026 0.045 −0.019∗∗∗ 0.017 0.035 −0.018∗∗∗ 0.046 0.068 −0.023∗∗∗
book leverage ind-adj 0.039 0.044 −0.004 0.029 0.034 −0.004 0.061 0.065 −0.005
market leverage hist-adj −0.037 −0.01 −0.026∗∗∗ −0.048 −0.019 −0.029∗∗∗ −0.011 0.009 −0.020∗∗
book leverage hist-adj −0.029 −0.018 −0.011∗∗ −0.035 −0.024 −0.011∗ −0.015 −0.005 −0.01
Industry Characteristics
high-tech industry 0.318 0.31 0.008 0 0 0 1 1 0
ind outside input 0.612 0.614 −0.002 0.613 0.617 −0.004 0.610 0.608 0.002
compete (TNIC) 0.771 0.752 0.019∗∗∗ 0.75 0.723 0.027∗∗∗ 0.816 0.816 0
supplier compete 0.609 0.601 0.008∗∗∗ 0.593 0.582 0.011∗∗∗ 0.642 0.641 0.001
Observations 2022 2380 1380 1643 642 737
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Table 2.3: Determinants of PO existence / PO increase
The table displays the marginal effects of probit regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variable, PO exists is a
firm-level variable that equals one, if the firm has disclosed a non-zero amount of purchase obligations at least
once during the sample period. The regression (4) and (5) are for the sub-samples of non high-technology and
high-technology firms. (6) of Panel A estimates a Tobit regression of PO/sales with the industry-fixed effects. In
Panel B, the sample only includes the firms with purchase obligations. The dependent variable, PO increases is
a firm-year level variable that equals one, if the firm increases purchase obligations. (5) of Panel B estimates a
regression of PO/sales with the firm-fixed effects. The sample consists of firm-years with available data in the
period of 2004-2009. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for clustering at the firm level (unless they
are for between-regressions). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Whole Sample Non High-Tech High-tech Whole Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PO exists PO exists PO exists PO exists PO exists PO/sales
log(sales) 0.203∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.0239∗∗∗
(8.98) (9.87) (9.14) (7.94) (4.42) (6.92)
log(1+#patents) 0.0493∗∗ 0.0497∗∗ 0.0475∗∗ 0.0401∗ 0.0518 0.00566∗∗
(2.52) (2.55) (2.42) (1.75) (1.34) (2.01)
log(1+age) -0.100∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.0680 -0.152∗ -0.0138∗∗
(-2.44) (-2.75) (-2.46) (-1.41) (-1.85) (-2.38)
Tobin’s Q 0.0633∗ 0.0562∗ 0.0544 0.0507 0.0786 0.00145
(1.86) (1.69) (1.59) (1.28) (1.11) (0.29)
sales growth 0.147 0.104 0.109 0.0958 0.187 0.123∗∗∗
(1.04) (0.77) (0.76) (0.56) (0.70) (3.72)
high-tech industry 0.204∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.149∗
(2.66) (2.22) (1.83)
ind outside input -0.0716 -0.188 -0.0977 0.219 -1.537
(-0.20) (-0.52) (-0.26) (0.53) (-1.53)
compete (TNIC) 0.406∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗ 0.156 0.676∗∗
(2.77) (2.24) (0.90) (2.07)
supplier compete 1.361∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗ 1.236∗∗ 1.925
(3.03) (2.05) (2.39) (1.17)
Observations 1638 1697 1638 1147 491 1703
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.081 0.081 0.079 0.096 1.244
Between Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO YES
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Panel B PO exist=1 Non High-Tech High-tech PO exist=1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PO increases PO increases PO increases PO increases PO/sales
log(sales) 0.0664∗∗∗ 0.0677∗∗∗ 0.0741∗∗∗ 0.0429∗ -0.0474∗∗
(5.03) (5.07) (4.55) (1.80) (-2.36)
log(1+#patents) -0.00365 -0.00328 0.00207 -0.00939
(-0.34) (-0.30) (0.16) (-0.47)
log(1+age) -0.00525 -0.00194 -0.00874 -0.00144 0.0169
(-0.17) (-0.06) (-0.24) (-0.03) (0.77)
Tobin’s Q 0.0809∗∗∗ 0.0801∗∗∗ 0.0598∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.00726
(3.76) (3.73) (2.24) (3.70) (1.50)
sales growth 0.379∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.0145
(5.33) (5.24) (4.29) (2.82) (1.07)
high-tech industry 0.0571 0.0475
(1.21) (0.97)
compete (TNIC) 0.0648 0.0402 0.0757 -0.0718 0.00166
(0.73) (0.44) (0.70) (-0.39) (0.10)
supplier compete 0.183 0.277 -0.0746 -0.211
(0.65) (0.92) (-0.08) (-1.38)
ind PO/sales, lagged -0.469 -0.457 -0.488 -0.731 0.0948
(-1.50) (-1.42) (-1.44) (-0.55) (1.26)
macro credit spread -0.0994∗∗∗ -0.0972∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.0345 -0.00215
(-5.11) (-4.88) (-5.17) (-0.89) (-0.70)
Observations 4044 4012 2757 1255 4012
Pseudo R2 0.027 0.027 0.030 0.027 0.702
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO YES
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Table 2.4: PO Exists and Capital Expenditures
The table presents the estimated relations between PO existence and capital expenditures using seemingly
unrelated regressions with the identical regressors. The two dependent variables are PO exists and CAPX/sales.
PO exists is a firm-level variable that equals one, if the firm has disclosed a non-zero amount of purchase obligations
at least once during the sample period. CAPX/sales is capital expenditures divided by total sales in the same
year. Other variables are defined in Appendix. The sample consists of firm-years with available data in the period
of 2004-2009. Rho refers to the correlation of the residuals in the two equations. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are
robust and adjusted for clustering at the firm level (unless they are for between-regressions). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
PO exists CAPX/sales PO exists CAPX/sales PO exists CAPX/sales
log(sales) 0.0708*** -0.00289** 0.198*** -0.00290*** 0.218*** -0.00254**
(10.04) (-2.18) (10.16) (-3.25) (9.34) (-2.41)
log(1+age) -0.0376*** -0.00820*** -0.116*** -0.00741*** -0.115** -0.00606***
(-2.58) (-3.74) (-2.79) (-4.38) (-2.54) (-3.44)
log(1+#patents) 0.0156** 0.00423*** 0.0510*** 0.00371*** 0.0534*** 0.00402***
(2.49) (3.87) (2.96) (5.09) (2.61) (4.80)
Tobin’s Q 0.0232** 0.00355* 0.0310 0.00506*** 0.0154 0.00379***
(2.00) (1.78) (1.40) (5.59) (0.65) (3.80)
sales growth 0.0510 0.0672** 0.0174 0.0114* -0.0420 0.00913
(1.03) (2.52) (0.32) (1.89) (-0.74) (1.47)
compete (TNIC) 0.149*** -0.00214 0.335*** 0.00434 0.180 -0.0151*
(2.80) (-0.25) (2.90) (0.75) (1.32) (-1.76)
high-tech industry 0.0696*** -0.00781* 0.166** -0.00693* -0.420 0.0670***
(2.64) (-1.76) (2.34) (-1.90) (-0.59) (9.40)
Rho 0.0540** 0.0656*** 0.0659***
(2.27) (2.61) (2.64)
Observations 1644 7629 7629
Log Likelihood 1147.6 4808.7 5739.3
Chi-squared 213.2 208.7 .
p-value < 1% < 1% < 1%
Between Effects YES NO NO
Year Fixed Effects NO YES YES
Industry Fixed Effects NO NO YES
SIZE AGE # PATENTS TOBIN’S Q SALES GROWTH COMPETITION HIGH-TECH
PO Exists + − + + +
CAPX/sales − − + + + − −
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Table 2.5: PO Exists and Capital Intensity
The table presents the estimated relations between PO existence and capital intensity using seemingly unrelated
regressions with the identical regressors. The two dependent variables are PO exists and PPE/assets. PO exists is
a firm-level variable that equals one, if the firm has disclosed a non-zero amount of purchase obligations at least
once during the sample period. PPE/assets is gross property, plant and equipment divided by total assets in the
prior year. Other variables are defined in Appendix. The sample consists of firm-years with available data in the
period of 2004-2009. Rho refers to the correlation of the residuals in the two equations. t-statistics (in parenthesis)
are robust and adjusted for clustering at the firm level (unless they are for between-regressions). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
PO exists PPE/assets PO exists PPE/assets PO exists PPE/assets
log(sales) 0.203*** 0.0248*** 0.198*** 0.0214*** 0.218*** -0.00506
(9.27) (5.26) (10.17) (4.49) (9.34) (-1.15)
log(1+age) -0.102** 0.0617*** -0.116*** 0.0680*** -0.115** 0.0478***
(-2.47) (6.48) (-2.78) (6.47) (-2.53) (5.39)
log(1+#patents) 0.0502*** -0.0135*** 0.0510*** -0.0105** 0.0533*** 0.00830**
(2.61) (-3.18) (2.96) (-2.35) (2.61) (2.02)
Tobin’s Q 0.0645* -0.0409*** 0.0311 -0.0310*** 0.0161 -0.00796*
(1.91) (-5.78) (1.41) (-6.30) (0.67) (-1.76)
sales growth 0.149 -0.0233 0.0168 0.0174 -0.0439 0.0299***
(1.05) (-0.61) (0.31) (1.22) (-0.79) (2.69)
compete (TNIC) 0.405*** -0.0952*** 0.336*** -0.114*** 0.182 -0.0931***
(2.77) (-2.84) (2.91) (-3.84) (1.35) (-3.22)
high-tech industry 0.199*** -0.103*** 0.165** -0.107*** -0.420 0.0386
(2.62) (-6.60) (2.33) (-6.66) (-0.59) (1.05)
Rho 0.0232 0.00660 -0.00632
(0.72) (0.23) (-0.22)
Observations 1644 7629 7629
Log Likelihood -1352.9 -6789.5 -4379.6
Chi-squared 146.9 208.6 .
p-value < 1% < 1% < 1%
Between Effects YES NO NO
Year Fixed Effects NO YES YES
Industry Fixed Effects NO NO YES
SIZE AGE # PATENTS TOBIN’S Q SALES GROWTH COMPETITION HIGH-TECH
PO Exists + − + + + +
PPE/assets + + − − − −
88
Table 2.6: PO Exists and Leverage
The table presents the estimated relations between PO existence and market leverage using seemingly unrelated
regressions with the identical regressors. The two dependent variables are PO exists and market leverage. PO
exists is a firm-level variable that equals one, if the firm has disclosed a non-zero amount of purchase obligations at
least once during the sample period. market leverage is the ratio of total debt to the market value of assets. Other
variables are defined in Appendix. The sample consists of firm-years with available data in the period of 2004-2009.
Rho refers to the correlation of the residuals in the two equations. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and
adjusted for clustering at the firm level (unless they are for between-regressions). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
PO exists market leverage PO exists market leverage PO exists market leverage
log(sales) 0.204*** 0.0229*** 0.198*** 0.0230*** 0.218*** 0.0177***
(9.26) (8.90) (10.16) (9.72) (9.29) (7.12)
log(1+age) -0.102** -0.0166*** -0.116*** -0.0113** -0.113** -0.0141***
(-2.48) (-3.00) (-2.79) (-2.09) (-2.49) (-2.64)
log(1+#patents) 0.0499*** -0.00991*** 0.0507*** -0.0101*** 0.0537*** -0.00794***
(2.59) (-4.63) (2.95) (-4.85) (2.63) (-3.60)
Tobin’s Q 0.0658** -0.0595*** 0.0317 -0.0491*** 0.0177 -0.0431***
(1.97) (-12.09) (1.43) (-17.12) (0.74) (-15.39)
sales growth 0.146 0.0168 0.0172 -0.00240 -0.0440 0.000464
(1.05) (0.77) (0.31) (-0.30) (-0.79) (0.07)
compete (TNIC) 0.404*** -0.0764*** 0.336*** -0.0679*** 0.179 -0.0253
(2.76) (-3.80) (2.91) (-4.46) (1.33) (-1.56)
high-tech industry 0.198*** -0.0604*** 0.165** -0.0547*** -0.429 -0.114***
(2.61) (-7.26) (2.33) (-6.90) (-0.61) (-3.50)
Rho -0.102*** -0.0911*** -0.110***
(-3.19) (-3.58) (-4.21)
Observations 1644 7629 7629
Log Likelihood -306.9 -2184.5 -901.8
Chi-squared 146.4 208.1 .
p-value < 1% < 1% < 1%
Between Effects YES NO NO
Year Fixed Effects NO YES YES
Industry Fixed Effects NO NO YES
SIZE AGE # PATENTS TOBIN’S Q SALES GROWTH COMPETITION HIGH-TECH
PO Exists + − + + + +
market leverage + − − − − −
89
Table 2.7: Propensity Score Based Effect of Outsourcing on Leverage
The table presents the effects of outsourcing on leverage. The probit regressions of PO exists on matching
variables, log(sales), log(1+age), log(1+#patents), Tobin’s Q, operating margin, PPE/assets, high-tech industry
estimate outsourcing propensity. PO exists is a firm-level variable that equals one, if the firm has disclosed a
non-zero amount of purchase obligations at least once during the sample period. The control observations are the
10 nearest neighbors across the matching variables with the exact SIC code or the code as close as possible. The
variable of interest is market leverage or book leverage, which is the ratio of total debt to the market value or book
value of assets. Market value of total assets is market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock
plus debt (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) plus book value of minority interest. ind-adj represents the
subtraction by the 4-digit SIC industry median of the variable. Other variables are defined in Appendix. Results
are robust to using different numbers of control observations. The sample consists of firm-years with available
data in the period of 2004-2009. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Whole Sample
Year [Outsourcing - Non outsourcing] Std. Err. z P>z N
market leverage - industry adjusted
2004-2009 (unadjusted) −0.024∗∗∗ 0.009 -2.824 0.005 1706
2004-2009 −0.030∗∗∗ 0.008 -3.797 0.000 1706
2004 −0.005 0.008 -0.561 0.575 1378
2005 −0.006 0.008 -0.739 0.460 1349
2006 −0.020∗∗ 0.008 -2.549 0.011 1321
2007 −0.032∗∗∗ 0.009 -3.405 0.001 1293
2008 −0.045∗∗∗ 0.013 -3.413 0.001 1285
2009 −0.032∗∗∗ 0.010 -3.122 0.002 1227
Panel B: Whole Sample
Year [Outsourcing - Non outsourcing] Std. Err. z P>z N
book leverage - industry adjusted
2004-2009 (unadjusted) −0.015 0.009 -1.605 0.109 1706
2004-2009 −0.018∗∗ 0.009 -2.108 0.035 1706
2004 0.001 0.010 0.069 0.945 1378
2005 0.006 0.009 0.650 0.516 1349
2006 −0.008 0.010 -0.793 0.428 1321
2007 −0.020∗ 0.011 -1.931 0.054 1293
2008 −0.021∗ 0.011 -1.877 0.061 1285
2009 −0.019∗ 0.010 -1.869 0.062 1227
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Table 2.8: Outsourcing and Leverage in IV Estimation
The table presents the effects of outsourcing existence (PO ever exists) and outsourcing intensity (PO1year/COGS)
on firm leverage. The dependent variable is market leverage, which is the ratio of total debt to the market value
of assets. Other variables are defined in Appendix. The sample consists of firm-years with available data in the
period of 2004-2009. Year and industry (in each four-digit SIC code) fixed effects are included in all specifications.
t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: market leverage
PO ever exists -0.0204∗∗ -0.0316∗∗∗ -0.0701∗∗∗
(-2.27) (-3.51) (-3.44)
PO1year/COGS -0.0604∗∗∗ -0.0502∗∗∗ -0.0896∗∗∗
(-3.73) (-2.92) (-3.30)
log(sales) 0.0183∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0174∗∗∗
(7.34) (7.06) (6.83) (6.67)
log(1+age) -0.0240∗∗∗ -0.0253∗∗∗ -0.0225∗∗∗ -0.0222∗∗∗
(-4.39) (-4.18) (-4.10) (-3.75)
Tobin’s Q -0.0445∗∗∗ -0.0446∗∗∗ -0.0445∗∗∗ -0.0448∗∗∗
(-16.62) (-14.95) (-16.47) (-14.83)
operating margin -0.0333∗∗∗ -0.0324∗∗∗ -0.0318∗∗∗ -0.0294∗∗∗
(-5.08) (-4.09) (-4.91) (-3.95)
sales growth -0.000605 -0.0000166 0.00126 0.00290
(-0.09) (-0.00) (0.20) (0.40)
PPE/assets 0.0450∗∗∗ 0.0523∗∗∗ 0.0443∗∗∗ 0.0508∗∗∗
(2.87) (3.01) (2.83) (2.95)
compete (TNIC) -0.0357∗∗ -0.0359∗ -0.0355∗∗ -0.0362∗
(-2.11) (-1.87) (-2.08) (-1.86)
supplier compete -0.000399 -0.0000625 -0.0000204 0.000709
(-0.05) (-0.01) (-0.00) (0.09)
Observations 9248 7627 6191 9219 7627 6191
Adjusted R2 0.257 0.339 0.333 0.258 0.337 0.336
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation Method OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
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Table 2.9: PO Exists and R&D Expenditures
The table presents the estimated relations between PO existence and R&D expenditures using seemingly unrelated regressions with the identical regressors. The two
dependent variables are PO exists and R&D/sales. PO exists is a firm-level variable that equals one, if the firm has disclosed a non-zero amount of purchase obligations
at least once during the sample period. R&D/sales is R&D expenditures divided by sales in the same year. Other variables are defined in Appendix. The sample
consists of firm-years with available data in the period of 2004-2009. Rho refers to the correlation of the residuals in the two equations. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are
robust and adjusted for clustering at the firm level (unless they are for between-regressions). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) Non High-Tech (4) High-Tech
PO exists R&D/sales PO exists R&D/sales PO exists R&D/sales PO exists R&D/sales
log(sales) 0.223*** -0.0277*** 0.246*** -0.0194*** 0.249*** -0.0215*** 0.235*** -0.0142***
(10.67) (-13.95) (11.55) (-11.37) (9.56) (-10.13) (6.24) (-5.13)
log(1+age) -0.0641* -0.00258 -0.0767* -0.00569* -0.0182 0.00165 -0.197** -0.0235***
(-1.68) (-0.86) (-1.80) (-1.90) (-0.36) (0.49) (-2.47) (-4.04)
Tobin’s Q 0.0786** 0.0297*** 0.0238 0.0110*** 0.0185 0.0120*** 0.0305 0.00913**
(2.37) (8.04) (1.00) (4.32) (0.66) (3.67) (0.67) (2.38)
sales growth 0.134 0.0527*** -0.0547 0.00220 -0.0982 0.0145** 0.0753 -0.0325***
(0.96) (2.62) (-0.99) (0.34) (-1.54) (1.97) (0.68) (-2.58)
compete (TNIC) 0.434*** 0.202*** 0.197 0.0984*** 0.0678 0.0932*** 0.492** 0.104***
(2.96) (15.73) (1.45) (10.56) (0.42) (8.15) (1.99) (6.37)
high-tech industry 0.248*** 0.0204*** -0.605 -0.0210
(3.38) (3.06) (-0.69) (-1.58)
Rho 0.0829*** 0.0752*** 0.0652** 0.0933*
(2.59) (2.83) (2.06) (1.88)
Observations 1644 7629 5345 2284
Between Effects YES NO NO NO
Industry-Year Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES
SIZE AGE TOBIN’S Q SALES GROWTH COMPETITION HIGH-TECH
Whole Sample PO Exists + − + + +
R&D/sales − + + + +
Non High-Tech PO Exists +
R&D/sales − + + +
High-Tech PO Exists + − +
R&D/sales − − + − +
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Table 2.10: Propensity Score Based Effect of Outsourcing on R&D
The table presents the effects of outsourcing on R&D expenditures. The probit regressions of PO exists on
matching variables, log(sales), log(1+age), Tobin’s Q, operating margin estimate outsourcing propensity. PO exists
is a firm-level variable that equals one, if the firm has disclosed a non-zero amount of purchase obligations at least
once during the sample period. The control observations are the 10 nearest neighbors across the matching variables
with the exact SIC code or the code as close as possible. The variable of interest is R&D/sales - industry adjusted,
which is the industry adjusted R&D expenditures divided by sales in the same year. ind-adj represents the
subtraction by the 4-digit SIC industry median of the variable. Other variables are defined in Appendix. Results
are robust to using different numbers of control observations. The sample consists of firm-years with available
data in the period of 2004-2009. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Non High-Technology Industries
Year [Outsourcing - Non outsourcing] Std. Err. z P>z N
R&D/sales - industry adjusted
2004-2009 0.006 0.005 1.374 0.169 1236
2004 0.003 0.006 0.561 0.575 992
2005 0.006 0.006 0.949 0.343 976
2006 0.008 0.006 1.263 0.207 979
2007 0.003 0.007 0.495 0.621 945
2008 0.007 0.006 1.111 0.267 927
2009 −0.000 0.007 -0.013 0.990 903
Panel B: High-Technology Industries
Year [Outsourcing - Non outsourcing] Std. Err. z P>z N
R&D/sales - industry adjusted
2004-2009 0.017∗ 0.010 1.692 0.091 518
2004 0.002 0.012 0.186 0.853 431
2005 0.016 0.011 1.518 0.129 421
2006 0.014 0.010 1.364 0.173 404
2007 0.024∗∗ 0.011 2.107 0.035 408
2008 0.037∗∗∗ 0.011 3.287 0.001 391
2009 0.027∗∗ 0.012 2.262 0.024 369
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Table 2.11: PO Exists and Operating Segments
The table presents the estimated relations between PO existence and the number of operating segments using seemingly unrelated regressions with the identical regressors. The
two dependent variables are PO exists and log(#seg). PO exists is a firm-level variable that equals one, if the firm has disclosed a non-zero amount of purchase obligations at
least once during the sample period. log(#seg) is the log of a total count of the operating segments which appear in different industries at the four-digit sic code level. Other vari-
ables are defined in Appendix. The sample consists of firm-years with available data in the period of 2004-2009. Rho refers to the correlation of the residuals in the two equations.
(1) (2) (3) Non High-Tech (4) High-Tech
PO exists log(#seg) PO exists log(#seg) PO exists log(#seg) PO exists log(#seg)
log(sales) 0.203*** 0.0893*** 0.218*** 0.0746*** 0.219*** 0.0688*** 0.215*** 0.0859***
(9.26) (13.50) (9.33) (9.87) (7.73) (7.53) (5.07) (6.63)
log(1+age) -0.101** 0.112*** -0.115** 0.115*** -0.0653 0.128*** -0.221*** 0.0728***
(-2.47) (9.74) (-2.53) (8.25) (-1.21) (7.31) (-2.59) (3.36)
log(1+#patents) 0.0500*** -0.000833 0.0531*** 0.00274 0.0642** 0.0109 0.0325 -0.0142
(2.60) (-0.13) (2.60) (0.38) (2.53) (1.31) (0.93) (-1.05)
Tobin’s Q 0.0648* -0.0339*** 0.0161 -0.0189*** 0.00733 -0.0236*** 0.0286 -0.0115
(1.92) (-4.25) (0.67) (-2.91) (0.26) (-2.96) (0.62) (-1.05)
sales growth 0.149 0.0334 -0.0438 0.0183 -0.0865 0.0222 0.0858 -0.00352
(1.05) (1.12) (-0.79) (1.44) (-1.34) (1.47) (0.78) (-0.15)
compete (TNIC) 0.406*** -0.176*** 0.182 -0.0723 0.0604 0.00368 0.476* -0.296***
(2.77) (-3.66) (1.35) (-1.47) (0.37) (0.07) (1.94) (-2.94)
high-tech industry 0.200*** -0.0760*** -0.420 -0.290
(2.63) (-3.61) (-0.59) (-1.31)
Rho -0.0672* -0.0399 -0.00511 -0.144**
(-1.95) (-1.26) (-0.13) (-2.54)
Observations 1644 7629 5345 2284
Between Effects YES NO NO NO
Industry-Year Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES
SIZE AGE # PATENTS TOBIN’S Q SALES GROWTH COMPETITION HIGH-TECH
Whole Sample PO Exists + − + + + +
log(#seg) + + − − −
Non High-Tech PO Exists + +
log(#seg) + + −
High-Tech PO Exists + − +
log(#seg) + + −
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Table 2.12: Propensity Score Based Effect of Outsourcing on the Number of Seg-
ments
The table presents the effects of outsourcing on the number of business segments. The probit regressions of
PO exists on matching variables, log(sales), log(1+age), log(1+#patents), Tobin’s Q, operating margin estimate
outsourcing propensity. PO exists is a firm-level variable that equals one, if the firm has disclosed a non-zero
amount of purchase obligations at least once during the sample period. The control observations are the 10 nearest
neighbors across the matching variables with the exact SIC code or the code as close as possible. The variable of
interest is log(#seg), which is the log of a total count of the operating segments which appear in different industries
at the four-digit sic code level. ∆ seg is the change in the total number of four-digit SIC code industry segments.
Other variables are defined in Appendix. Results are robust to using different numbers of control observations.
The sample consists of firm-years with available data in the period of 2004-2009. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Non High-Technology Industries
Year [Outsourcing - Non outsourcing] Std. Err. z P>z N
log(#seg)
2004-2009 (∆ seg) 0.034∗∗∗ 0.012 2.838 0.005 1086
2004-2009 0.039 0.026 1.503 0.133 1101
2004 0.046 0.031 1.481 0.139 858
2005 0.073∗∗ 0.031 2.366 0.018 839
2006 0.075∗∗ 0.031 2.401 0.016 832
2007 0.084∗∗ 0.033 2.570 0.010 805
2008 0.068∗∗ 0.032 2.090 0.037 786
2009 0.063∗ 0.036 1.756 0.079 687
Panel B: High-Technology Industries
Year [Outsourcing - Non outsourcing] Std. Err. z P>z N
log(#seg)
2004-2009 (∆ seg) 0.016 0.015 1.036 0.300 451
2004-2009 −0.053∗ 0.032 -1.651 0.099 459
2004 −0.043 0.037 -1.139 0.255 360
2005 −0.065∗ 0.038 -1.693 0.090 347
2006 −0.094∗∗ 0.037 -2.506 0.012 333
2007 −0.042 0.038 -1.091 0.275 340
2008 −0.045 0.040 -1.115 0.265 318
2009 −0.016 0.046 -0.347 0.729 262
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Chapter 3
Firm Risk Taking versus CEO Diversification:
Evidence from Outsourcing Firms
3.1 Introduction
I examine CEO compensation of outsourcing firms, using a new dataset of
purchase obligations from firm 10-Ks. I first document two stylized facts: 1. CEOs
in outsourcing firms receive significantly higher compensation than do CEOs in
non-outsourcing firms (50% more in total compensation on average1). 2. The use of
equity-based compensation in outsourcing firms is greater than in non-outsourcing
firms by 5% on average. Can this relatively high compensation in outsourcing firms
be justified? Is this rise in CEO compensation related to the greater use of equity-
based compensation? This paper attempts to address these questions.
[INSERT FIGURE 3.1 HERE]
Outsourcing firm compensation policies are interesting to examine, particu-
larly because firm risk-taking incentives and CEO diversification incentives coexist
in outsourcing firms. Such a tension between the two different incentives of the firm
and its CEO creates an optimal trade-off in the use of equity-based compensation.
1See Figure 3.1 for the average CEO pay in outsourcing vs. non-outsourcing firms from 2004
to 2010.
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A firm’s investment is influenced by many factors such as the firm’s financial
constraints, product market competition, and operating overhead. With these con-
straints, the firm cannot fully exert its efforts in long-term projects such as R&D.
Moon (2011) shows that outsourcing increases firm flexibility. The firm flexibility
refers to the ability of a firm to adjust its factors of operation in response to product
market changes. Based on this flexibility, outsourcing firms would have greater risk
tolerance and capacity in investment spendings. Therefore, outsourcing firms can
invest more heavily in R&D than non-outsourcing firms. However, even in outsourc-
ing firms, the highly uncertain and long-term nature of R&D projects lead to agency
problems, which may result in suboptimal R&D investment (Jensen 1986; Ryan and
Wiggins III 2002). For example, managers could pass up risk-increasing positive net
present value R&D projects that would be beneficial to shareholders, because their
human capital tied up to the firm value (Amihud and Lev 1981; Smith and Stulz
1985). Therefore, to incentivize their managers to invest optimally in R&D, out-
sourcing firm shareholders are more likely to rely on equity-based compensation.
At the same time, outsourcing has a negative effect on the use of equity-based
compensation as well. Outsourcing activity inevitably increases risks of the firm.
For example, outsourcing firms are exposed to international risks and supplier firm-
specific risks by using other firms’ products or services. Also, with heavier R&D
investment, they may bear more risks in the outcomes of their R&D projects than
do non-outsourcing firms. Most of these risks are firm-specific, and shareholders
of the firm can diversify away these risks. However, firm-specific risk is not com-
pletely diversifiable for the firm’s manager whose personal wealth ties up in the firm
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with especially equity-based compensation. Therefore, outsourcing firms should pay
more to their CEOs to additionally compensate for this increased firm-specific risk.
The additional compensation equals to the deadweight loss incurred when
managers value the equity-based compensation at less than the price at which firms
could otherwise issue in the market. The understating of these costs departs from
the previous finance and accounting literature on private valuation of executives
with the loss of diversification (e.g. Hall and Murphy 2000; Jin 2000; Hall and Mur-
phy 2002). This further advances with Meulbroek (2001) who emphasizes that the
non-systematic, firm-specific risk as more costly to managers. This paper focuses
on this deadweight loss of equity-based compensation in outsourcing firms that have
higher firm-specific risk. Jin (2000) finds that firms appear to recognize this trade-
off between the benefits and costs of using equity-based compensation, by showing
that the pay-performance sensitivity is less as firm-specific risk increases. The level
of firm-specific risk is given in the previous studies and yet, there is no study ex-
ists about the direct tension between the firm’s promoting risk-taking behavior (the
more R&D) and the manager’s need to diversify the risk. Using a sample of out-
sourcing firms, this paper examines such a direct tension.
My analyses use a unique dataset of purchase obligations from firm 10-K fill-
ings to measure firm-level outsourcing activity. A purchase obligation is defined as
an enforceable and legally binding agreement to purchase goods or services from
other companies in the future. Using this measure, my analyses begin by examining
the relation between outsourcing intensity and the level of CEO compensation. I
find that CEO pay increases with outsourcing intensity, and this increase is most
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likely from outsourcing firms’ greater reliance on equity-based compensation.
Next, I examine whether the outsourcing firms’ greater reliance on equity-
based compensation arises from their efforts to spur R&D. I control for the fact
that R&D investment and outsourcing activity may be endogenous, using the firm’s
distance to the closest seaport as a primary instrument for outsourcing activity.
I find that R&D increases significantly as outsourcing intensity increases. As in
Guay (1999) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), the two primary characteristics
in equity-based compensation that promote risk-taking are the sensitivity of CEO
wealth to stock price (delta) and the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price volatil-
ity (vega). I show that the effectiveness of delta or vega in encouraging higher R&D
investment increases in general, as outsourcing intensifies.
I also find that outsourcing increases firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk. This
finding suggests that outsourcing firms compensate their managers more to adjust
this additional firm-specific risk. I further examine whether outsourcing firms rec-
ognize the significant deadweight loss of granting equity-based compensation, par-
ticularly when the managers are severely undiversified and highly risk-averse (for
example, CEOs with high delta and low vega). I find that the use of equity-based
compensation depends on the extent of managerial diversification and risk-aversion.
Outsourcing firms with CEOs having high-delta and low-vega compensation port-
folios do not increase their reliance on equity-based compensation as much as out-
sourcing firms with CEOs having low-delta and high-vega portfolios. Overall, these
results suggest that the direct tension between the firm’s pursuit of spurring R&D
and the manager’s need to diversify risks is well revealed in the outsourcing firms
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as an optimal trade-off of using equity-based compensation.
Related literature looks at the relation between compensation contracts and
managerial risk-taking behaviors. First strand of this literature examines why firms
increasingly use stock options as opposed to the other forms of incentive-aligned
compensation. This literature focuses on the role of convexity features in stock op-
tions to mitigate CEO risk-aversion. Guay (1999) finds that convexity of the CEO
compensation structure is positively related to firm risk-taking behaviors, such as
R&D expenditures and growth opportunities. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)
provides empirical evidence of a strong relation between the convexity in manager
compensation and riskier policy choices including R&D investment, the number of
lines of business, and leverage. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) further show that
the convexity is negatively related to cash balances.
Another strand of literature does not support the view that convexity can in-
crease a manger’s incentive to take risks. Ross (2004) shows that there exists no
incentive schedule that will make all expected utility maximizers more or less risk
averse. Empirically, Lewellen (2006) finds that higher option ownership tends to
increase the volatility costs of debt, and thus decrease the manager’s preference for
debt financing. These are the opposite results to those of Coles, Daniel, and Naveen
(2006). Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2011) provides new evidence that the decline in
option usage following the accounting rule change (FAS 123R) has no association
with corresponding reductions in risky firm policy choices.
This paper makes a contribution to the literature by examining a trade-off
between benefits and costs of using equity-based compensation, as outsourcing in-
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tensity varies cross-sectionally. I provide unique empirical evidence using an out-
sourcing firm sample that outsourcing firms realize this trade-off and determine their
compensation level and structure based on the optimal trade-off. My results support
the view in the first strand of the literature that the use of equity-based compensa-
tion plays an important role to induce optimal R&D investment from managers.
This paper is also related to the literature on executive pay rise. The CEO
compensation level in large U.S. companies has surged over the past several decades.
Previous studies on the literature generally focus on flawed corporate governance
and policy issues as possible causes for this pay rise. For example, Core, Holthausen,
and Larcker (1999) show empirical evidence that CEOs at firms with weaker gover-
nance structure receive greater compensation, and those firms suffer from the greater
agency problems and worse performance. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find
that CEO pay responds to a lucky dollar, and better governed firms pay their CEOs
less for luck. Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) also show how managerial power and
influence might lead to substantially inefficient executive compensation. However,
recent works argue that the high level and structure of CEO compensation reflects
market equilibrium by which firms can motivate and retain their CEOs. Gabaix
and Landier (2008) show that the increase in the level of CEO compensation can
be fully attributed to the corresponding increase in market capitalization of large
companies. Faulkender and Yang (2009) find that firms with highly paid CEOs are
more likely to be chosen as members of the peer group, so this increases the level of
median pay at the peer group and provides a mechanism for the pay manipulation.
However, the dramatic increases in total compensation are particularly pro-
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nounced in the manufacturing and financial services sectors (Faulkender, Kadyrzhanova,
Prabhala, and Senbet 2010). Thus far, firm production (outsourcing) decisions and
ensuing risk-taking behaviors have never been considered as direct explanation for
the executive pay rise. My results assist in understanding why managers in manu-
facturing firms (that possibly use incasing shares of outsourced production) should
be paid higher, by investigating their exposure to additional firm-specific risk.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss un-
derlying framework of my analyses in outsourcing firms’ use of equity-based compen-
sation. Section 3 details purchase obligations data and other data used throughout
the paper. Section 4 presents my empirical methodology and the results. Section 5
concludes.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, I discuss how outsourcing firms determine their optimal propor-
tion of equity-based compensation in the total compensation package. The frame-
work in this discussion is based on two theories in executive compensation. First,
the higher sensitivity to stock price (volatility) in the managerial compensation
scheme gives the manager incentives to invest in riskier assets (Guay 1999). Second,
managers with incomplete diversification privately value equity-based compensation
at less than the market value (Jin 2000; Meulbroek 2001; Hall and Murphy 2002).
Therefore, the firm’s costs of equity-based compensation depend on the private valu-
ation of the manager. Outsourcing firms are relevant examples to test these theories,
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in that both the benefits and costs of using equity-based compensation may increase
with outsourcing intensity.
My first objective is to understand how outsourcing influences R&D invest-
ment of the firm. Outsourcing can provide flexibility to the firm. Moon (2011) shows
that outsourcing firms lower operating leverage and generate higher cash flow. Based
on this operating flexibility, outsourcing firms would have higher capacity in invest-
ment spendings. In other words, their risk tolerance is greater. Figure 3.2 illustrates
this change in R&D investment, as outsourcing intensity varies. I hypothesize that
greater use of outsourcing will lead to greater use of equity-based compensation and
to higher R&D investment as a result. In Figure 3.2, the optimal level of R&D rises
from a to b to c, as outsourcing intensity increases. To induce the optimal level of
R&D from the manager, the proportional use of equity-based compensation should
increase as well from Sa to Sb to Sc. This relation is shown as the upright shifts of
the R&D investment curve with increases in outsourcing activity.
[INSERT FIGURE 3.2 AND 3.3 HERE]
However, the costs of granting equity-based compensation rise with outsourc-
ing intensity at the same time. Previous studies recognize the costs of grating equity-
based compensation as the risk premium associated with such compensation (Ross
2004). This risk premium depends on the extent of the manager’s outside wealth,
risk-aversion, diversification and the firm’s total risks. Outsourcing inevitably in-
creases risks of the firm, and most of these risks are idiosyncratic. The manager
needs to be compensated additionally for this increase in idiosyncratic risk, while
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shareholders might not concern about it. Therefore, the risk premium associated
with equity-based compensation increases with outsourcing, so the level of CEO
compensation would rise by the additional risk premium. This additional com-
pensation is the deadweight loss of granting equity-based compensation from the
perspective of shareholders.
Based on these benefits and costs of using equity-based compensation, the
firm optimizes the proportion of equity-based compensation in the total compen-
sation package at the point where the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal
cost. Figure 3.3 depicts the optimal proportion of equity-based compensation in
a non-outsourcing firm as S∗. This moves to S∗
′
when the firm outsources. The
increased benefits of using equity-based compensation by outsourcing are depicted
as the upward shift of the marginal benefit curve in both (a) and (b). At the same
time, the increased costs of using such compensation by outsourcing are depicted
also as the upward shift of the marginal cost curve.
(a) depicts the case of an outsourcing firm with a relatively diversified or
less risk-averse manager. The shift of marginal benefit curve exceeds the shift of
marginal cost curve. Thus, the firm use proportionally more equity-based compen-
sation than does the non-outsourcing firm (S∗
′
> S∗). (b) depicts the case of an
outsourcing firm with a less diversified or more risk-averse manager. The shift of
marginal cost curve exceeds the shift of marginal benefit curve. Therefore, the firm
uses less equity-based compensation than does the non-outsourcing firm (S∗
′
< S∗).
From this illustration, we expect that the positive effect of outsourcing on the use
of equity-based compensation will be manifested only in the outsourcing firms with
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relatively diversified or less risk-averse managers.
Based on the above discussion, the following hypotheses are formed and tested.
Hypothesis 3.1. Firm idiosyncratic risk is more likely to increase with outsourcing
intensity. Therefore, this increased firm risk leads higher compensation for outsourc-
ing firm CEOs.
Hypothesis 3.2. Outsourcing firms use proportionally more equity-based compen-
sation in the total CEO compensation package to induce higher R&D investment.
Hypothesis 3.3. The positive effect of outsourcing on the proportional usage of
equity-based compensation depends on the extent of managerial diversification and
risk-aversion.
3.3 Data
My primary dataset is the public manufacturing firms (SIC codes from 2000
to 3999) that disclose purchase obligations information to the Securities Exchange
Commissions (SEC). I electronically obtain this dataset by web-crawling to the
Edgar 10-K fillings site and parsing the documents using Perl programming. Then,
I supplement this dataset with the ExecuComp and Compustat databases by the
central index key (CIK).
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3.3.1 Purchase Obligations Data
The SEC issued in January 2003 a final rule on Disclosure about off-balance
sheet arrangements and aggregate contractual obligations.2 This rule requires pub-
lic companies other than small business issuers3 to provide an explanation of its
contractual obligations in a separately captioned subsection of the Management’s
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section. U.S. GAAP already requires firms to
aggregate and assess all of the specified categories of contractual obligations; long-
term debt obligations, capital lease obligations, and operating lease obligations.
This SEC’s final rule in January 2003 particularly includes the “purchase obliga-
tions” category and requires firms to provide tabular disclosure of all four categories
of contractual obligations.
The SEC defines a purchase obligation as an agreement to purchase goods
or services that is enforceable and legally binding on the registrant in the future.
Therefore, a firm’s purchase obligations represent the amount of inputs in produc-
tion that will be purchased in the near future (Lee 2010). Purchase obligations are
different with open-market orders, in that a firm legally submits purchase contracts
to the third parties. Thus, purchase obligations are more likely to capture a firm’s
outsourcing activity.
[INSERT FIGURE 3.4 HERE]
2This rule is to implement Section 401(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See Final Rule:
Disclosure in Managements Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and
Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Rel. No. 33-8182, Exchange Act Rel. 34-
47264, Financial Reporting Rel. No. FR-67, International Series Rel. No. 1266 (Jan. 27, 2003),
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8182.htm.
3SEC defines a small business issuer as a company that had less than $25 million in revenues in
its last fiscal year, and whose outstanding publicly-held stock is worth no more than $25 million.
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Figure 3.4 shows examples of purchase obligations disclosures from Apple Inc.’s
10-Ks. Firms generally do not subcategorize purchase obligations in their tabular
disclosures. They sometimes provide limited information on the types of purchase
obligations in the following footnotes. For manufacturing firms, the most common
type of purchase obligation is an inventory purchase commitment. A service agree-
ment, including advertising, marketing and IT, is another common type of purchase
obligation.4 The payment due is classified by specified periods in the tabular dis-
closure format. Among those specified periods, I use the the amount of purchase
obligations within 1 year.
3.3.2 Variables of Interest
My sample period covers from 2004 to 2010, because purchase obligations
data is completely available from 2004.5 Over the sample period, SEC also changed
the reporting requirement for executive compensation for fiscal years ending after
December 15, 2006 (the adoption of FAS 123R). The new disclosure rule rede-
fined certain compensation components. For example, the definitions of total direct
compensation (TDC1) and value of option awards (OPTION AWARDS FV) in the
ExecuComp database are different between pre- and post-FAS 123R periods. The
FAS 123R also separated the details of stock and option awards in two additional
tables, the outstanding equity award table and the plan-based award table in the
ExecuComp database. Therefore, I adjust each component of the variables under
4See Lee (2010) for discussion about the across-industry variation in the type of purchase
obligations.
5For the fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2003, all public firms (other than small
business issuers) are required to disclose purchase obligations in their financial statements.
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the new formats to the value under the old formats, in order to make important
compensation variables of interest comparable between pre- and post-FAS 123R.6
I construct the following key variables to examine possible relations in out-
sourcing activity, firm risk-taking, and CEO compensation. For outsourcing activ-
ity (PO1year/COGS ), I use the dollar amount of purchase obligations due within
1 year, scaled by costs of goods sold. This captures annual outsourcing activity of
a firm for a given year. I study R&D investment as a primary and relevant mea-
sure of risk-taking behaviors in a firm. To measure a firm’s R&D investment, I
use R&D/sales which is R&D expenditures for a given year, scaled by sales in the
prior year. I use two measures of firm risks, the log of total risks and the log of
idiosyncratic risks. Log(total risks) is the log of standard deviation of the firm’s
daily stock returns over the 252 trading days starting from June to May in the next
year. Log(idiosyncratic risks) is the log of standard deviation of residuals from a
regression of the firm’s daily excess stock returns (raw returns less the risk-less rate)
on the Fama-French 3 factors.7 The regression uses daily stock returns of a firm
over the one year period from June to May in the next year and yield one firm-year
observation of idiosyncratic risks.
My measures of CEO compensation are total direct compensation (TDC1 in
the ExecuComp database), cash compensation (salary plus bonus), and equity-based
compensation (stock and option awards). I take the logs of these variables to use
6I refer to the existing literature for this component adjustment (e.g. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen
2010; Kini and Williams 2011; Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu 2012). In particular, I recalculate the
Black-Scholes value of the option under the new formats, following the ExecuComp assumptions
for old formats which is available in the Wharton Data Research Services website.
7For a robustness check, I also use the CAPM model and get similar results.
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as dependent variables in my regressions, following Murphy (1999). To calculate
incentive measures, I follow the methodology in Guay (1999) and Core and Guay
(2002). I define CEO delta as the change in the dollar value of the CEO’s annual
compensation for a 1 % change in stock price, and CEO vega as the change in the
dollar value of the CEO’s annual compensation for a 0.01 change in stock price
volatility. Details on how I construct variables including these incentive measures
are provided in Appendix C.1.
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 present summary statistics on selected variables for
firm and compensation characteristics. I tabulate separate statistics for the different
quantile groups of outsourcing intensity; No purchase obligations (PO1year/COGS=0)
and Quantile 1 to 3 of PO1year/COGS (Low, Medium, and High). For each vari-
able, I winsorize the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. According to the
summary statistics, firms with purchase obligations represent more than two third
of total firms in the sample. In the original purchase obligations dataset, the per-
centage of firms with purchase obligations is around 50%. The percentage rises
slightly, after I merge the dataset to the ExecuComp database. It is because the
ExecuComp database only tracks compensation for executives of companies within
the S&P 1500. Small firms that generally do not have outside purchase contracts
are dropped out after merging.
[INSERT TABLE 3.1 AND 3.2 HERE]
Table 3.1 shows that firms with purchase obligations differ from the firms with-
out purchase obligations in many aspects. Particularly, outsourcing intensity rises
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with firm size, based on the percentiles of NYSE market capital. Market-to-book
ratio, sales growth and R&D investment also increase with outsourcing intensity,
while leverage decreases.
The CEO compensation variables in Table 3.2 show interesting linear relations
to outsourcing intensity. Both total compensation and equity-based compensation
increase, as outsourcing intensity increases. However, I don’t find this relation
between cash compensation and outsourcing. Looking at the structure of compen-
sation, firms use equity-based compensation increasingly more, when the firms do
more outsourcing. The difference in the proportional usage of equity-based compen-
sation between non-outsourcing firms and firms most intensely using outsourcing is
about 7.3%. I find that the similar linear relation is more pronounced between out-
sourcing and the risk-taking incentives, measured as CEO delta and vega. Also,
managers are more likely to sell their equity shares granted, as outsourcing intensity
increases. The probability that the CEO sells her shares is higher than by 6% in
the most intense outsourcing firm group than in the non-outsourcing firm group.
Overall, the more the firms do outsourcing, the more compensation the CEOs
in the firms receive, particularly with more equity-based compensation. With the
increased incentives in managerial risk-taking, outsourcing firms appear to invest
more heavily in R&D. However, it also appears that the managers desire to diver-
sify away their risks by selling their equity shares of the firms.
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3.4 Empirical Methodology and Results
This section presents the paper’s empirical methodology and results. I begin
by examining how much more the outsourcing firm CEOs receive, and whether any
specific form of compensation is preferred in outsourcing firms. Next, I examine
risk taking behaviors in outsourcing firms, by focusing on their R&D investment. I
further investigate the need for diversification from the CEO’s perspective, and then
whether outsourcing firms take into account this trade-off of firm risk-taking versus
CEO diversification to determine their optimal compensation level and structure.
3.4.1 Identification Strategy
In this paper, I analyze the possible relations in outsourcing activity, corpo-
rate investment, and CEO compensation. I focus on the cross-sectional relations,
because outsourcing activity is relatively invariant in the time-series and most of the
variations arise in the cross-section. Outsourcing firms are not randomly selected.
Moreover, the combination of complex decision processes in production, investment,
and compensation are surely simultaneous. Therefore, endogeneity concerns are
present in my study. I solve the identification problem using instrumental variables.
A valid instrument in my study is a variable that affects the amount of outside
purchase contracts, but has no impact on R&D investment and CEO compensation.
I use distance to the closest seaport as a primary instrumental variable in my anal-
yses.
The distance to the closest seaport proxies for the firm’s feasibility to purchase
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products from foreign suppliers by water transportation. Assuming a large number
of U.S. manufacturing firms hire foreign suppliers, distance to international entry
ports is an important factor to the firm’s decision to offshore production. Water
transportation is the cheapest method of transporting and still carries most imports
to the U.S., while the importance has decreased due to air transportation. This
study is not the first to examine the impact of distance to entry port on outsourc-
ing. Fort (2011) shows that plants over 200 miles away from a deep water port are
2.4 percentage points less likely to fragment (outsource), relative to plants within
50 miles of the closest port.
I construct a variable of Distance to closest seaport by calculating the distance
between the main business location of the firm and the firm’s closest seaport. The
information of the U.S. seaports are provided by the Maritime Administration’s
Port Import Export Reporting Service in their website. I identify 40 seaports that
carry with a value of imports greater than 500 TEUs.8 The complete list of these 40
seaports is provided in Appendix C.2. Then, I calculate the great-circle distances
between the firm location and the 40 seaports using their latitudes and longitudes
to find the closest distance of the firm to an international port of entry.
There might be a concern in using this variable to identify the relation between
outsourcing and R&D investment, because technology firms tend to cluster in the
west coastal states. For example, the southern part of the San Francisco Bay Area
in Northern California (Silicon Valley) which is very close to the port of Oakland,
8A TEU is a nominal unit of measure equivalent to a 20 x 8 x 8 shipping container. The results
remain similar, when I use 100, 300 or 500 TEUs for the cutoff.
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is home to many of the world’s largest technology firms and high-tech businesses.
To address this concern, I include coastal region fixed effects in all regressions. The
U.S. has 4 coastal state regions, which are Atlantic Ocean states, Pacific Ocean
states, Gulf of Mexico states, and Great Lake states. I control for these coastal
regions using the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean and Gulf of Mexico states dummy
variables.9 As a result, the relation between outsourcing activity and R&D invest-
ment (or compensation) adjusted by the coastal region fixed effects is analyzed in
my analyses. For a robustness check, I also include a dummy variable of whether
the firm is close to the Silicon Valley (less than 200 miles) in the R&D regressions.
I find that this does not change results.
I also add two additional variables in the first-stage regressions that might cap-
ture the geographical feasibility of outsourcing; the distances to the closest airport
(large airports with cargo services), and the distance to the closest border of entry.
However, these variables are not significant to explain the cross-sectional variations
of outsourcing activity. A possible explanation for the insignificant explanatory
power of air transportation is that airports with cargo services are not uncommon
at any location. In the data, the distances to cargo airports range from 0.25 to 400
miles with an average of 60 miles, while the distances to seaports range from 0.15 to
1150 miles with a mean of 225 miles. Another explanation is that firms might not
use air transportation as their primary method of transporting due to higher costs.
Also, a possible explanation for the insignificant explanatory power of the distance
9The map of the U.S. coastal states region is provided in Figure C.2 of Appendix. I do not
include Great Lake states dummy, because deep water ports are only relevant in my study.
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to border crossings is that this variable only concerns the trades with the Canada
and the Mexico, while manufacturing firms increasingly use Asian suppliers.
I report the first-stage regression results in Table C.3 of Appendix. In all in-
strumental regressions, the above three variables and PO1year/COGS (lagged) are
used as excluded instruments. (1) is the exact specification used at the first-stage in
all instrumental variable regressions. (2) and (3) are the extended specifications to
better examine the economic effects of the instrumental variables. The results show
that Distance to the closest seaport is the most important instrumental variable in
my identification strategy. A firm’s outsourcing activity is decreasing, as distance
to the closet seaport increases. Considering a lagged variable of PO1year/COGS is
also included in the first-state regression, the 1.2 percent increase of a firm’s out-
sourcing activity relative to the last year’s activity can be explained by whether the
firm is close to the seaport.
I conduct an additional set of tests to show that these variables are good in-
struments. All instrumental variable regressions pass the weak, under- and over-
identification tests. For R&D regressions, the F-test statistic of excluded instru-
ments is 239.81.10 The regressions are not over-identified (Hansen’s J-statistic is
1.627). For % Equity Comp regressions, the F-test statistic of excluded instru-
ments is 257.05.11 The regressions are also not over-identified (Hansen’s J-statistic
is 0.730).
10Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic for under-identification is 104.674, and Cragg-Donald Wald F-
statistic for weak identification is 1310.841.
11Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic is 104.798, and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 1329.823.
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3.4.2 CEO Compensation and Firm Risk in Outsourcing Firms
In Table 3.3, I begin my regression analyses by examining whether outsourcing
activity has an impact on CEO compensation. I use the logs of total compensation,
cash compensation, and equity-based compensation as dependent variables in (1),
(2), and (3), respectively. I alternately estimate OLS and IV regressions, and find the
results did not change between the two estimation methods. I control for year, and
industry in each three-digit SIC code. In addition, I control for coastal region using
the costal states definition in Figure C.2. The estimates show that the increased
outsourcing activity is more likely to lead to the firm’s manager receiving greater
compensation. An increase of outsourcing intensity by 0.1 is associated with a 2.7
percentage point increase in total compensation. This relation is more pronounced in
equity-based compensation. An increase of outsourcing intensity by 0.1 is associated
with a 3.5 percentage point increase in equity-based compensation. In contrast, the
results for cash compensation do not show this relation.
[INSERT TABLE 3.3 HERE]
Next, I further test whether an increase in firm risk in outsourcing firms is
likely to cause the increase in compensation. I separately examine total firm risk
and idiosyncratic risk. I do not examine changes in systematic risk, because the
market price movement of the firm’s securities will compensate for the changes in
systematic risk of equity-based compensation. I measure a firm’s total risk using
the firm’s daily stock return volatility in the given year’s 252 trading days. I also
use the monthly stock return volatility in the last 36 months for a robustness check,
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and the results are similar. A firm’s idiosyncratic risk is computed as the standard
deviation of residuals from a regression of the firm’s daily excess stock returns on
the Fama-French 3 factors. Using the CAPM model for the regression does not yield
different results.
Table 3.4 reports the results. I estimate between-, OLS, and IV regressions
alternatively for each risk measure. The estimated coefficients suggest that the in-
tensity of outsourcing is significantly associated with firm total risk and idiosyncratic
risk. The association is greater for the idiosyncratic risk. A rise in outsourcing in-
tensity by 0.1 results in a 1.3 percentage point increase in firm total risk, and a 1.7
percentage point increase in firm idiosyncratic risk. Thus far, the empirical results
suggest that outsourcing firm CEOs are exposed to more risks (particularly, more
idiosyncratic risk) and the firms compensate their CEOs for these additional risk
exposures with higher compensation.
[INSERT TABLE 3.4 HERE]
3.4.3 R&D Investment in Outsourcing Firms
This section examines R&D investment in outsourcing firms. Kothari, La-
guerre, and Leone (2002) provide empirical evidence that R&D expenditures are
high-risk investments compared to capital expenditures. And we also know from
the previous section that a firm’s outsourcing intensity significantly explains the
firm’s (idiosyncratic) risk. Therefore, now I examine whether outsourcing itself di-
rectly affects the firm’s R&D investment.
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[INSERT TABLE 3.5 HERE]
In Table 3.5, I estimate the effect of outsourcing intensity on R&D expendi-
tures scaled by firm sales.12 While my main focus is the estimated coefficient of
PO1year/COGS, I also control for the other important variables in explaining a
firm’s investment. These control variables are growth opportunities, operating prof-
itability, stock returns, and CEO characteristics such as age, tenure, and delta/vega
of CEO compensation portfolios. The results indicate that the effect of outsourcing
on the firm’s R&D investment is more than double the effect of the firm’s growth
opportunities (measured by market-to-book). I also confirm the results of previous
studies by Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) that higher CEO vega is associated
with higher R&D investment. However, in contrast with their results, I find higher
CEO delta also increases the firm’s R&D investment. CEO age and tenure do not
explain significantly the variations in firm R&D investment.
[INSERT TABLE 3.6 HERE]
Next, in Table 3.6, I investigate whether the effectivenesses of incentive align-
ment (CEO delta) and convexity (CEO vega) on inducing managerial risk-taking
vary with outsourcing intensity. In addition to the whole sample, I sort the sample
into four subsamples based on outsourcing intensity; the group of firms without
purchase contracts, the groups of firms with the low, medium, and high outsourcing
intensity. Then, I repeat the delta and vega regression analysis for each sample.
In the previous literature, the relation between CEO delta and risk-taking is
12I avoid using firm assets to scale R&D, because outsourcing firms, by definition, have fewer
fixed assets, and thus fewer total assets than comparable non-outsourcing firms.
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unclear, while the positive relation between CEO vega and risk-taking is relatively
robust (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006). This is because CEO delta has two differ-
ent effects on managerial risk-taking. First, the firm can induce optimal managerial
risk-taking, by aligning the manager’s incentives to shareholders’ value through high
CEO delta. Second, high CEO delta makes the manager to be more exposed to the
firm’s risks, so the manager’s incentives to take risks will also decrease. In Table 3.6,
I find that the effect of delta is unclear in the group of non-outsourcing firms and
the group of firms with greater shares of outsourcing. However, the effect of delta
is significant in (2), the mild outsourcing group. Also, the magnitude of the effect
in (2) is nearly twice as much as that in the whole sample. This indicates that
the incentive alignment scheme by increasing CEO delta functions well in the mild
outsourcing firms. This effect decreases as the intensity of outsourcing increases,
possibly because idiosyncratic risk rises with outsourcing intensity.
Regardless of outsourcing intensity, the effect of convexity on inducing R&D
investment appears to be strong and significant in all specifications. I find that the
effectiveness of convexity for increasing R&D investment is higher in the group of
non-outsourcing firms or intensive outsourcing firms. In contrast with the result of
CEO delta, the vega effectiveness increases as outsourcing intensity increases.
3.4.4 The Optimal Proportion of Equity-Based Compensation
Outsourcing has two effect on the proportional usage of equity-based com-
pensation. First, it increases firm-specific risk that managers can not completely
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diversify away. Therefore, if outsourcing firms grant equity-based compensation to
their CEOs, they need to pay more to compensate the increased risk. This may
justify the relatively higher CEO compensation in outsourcing firms than in non-
outsourcing firms. According to this argument, outsourcing firms may not prefer
equity-based compensation due to the possibly significant deadweight loss. Second,
outsourcing improves firm flexibility that enables the firm to increase the investment
level of R&D. Therefore, outsourcing firms are more likely to use equity-based com-
pensation so that they can reach higher levels of R&D investment more effectively.
Based on these two different effects of outsourcing, I examine how outsourcing firms
determine their compensation structure in this section.
I first examine whether the CEOs of the firms that increasingly use outsourc-
ing are more likely to diversify their risks by selling their equity shares granted. In
(1) of Table 3.7, I use probit models to test how an increase in outsourcing inten-
sity changes the probability that CEOs sell their equity shares. I control for the
lagged variables of stock returns, CEO delta, and CEO vega. The estimates show
that CEOs with high delta or high vega are more likely to sell their shares, and the
relation appears to be stronger for delta than vega. Even after controlling for stock
returns, CEO delta, and CEO vega, the estimated coefficient of ∆PO1year/COGS
is still large and significant. An outsourcing firm’s CEO is more likely to sell her
shares with a 4 percentage point increased probability, when the firm increases its
share of outsourcing by 0.1. This association is as much strong as the association
between stock returns and the probability that CEOs sell their equity shares.
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[INSERT TABLE 3.7 HERE]
The specification (2) in Table 3.7 presents the results for the effect of outsourc-
ing on the compensation structure. Firms use more equity-based compensation, as
their outsourcing intensity increases. A 0.1 increase in PO1year/COGS increases
the proportion of equity-based compensation in total compensation by about 1 per-
cent. It indicates that CEOs of the firms without purchase contracts receive about
10 percent lower compensation in the form of equity-based compensation than all-
outsourcing firms. In addition, I include a dummy variable of whether the firm’s
CEO has sold her shares in the previous fiscal year. I find that firms tend to grant
3 percentage point more equity-based compensation, when their CEOs sold their
shares in the previous year. This suggest that firms have an optimal compensation
structure, and re-adjust the proportion of equity-based compensation to their CEOs’
diversification behaviors.
In Table 3.8, I test the optimal trade-off between the benefits and costs of
granting equity-based compensation, by sorting my sample into four subsamples
based on CEO delta and vega; (1) low delta & low vega, (2) low delta & high vega,
(3) high delta & low vega, (4) high delta & high vega. High and low represents below
and above the median of each variable. The numbers of observations of two low-
high pairs among the four subsamples are much lower than that of the high-high or
low-low pair. This indicates that firms with high CEO delta are more likely to have
high CEO vega as well. Based on the previous literature, I conjecture that CEOs
in high delta groups are less diversified than those in low delta groups. Also, CEOs
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in high vega groups are less risk-averse than those in low vega groups, because their
wealth increases with higher stock return volatility. According to these arguments,
the costs of granting equity-based compensation will be the highest for the firms in
the high delta & low vega group (the specification (3)) among the four subsamples.
In contrast, the costs of granting such compensation will be lowest for the firms with
low delta & high vega (the specification (2)). Therefore, I expect that the effect of
outsourcing on the proportional usage of equity-based compensation will be larger
in the low delta & high vega group than in the high delta & low vega group.
[INSERT TABLE 3.8 HERE]
In Table 3.8, all the estimated coefficients of PO1year/COGS are positive,
but those are significant only in high CEO vega groups. Outsourcing has the most
significant impact (0.187) on the proportional usage of equity-based compensation,
when the firm’s CEO is in the low delta & high vega group. The effect decreases
to almost one third (0.0571) and becomes insignificant, when the firm’s CEO is in
the high delta & low vega group. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 3.3
that outsourcing firms use proportionally more equity-based compensation, and this
preference is pronounced when managers are more diversified and less risk-averse.
3.5 Conclusion
Using a new dataset of purchase obligations from firm 10-Ks to measure firm-
level outsourcing activity, I analyze CEO compensation in outsourcing firms. I first
document that outsourcing intensity plays an important role in explaining the cross-
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sectional variations in CEO compensation. Outsourcing firms pay higher compen-
sation to their CEOs than do non-outsourcing firms. Also, the higher compensation
mostly arises from the greater use of equity-based compensation. This paper ex-
plains how the relatively high level of CEO compensation and the greater use of
equity-based compensation in outsourcing firms can be justified.
Outsourcing firms are a special sample to examine compensation policies, be-
cause outsourcing has two different effects on the use of equity-based compensation.
First, outsourcing improves firm flexibility which enable the firm to increase their
risk tolerance and capacity in spendings. I find that outsourcing firms invest more
heavily in R&D, and thus they are more likely to depend on equity-based compen-
sation to induce more R&D investment from their managers.
Second, outsourcing increases the costs of granting equity-based compensation
at the same time. Outsourcing activity inevitably leads to making business relation-
ships with other firms, so they are more seriously exposed to other firm-specific risks
or international risks. I find that a firm’s idiosyncratic risk increases with the firm’s
outsourcing intensity. Therefore, outsourcing firm CEOs will require additional pre-
miums to compensate their increased risks, which may justify the higher level of
CEO compensation in outsourcing firms. The additional compensation is, in other
words, additional costs to the firm. Therefore, firms are more likely to refrain from
using equity-based compensation due to the additional costs.
Based on the above two effects of outsourcing, I show that the positive as-
sociation between outsourcing intensity and the use of equity-based compensation
depends on the relative costs of granting such compensation. I find that the positive
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impact of outsourcing on the use of equity-based compensation diminishes in the
firms with less diversified and more risk-averse CEOs. In contrast, the firms with
relatively diversified and less risk-averse CEOs use proportionally more equity-based
compensation in the total compensation package than do other firms.
Overall, my findings are consistent with outsourcing firms determining their
compensation level and structure based on the optimal trade-off between the in-
creased benefits and costs of granting equity-based compensation. My results also
provide new evidence that the dramatic executive pay rise in the manufacturing
sector might result from the sharp rise in outsourcing activity and the following




• PO1year/COGS is the total amount of purchase obligations due within 1 year,
scaled by costs of good sold.
• ∆ PO1year/COGS is the difference between PO1year/COGS and the value
in the prior year.
• Log(sales) is the log of sales.
• Log(1+age) is the log of one plus firm age, defined as a given year minus the
year when the firm first appeared in Compustat.
• NYSE size is the percentile of the firm’s market cap, based on Fama-French’s
NYSE breakpoints.
• M/B is market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Market value
of assets is market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock
plus debt (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) plus book value of
minority interest.
• ROA is net operating income divided by total assets in the prior year.
• R&D/sales is R&D expenditures divided by sales in the prior year.
• Book leverage are the ratio of total debt to the book value of assets.
• Stock return is annual stock returns calculated using 12 monthly stock returns
between June to May in the next year.
• Log(total risks) is the log of standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns
over the 252 trading days starting from June to May in the next year.
• Log(idiosyncratic risks) is the log of standard deviation of residuals from a
regression of the firm’s daily excess stock returns (raw returns less the risk-
less rate) on the Fama-French 3 factors. The regression uses daily stock returns
of a firm over the one year period from June to May in the next year and yield
one firm-year observation.
• Log(cash comp) is the log of dollar value of salary plus bonus.
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• Log(equity comp) is the log of dollar value of equity-based compensation includ-
ing restricted stock grants and stock option grants. I use recalculated option
value (OPTION AWARDS BLK VALUE adusted) following Coles, Daniel, and
Naveen (2010). They find that firms report their own valuation of option
grants in the post-FAS 123R period in OPTION AWARDS BLK VALUE. By
using the exact assumptions of the ExecuComp in the pre-FAS 123R period on
the Black-Sholes model parameters, the recalculated value of options awards
post-FAS 123R is comparable to that pre-FAS 123R. The assumptions of the
ExecuComp are available at the Wharton Data Research Services website
or Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2010). They find the method of adjustment
for pre-FAS 123R option value yields about 0.99 correlation with the OP-
TION AWARDS BLK VALUE reported by the ExecuComp.
• Log(total comp) is the log of dollar value of total direct compensation (TDC1).
TDC1 is recalculated for the post-FAS 123R value following Coles, Daniel,
and Naveen (2010). The redefined TDC1 post-FAS 123R is SALARY +
BONUS + NONEQ INCENT + OTHCOMP + STOCK AWARDS FV +
”OPTION AWARDS BLK VALUE adusted” + DEFER RPT AS COMP TOT,
while TDC1 pre-FAS 123R is SALARY + BONUS + OTHANN + ALLOTH-
TOT + RSTKGRNT + OPTION AWARDS BLK VALUE + LTIP.
• % Equity comp is the percentage point of dollar value of equity-based com-
pensation in dollar value of total direct compensation. ∈(0,1)
• CEO delta is the delta of current grants plus the delta of prior outstanding
grants. The delta of current grants is (Black-Sholes Delta of all current option
grants + number of shares of current restricted stock grants) × fiscal year-
end price × 0.01. The delta of prior grants is (Black-Sholes Delta of all prior
option grants + number of outstanding shares of prior restricted stock grants)
× fiscal year-end price × 0.01.
• CEO vega is the vega of current option grants plus the vega of prior outstand-
ing option grants. The vega of current option grants is Black-Sholes Vega of
all current option grants × fiscal year-end price × 0.01. The vega of prior
option grants is Black-Sholes Vega of all prior option grants × 0.01.
• the number of current restricted stock grants is RSTKGRNT(STOCK AWARDS FV)
divided by the fiscal year-end stock price in the pre-FAS 123R period (post-
FAS 123R period).
• the number of prior restricted stock grants is SHROWN EXCL OPTS.
• the number of current option grants is NUMSECUR from the Stock Option
Grants - 1992 format Table for the pre-FAS 123R period, and OPTS GRT
from the Plan-Based Awards Table for the post-FAS 123R period. The de-
tailed reference under the old and new SEC reporting requirement is in Hayes,
Lemmon, and Qiu (2012).
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• the number of prior outstanding option grants is OPT UNEX UNEXER NUM
plus OPT UNEX EXER NUM.
• Black-Sholes Delta is the first partial derivative of the option value with respect
to stock price. I follow Core and Guay (2002) method.
• Black-Sholes Vega is the first partial derivative of the option value with respect
to stock price volatility. I follow Guay (1999) method.
• Log(CEO age) is the log of executive age.
• Log(1+tenure) is the log of 1 plus the years between the given fiscal year and
the year that the executive became chief executive officer (becameceo).
• CEO sells share is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO sold shares of
her firm in the given fiscal year. Data on managers’ sale of shares are obtained
from Thomson Financial’s compilation of insider trades that are filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
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C.2 The U.S. Leading Seaports with Importing Trade
The Maritime Administration at the U.S. Department of Transportation pro-
vides the data for the U.S. waterborne custom ports.1 I use the trade statistics data
on U.S. waterborne foreign container trade by U.S. custom ports. The statistics
include both government and non-government shipments by vessel into and out of
U.S. foreign trade zones, the 50 states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The
statistics exclude shipments between the 50 states and Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, American Samoa and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands.
Among 90 ports with non-zero importing trade in 2010, I exclude the ports with
imports less than 500 TEUs. This gives 40 large seaports with significant importing
trade.2 The following figure plots locations of these seaports based on the latitudi-
nal and longitudinal positions. Also, Table C.1 provides the complete list of the 40
seaports.
Figure C.1: Map of 40 U.S. Leading Seaports with Importing Trade
1Fort (2011) has detailed description about this data. The data are available at
http://www.marad.dot.gov/.
2A TEU is a nominal unit of measure equivalent to a 20 x 8 x 8 shipping container. The cutoff
point in TEUs is not critical. In unreported tests, I use 50, 100 or 300 TEUs as a cutoff point and
find the similar results.
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Table C.1: 40 Leading U.S. Seaports for Importing Trade
Port Name State Imports (TEUs) Latitude Longitude
LOS ANGELES CA 3877969 33.72 -118.27
LONG BEACH CA 3048538 33.75 -118.20
NEW YORK NY 2622795 40.70 -74.02
SAVANNAH GA 1055195 32.08 -81.10
SEATTLE WA 888147 47.65 -122.33
OAKLAND CA 739542 37.83 -122.30
NORFOLK VA 721259 36.85 -76.32
CHARLESTON SC 548392 32.78 -79.93
HOUSTON TX 520881 29.75 -95.33
TACOMA WA 495755 47.25 -122.42
MIAMI FL 309201 25.77 -80.17
BALTIMORE MD 280097 39.28 -76.58
EVERGLADES FL 246083 26.08 -80.07
PHILADELPHIA PA 143631 39.95 -75.17
WILMINGTON DE DE 132495 39.75 -75.50
WILMINGTON NC NC 115011 34.23 -77.95
GULFPORT MS 104830 30.35 -89.08
JACKSONVILLE FL 93356 30.40 -81.38
BOSTON MA 79863 42.35 -71.08
NEW ORLEANS LA 78511 29.95 -90.07
PORTLAND OR OR 68597 45.53 -122.72
SAN DIEGO CA 49931 32.70 -117.17
CHESTER PA 45781 39.87 -75.43
MOBILE AL 35267 30.67 -88.03
FREEPORT TX 31092 28.95 -95.27
PALM BEACH FL 24148 26.77 -80.05
TAMPA FL 23090 27.92 -82.45
HUENEME CA 18272 34.15 -119.20
PANAMA CITY FL 14624 30.13 -85.67
MANATEE FL 11709 27.63 -82.55
GALVESTON TX 8135 29.28 -94.83
GLOUCESTER NJ 5249 42.62 -70.67
FORT PIERCE FL 3062 27.47 -80.32
EVERETT WA WA 2610 47.98 -122.25
RICHMOND VA VA 1801 37.45 -77.42
FERNANDINA BEACH FL 829 30.68 -81.47
BEAUMONT TX 674 30.08 -94.08
SOUTH LOUISIANA LA 647 30.00 -90.50
VANCOUVER WA 569 45.60 -122.67
LAKE CHARLES LA 557 30.22 -93.22
C.3 Distance to Port and First-stage Regressions
The following table presents summary statistics of distance between a firm and
the closest port by firm outsourcing intensity. In the table, PO1year/COGS=0 is
the group of firms without purchase contracts. Low, Medium, and High are the three
quantile groups with High being the most intense outsourcing activity. Distance to
port (in 100 miles) is calculated as the great-circle distance between firm and port
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location using latitude and longitude.
Table C.2: Distance between a firm and the closest port (in 100 miles)
Quantile(PO1year/COGS) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Distance to closest any port
PO1year/COGS=0 0.538 0.712 0.015 3.187
Low 0.566 0.738 0.003 4.001
Medium 0.47 0.681 0.004 3.324
High 0.43 0.614 0.002 2.923
Distance to closest seaport
PO1year/COGS=0 2.405 2.863 0.015 9.890
Low 2.526 2.754 0.004 9.928
Medium 2.095 2.662 0.004 9.458
High 1.778 2.661 0.002 11.478
Distance to closest airport
PO1year/COGS=0 0.635 0.748 0.016 3.337
Low 0.684 0.772 0.013 4.001
Medium 0.599 0.743 0.013 3.324
High 0.556 0.655 0.003 2.923
Distance to closest border
PO1year/COGS=0 2.925 2.07 0.182 10.746
Low 2.877 1.713 0.056 10.758
Medium 3.052 1.516 0.247 10.749
High 2.955 1.64 0.188 10.63
Table C.3 reports the first-stage regression results. Excluded instruments are
Distance to closest seaport, Distance to closest airport, Distance to closest border,
and PO1year/COGS (lagged). close to port is a dummy variable that equals 1, if
the distance to port is less than the mean distance to the port in the sample.
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Table C.3: First-Stage Regressions
Dependent variable: PO1year/COGS
(1) (2) (3)
Distance to closest seaport -0.00183∗ -0.00133∗∗
(-1.95) (-2.16)
Distance to closest airport -0.000271 0.0000793
(-0.12) (0.04)
Distance to closest border 0.00106 0.000521
(1.07) (0.56)
Close to seaport (dummy) 0.0122∗∗
(2.14)
Close to airport (dummy) -0.00148
(-0.40)
Close to border (dummy) -0.00569
(-1.46)
PO1year/COGS (lagged) 0.793∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗
(30.15) (30.38) (29.97)
Log(sales) 0.000512 0.000527 0.000622
(0.30) (0.31) (0.36)
Log(1+age) -0.00377 -0.00310 -0.00393
(-1.52) (-1.27) (-1.58)
M/B 0.00822∗∗ 0.00799∗∗ 0.00796∗∗
(2.52) (2.46) (2.44)
ROA -0.0288 -0.0298 -0.0289
(-1.06) (-1.09) (-1.06)
Stock return (lagged) 0.00183 0.00192 0.00163
(0.40) (0.42) (0.35)
Log(CEO age) -0.0149 -0.0155 -0.0140
(-1.01) (-1.04) (-0.95)
Log(1+tenure) -0.000633 -0.000388 -0.000712
(-0.28) (-0.17) (-0.32)
Log(CEO delta) (lagged) -0.00156 -0.00162 -0.00142
(-0.86) (-0.89) (-0.78)
Log(CEO vega) (lagged) 0.000948 0.00101 0.000828
(0.83) (0.88) (0.73)
Observations 3604 3604 3604
Adjusted R2 0.670 0.670 0.670
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Coastal Region dummy Yes No Yes
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Figure C.2: U.S. Coastal States
There are 4 coastal state regions in the United States. (1) Atlantic Ocean states: Maine, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Florida (2) Pacific Ocean states: California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Hawaii (3) Gulf
of Mexico states: Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas (4) Great Lake states: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota. I exclude Great Lake states dummy, because this region is not relevant with deep
water ports.
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Figure 3.1: CEO Compensation Level and Structure: Outsourcing Firms versus
Non-outsourcing Firms
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Figure 3.2: Outsourcing Intensity and R&D Investment
The figure illustrates the relations between outsourcing intensity and R&D investment. In the case depicted,
the optimal R&D level changes, as firms differ in outsourcing intensity. The firm with intense outsourcing uses more




Figure 3.3: Marginal Benefits and Costs of Granting Equity-based Compensation
The figure shows the relation between the marginal benefit and cost of using equity-based compensation. S∗ is
the optimal proportion of equity-based compensation in total compensation of a non-outsourcing firm. (a) depicts
the case of an outsourcing firm with a relatively diversified or less risk-averse manager. The shift of marginal benefit
curve exceeds the shift of marginal cost curve. Thus, the firm use proportionally more equity-based compensation.
(b) depicts the case of an outsourcing firm with a less diversified or more risk-averse manager. The shift of marginal
cost curve exceeds the shift of marginal benefit curve. The firm uses less equity-based compensation.
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(a) In the Apple Inc.’s 10-K for the fiscal year 2005
(b) In the Apple Inc.’s 10-K for the fiscal year 2008
Figure 3.4: Examples of Purchase Obligations Disclosures
Description of purchase obligations excerpted from the footnotes of the Apple Inc.’s 2008 10-K: “The Company
utilizes several contract manufacturers to manufacture sub-assemblies for the Companys products and to perform
final assembly and test of finished products. These contract manufacturers acquire components and build product
based on demand information supplied by the Company, which typically covers periods ranging from 30 to 150
days. The Company also obtains individual components for its products from a wide variety of individual suppliers.
Consistent with industry practice, the Company acquires components through a combination of purchase orders,
supplier contracts, and open orders based on projected demand information. Such purchase commitments typically
cover the Companys forecasted component and manufacturing requirements for periods ranging from 30 to 150
days. In addition, the Company has an off-balance sheet warranty obligation for products accounted for under
subscription accounting pursuant to SOP No. 97-2 whereby the Company recognizes warranty expense as incurred.
As of September 27, 2008, the Company had outstanding off-balance sheet third-party manufacturing commitments,
component purchase commitments, and estimated warranty commitments of $5.4 billion. During 2006, the Company
entered into long-term supply agreements with Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., Intel Corporation, Micron Technology,
Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and Toshiba Corporation to secure supply of NAND flash memory through
calendar year 2010. As part of these agreements, the Company prepaid $1.25 billion for flash memory components
during 2006, which will be applied to certain inventory purchases made over the life of each respective agreement.
The Company utilized $567 million of the prepayment as of September 27, 2008.”
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics on Firm Characteristics
The table reports the summary statistics on the selected firm characteristics. The sample consists of 822
manufacturing firms with the firm-level averages on each variable in the fiscal year period of 2004-2010. The sample
is sorted by outsourcing intensity into four subsamples; firms without purchase contracts and the three quantile
groups based on PO1year/COGS (Low, Medium, and High). Variables definitions are available in Appendix.
Quantile(PO1year/COGS) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
NYSE size (%)
PO1year/COGS=0 39.343 25.978 5 100 164
Low 45.784 27.152 5 100 215
Medium 49.608 28.068 5 100 215
High 51.345 30.492 5 100 215
Book leverage
PO1year/COGS=0 0.201 0.163 0 0.729 164
Low 0.217 0.148 0 0.679 215
Medium 0.187 0.15 0 0.699 215
High 0.158 0.157 0 0.729 215
M/B
PO1year/COGS=0 1.664 1.054 0.414 5.985 164
Low 1.504 0.820 0.494 5.412 215
Medium 1.694 0.91 0.46 5.659 215
High 2.051 1.215 0.601 6.843 215
Sales growth
PO1year/COGS=0 0.104 0.128 -0.123 0.734 164
Low 0.093 0.121 -0.267 0.558 215
Medium 0.104 0.121 -0.321 0.618 215
High 0.139 0.131 -0.211 0.769 215
R&D/sales
PO1year/COGS=0 0.066 0.114 0 0.657 166
Low 0.058 0.106 0 0.706 219
Medium 0.076 0.103 0 0.625 219
High 0.11 0.125 0 0.706 218
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics on Compensation Characteristics
The table reports the summary statistics on the selected compensation variables. The sample consists of 822
manufacturing firms with the firm-level averages on each variables in the fiscal year period of 2004-2010. The
sample is sorted by outsourcing intensity into four subsamples; firms without purchase contracts and the three
quantile groups based on PO1year/COGS (Low, Medium, and High). Variables definitions are available in
Appendix.
Quantile(PO1year/COGS) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Log(total comp)
PO1year/COGS=0 7.702 0.8 5.624 9.906 166
Low 7.983 0.867 6.055 10.017 219
Medium 8.106 0.84 5.614 9.612 219
High 8.045 0.989 5.614 10.07 218
Log(cash comp)
PO1year/COGS=0 6.651 0.477 5.451 8.093 166
Low 6.793 0.522 5.552 8.532 219
Medium 6.815 0.545 5.39 8.297 219
High 6.767 0.627 5.39 8.508 218
Log(equity comp)
PO1year/COGS=0 7.095 1.029 3.875 9.096 157
Low 7.248 1.145 4.411 9.724 214
Medium 7.534 0.976 4.604 9.388 213
High 7.504 1.173 3.783 9.817 213
% Equity comp
PO1year/COGS=0 39.562 19.287 0 91.288 166
Low 41.885 18.361 0 87.34 219
Medium 45.322 18.734 0 87.489 219
High 46.916 20.334 0 85.358 218
CEO delta ($000s)
PO1year/COGS=0 481.314 708.16 0 4669.464 163
Low 736.622 2501.219 2.006 33922.605 215
Medium 606.497 882.025 5.547 6697.142 215
High 947.730 2041.406 15.306 20928.076 215
CEO vega ($000s)
PO1year/COGS=0 112.643 191.749 0 1475.132 164
Low 154.451 216.418 0 1485.971 215
Medium 166.430 223.716 0 1371.888 215
High 217.627 366.096 0 3363.412 215
CEO sells share (dummy)
PO1year/COGS=0 0.34 0.316 0 1 166
Low 0.357 0.32 0 1 219
Medium 0.393 0.334 0 1 219
High 0.398 0.328 0 1 218
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Table 3.3: Outsourcing Intensity and CEO Pay
The table displays the effects of outsourcing intensity (PO1year/COGS) on the level of CEO compensation. The
dependent variables, (1) Log(total comp, (2) Log(cash comp, and (3) Log(equity comp are the logs of total direct
compensation, salary plus bonus, and equity-based compensation including restricted stocks and stock options
grants, respectively. Other variables are defined in Appendix. The sample consists of 822 manufacturing firms
with available firm-years data in the period of 2004-2010. Year, industry (in each three-digit SIC code), and
coastal region fixed effects are included in all specifications. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for
clustering at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) Log(total comp) (2) Log(cash comp) (3) Log(equity comp)
PO1year/COGS 0.226∗∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.0581 -0.00126 0.328∗∗ 0.354∗
(2.07) (2.07) (0.67) (-0.01) (2.24) (1.89)
Log(sales) 0.384∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(17.07) (17.04) (17.40) (17.44) (17.97) (17.91)
Log(1+age) -0.0386 -0.0379 -0.00150 -0.00229 -0.0865∗∗ -0.0861∗∗
(-1.38) (-1.36) (-0.07) (-0.10) (-2.32) (-2.31)
M/B 0.0747∗∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗ -0.0132 -0.0122 0.166∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(2.93) (2.88) (-0.79) (-0.74) (6.01) (5.97)
ROA 0.0334 0.0353 0.0125 0.0105 -0.447∗ -0.446∗
(0.17) (0.18) (0.11) (0.09) (-1.86) (-1.86)
Stock return (lagged) 0.118∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.0468∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.0764∗ 0.0761∗
(4.40) (4.38) (2.71) (2.74) (1.80) (1.79)
Log(CEO age) 0.0479 0.0479 0.321∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ -0.369∗ -0.369∗
(0.31) (0.31) (2.73) (2.73) (-1.81) (-1.81)
Log(1+tenure) -0.0545∗∗ -0.0543∗∗ 0.0135 0.0133 -0.114∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
(-2.53) (-2.52) (0.79) (0.78) (-3.88) (-3.88)
Log(CEO delta) (lagged) -0.0336 -0.0335 -0.0463∗∗∗ -0.0465∗∗∗ 0.0868∗∗∗ 0.0869∗∗∗
(-1.56) (-1.55) (-2.96) (-2.97) (3.12) (3.13)
Log(CEO vega) (lagged) 0.163∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.0889∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(5.90) (5.89) (4.74) (4.75) (6.19) (6.19)
Observations 3584 3584 3588 3588 3118 3118
Adjusted R2 0.649 0.649 0.631 0.631 0.598 0.598
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coastal region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation Method OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
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Table 3.4: Outsourcing Intensity and Total/Idiosyncratic Risks
The table displays the effects of outsourcing intensity (PO1year/COGS) on the risks of the firms. The dependent
variable, (1) Log(total risks is the log of standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 252 trading days starting
from June to May in the next year. The dependent variable, (2) Log(idiosyncratic risks is the log of standard
deviation of residuals from a regression of the firms daily excess stock returns on the Fama-French 3 factors, using
daily stock returns of a firm over the one year period from June to May in the next year. Other variables are
defined in Appendix. The sample consists of 822 manufacturing firms with available firm-years data in the period
of 2004-2010. Year, industry (in each three-digit SIC code), and coastal region fixed effects are included in all
specifications. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) Log(total risks) (2) Log(idiosyncratic risks)
PO1year/COGS 0.112∗∗ 0.0902∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(2.17) (2.46) (2.57) (2.44) (2.43) (2.74)
Log(sales) -0.0876∗∗∗ -0.0953∗∗∗ -0.0923∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗
(-15.14) (-20.18) (-18.60) (-15.65) (-19.37) (-17.78)
Log(1+age) -0.0536∗∗∗ -0.0371∗∗∗ -0.0331∗∗∗ -0.0698∗∗∗ -0.0562∗∗∗ -0.0541∗∗∗
(-4.99) (-3.73) (-3.15) (-5.84) (-4.85) (-4.33)
M/B -0.0230∗∗∗ -0.0160∗∗∗ -0.0247∗∗∗ -0.0241∗∗ -0.0242∗∗∗ -0.0346∗∗∗
(-2.74) (-2.59) (-3.58) (-2.49) (-3.43) (-4.31)
ROA -0.695∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.796∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗
(-6.16) (-5.72) (-5.13) (-5.87) (-5.92) (-5.39)
Stock return 0.201∗∗∗ 0.0537∗∗∗ 0.0771∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.0454∗∗∗ 0.0621∗∗∗
(5.86) (7.13) (9.80) (3.63) (5.21) (6.75)
Book leverage -0.0301 0.0945∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.0419 0.145∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(-0.53) (2.33) (2.38) (0.65) (3.00) (3.05)
Observations 754 4321 3583 758 4351 3609
Adjusted R2 0.637 0.703 0.724 0.633 0.623 0.630
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coastal region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation Method OLS-Between OLS IV OLS-Between OLS IV
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Table 3.5: Outsourcing Intensity and R&D
The table displays the effects of outsourcing intensity (PO1year/COGS) on R&D investment. The dependent
variable is R&D/sales which is R&D expenditures divided by sales in the prior year. Other variables are defined
in Appendix. The sample consists of 822 manufacturing firms with available firm-years data in the period of
2004-2010. Year, industry (in each three-digit SIC code), and coastal region fixed effects are included in all
specifications. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: R&D/sales
PO1year/COGS 0.0463∗ 0.0410∗∗ 0.0496∗∗ 0.0684∗∗∗ 0.0959∗∗∗
(1.66) (1.96) (2.37) (2.88) (3.74)
Log(sales) -0.00776∗∗∗ -0.0160∗∗∗ -0.0175∗∗∗ -0.0176∗∗∗
(-2.74) (-3.98) (-3.81) (-4.46)
Log(1+age) -0.00259 -0.00125 -0.000880 -0.00206
(-0.63) (-0.30) (-0.19) (-0.53)
M/B 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗
(5.00) (3.86) (3.94) (4.11)
ROA -0.394∗∗∗ -0.385∗∗∗ -0.397∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗
(-7.04) (-5.96) (-5.44) (-5.79)
Stock return (lagged) 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗
(4.19) (3.30) (3.09) (3.35)
Log(CEO age) -0.0247 -0.00781 -0.0288
(-0.98) (-0.28) (-1.20)
Log(1+tenure) -0.00356 -0.00121 -0.00324
(-0.85) (-0.25) (-0.78)
Log(CEO delta) (lagged) 0.00508∗∗ 0.00640∗∗ 0.00596∗∗
(2.16) (2.44) (2.56)
Log(CEO vega) (lagged) 0.00899∗∗∗ 0.00982∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗
(5.69) (6.28) (6.75)
Observations 4656 4604 3604 3580 3604
Adjusted R2 0.457 0.563 0.579 0.530
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coastal region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS Heckman IV
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Table 3.6: R&D and Risk-Taking Incentives
The table displays the effects of risk-taking incentives (Log(CEO delta) and Log(CEO vega)) on R&D investment.
The dependent variable is R&D/sales which is R&D expenditures divided by sales in the prior year. Other
variables are defined in Appendix. The sample consists of 822 manufacturing firms with available firm-years data
in the period of 2004-2010. In addition to the whole sample, the sample is sorted by outsourcing intensity into
four subsamples; firms without purchase contracts and the three quantile groups based on PO1year/COGS (Low,
Medium, and High). Year, industry (in each three-digit SIC code), and coastal region fixed effects are included in
all specifications. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: R&D/sales
Quantile(PO1year/COGS):
Whole Sample (1) PO1year/COGS=0 (2) Low (3) Medium (4) High
Log(CEO delta) (lagged) 0.00570∗∗ -0.00318 0.00932∗∗ 0.00754 0.00482
(2.39) (-0.57) (2.04) (1.49) (0.94)
Log(CEO vega) (lagged) 0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗
(7.02) (3.74) (3.24) (3.22) (4.65)
Log(sales) -0.0171∗∗∗ -0.0193∗∗ -0.0137∗ -0.0203∗ -0.0208∗∗∗
(-4.25) (-2.37) (-1.70) (-1.89) (-3.21)
Log(1+age) -0.00334 -0.00579 -0.0147∗∗ 0.00247 0.00244
(-0.83) (-0.49) (-2.22) (0.32) (0.28)
M/B 0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0134∗ 0.0441∗∗∗ 0.0103 0.0181∗∗
(4.59) (1.83) (3.41) (1.48) (2.49)
ROA -0.392∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗
(-6.01) (-3.07) (-3.36) (-2.78) (-4.67)
stock return (lagged) 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗ 0.00904 0.0141 0.0225∗∗
(3.55) (2.12) (1.10) (1.62) (2.07)
Log(CEO age) -0.0288 -0.125∗∗ -0.00474 -0.0493 0.00130
(-1.20) (-2.21) (-0.08) (-1.26) (0.03)
Log(1+tenure) -0.00367 -0.00434 -0.00334 -0.00166 0.00257
(-0.88) (-0.61) (-0.35) (-0.25) (0.31)
Observations 3604 692 949 966 997
Adjusted R2 0.525 0.476 0.565 0.452 0.556
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coastal region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.7: CEO Diversification and Equity-Based Compensation
The specification (1) examines the effect of an increase in outsourcing intensity (∆PO1year/COGS) on the
probability that CEOs sell their shares, using profit estimations. The dependent variable, CEO sells share is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO sold shares of her firm in the given fiscal year. The specification (2)
presents the effects of outsourcing intensity PO1year/COGS and diversifying action of the CEO in the prior year
(CEO sells share - lagged) on the proportional use of equity-based compensation. The dependent variable is %
Equity Comp which the proportion of dollar value of equity-based compensation in dollar value of total direct
compensation. Other variables are defined in Appendix. The sample consists of 822 manufacturing firms with
available firm-years data in the period of 2004-2010. In addition to the whole sample, the sample is sorted by
outsourcing intensity into four subsamples; firms without purchase contracts and the three quantile groups based
on PO1year/COGS (Low, Medium, and High). Year, industry (in each three-digit SIC code), and coastal region
fixed effects are included in all specifications. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for clustering at
the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) Dependent var: CEO sells share? (2) Dependent var: % Equity Comp
Whole Sample PO ever exists
PO1year/COGS 0.0728∗∗ 0.0932∗∗ 0.0920∗∗
(2.16) (2.21) (2.19)
CEO sells share (dummy-lagged) 0.0304∗∗∗
(3.21)
∆ PO1year/COGS 0.394∗ 0.385∗
(1.87) (1.79)
Log(sales) 0.00362 0.0467 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0183∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗
(0.11) (1.19) (3.10) (3.08) (3.18)
Log(1+age) -0.136∗∗ -0.175∗∗ -0.0136 -0.0133 -0.0123
(-2.21) (-2.57) (-1.42) (-1.39) (-1.29)
M/B (lagged) 0.0395 0.0213 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗
(1.51) (0.75) (3.16) (3.07) (2.89)
ROA (lagged) 0.302 0.190 0.0539 0.0544 0.0417
(1.26) (0.70) (1.22) (1.23) (0.97)
Stock return (lagged) 0.376∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ -0.00922 -0.00939 -0.0121
(6.90) (6.38) (-1.07) (-1.09) (-1.42)
Log(CEO age) -0.465 -0.501 -0.151∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(-1.62) (-1.57) (-3.00) (-3.00) (-2.94)
Log(1+tenure) 0.248∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ -0.0409∗∗∗ -0.0408∗∗∗ -0.0425∗∗∗
(5.88) (6.43) (-6.19) (-6.18) (-6.39)
Log(CEO delta) (lagged) 0.0948∗∗∗ 0.0894∗∗ 0.0000791 0.000142 -0.00116
(2.68) (2.12) (0.01) (0.02) (-0.19)
Log(CEO vega) (lagged) 0.0784∗∗∗ 0.0522∗ 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0459∗∗∗
(3.03) (1.65) (8.59) (8.56) (8.69)
Observations 3520 2812 3564 3564 3564
Pseudo / Adjusted R2 0.126 0.131 0.261 0.261 0.264
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coastal Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation Method Probit Probit OLS IV IV
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Table 3.8: Outsourcing and % of Equity-Based Compensation over Different CEO
Delta-Vega
The table displays the effects of outsourcing intensity (PO1year/COGS) on the proportional usage of equity-based
compensation. The dependent variable is % Equity Comp which the proportion of dollar value of equity-based
compensation in dollar value of total direct compensation. Other variables are defined in Appendix. The sample
consists of 822 manufacturing firms with available firm-years data in the period of 2004-2010. In addition to
the whole sample, the sample is sorted by CEO delta and CEO vega into four subsamples; Low-Low, Low-High,
High-Low and High-High groups of CEO delta-vage. Year, industry (in each three-digit SIC code), and coastal
region fixed effects are included in all specifications. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for
clustering at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: % Equity Comp
Whole Sample (1) Low Delta (2) Low Delta (3) High Delta (4) High Delta
Low Vega High Vega Low Vega High Vega
PO1year/COGS 0.108∗∗∗ 0.118 0.187∗ 0.0571 0.114∗
(2.59) (1.46) (1.89) (0.47) (1.86)
Log(sales) 0.0219∗∗∗ 0.0374∗∗∗ 0.0264∗ 0.0443∗∗ 0.00907
(3.75) (4.15) (1.77) (2.23) (0.95)
Log(1+age) -0.0153 -0.0144 -0.00546 -0.0498 -0.00709
(-1.64) (-0.95) (-0.26) (-1.50) (-0.46)
M/B 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.0216∗ 0.0304 0.0201 0.0272∗∗∗
(3.32) (1.88) (1.61) (1.03) (3.07)
ROA -0.149∗∗∗ -0.0608 -0.200 -0.265 -0.348∗∗∗
(-3.06) (-0.84) (-1.51) (-1.32) (-4.75)
Stock return (lagged) -0.0177∗ -0.0383∗∗∗ -0.0441 -0.00323 -0.0331
(-1.72) (-2.61) (-1.45) (-0.11) (-1.36)
Log(CEO age) -0.155∗∗∗ -0.127 -0.382∗∗∗ -0.123 -0.0912
(-3.10) (-1.65) (-3.28) (-0.83) (-1.08)
Log(1+tenure) -0.0401∗∗∗ -0.0524∗∗∗ -0.0113 -0.0648∗∗∗ -0.0348∗∗∗
(-6.09) (-4.64) (-0.48) (-2.74) (-3.68)
Log(CEO delta) (lagged) 0.00294 0.0344∗∗∗ -0.0547 -0.0418 0.0191
(0.51) (2.82) (-1.00) (-1.64) (1.34)
Log(CEO vega) (lagged) 0.0447∗∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0857∗ 0.0507∗∗∗ 0.0122
(8.36) (2.73) (1.74) (4.56) (0.84)
Observations 3584 1353 433 402 1396
Adjusted R2 0.261 0.185 0.145 0.327 0.157
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coastal region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV IV
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